Showing posts with label MAS-IPSP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MAS-IPSP. Show all posts

Sunday, May 19, 2019

The TIPNIS case: International tribunal faults Bolivia, calls for reparations

Leading environmentalists find government violated Rights of Nature and Indigenous peoples as defenders of Mother Earth

[The following news release was issued May 15 by the International Rights of Nature Tribunal, a body created in 2013 pursuant to a recommendation of the first World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, held in April 2010 in Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia. That conference was sponsored by the Bolivian government headed by President Evo Morales.]

On May 15, the International Rights of Nature Tribunal (hereinafter the Tribunal) released on its website its ruling regarding alleged violations of the Rights of Nature in the case of the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) in Bolivia.

The TIPNIS case was presented by representatives of Subcentral TIPNIS and the TIPNIS women’s organization before the Tribunal during its session in Bonn, Germany, on November 7 and 8 of 2017. The Tribunal agreed to try the case in January 2018 and decided to send an International Observer Commission to Bolivia to determine the facts and meet with all parties involved. Following a visit to Bolivia, the Commission — comprising Alberto Acosta (Ecuador), Shannon Biggs (USA), Enrique Viale (Argentina) and Hana Begovic (Sweden) — presented its report in January 2019. That report is the basis of the Tribunal’s ruling, which concludes that, in the TIPNIS case, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has violated the Rights of Nature and of Indigenous peoples as defenders of Mother Earth and failed to comply with its obligation to respect, protect, and guarantee the Rights of Mother Earth as established under national legislation and relevant international regulations (p.82).

The French naturalist Alcides D’Orbigny (1802-1857) called the region now known as TIPNIS “the most beautiful jungle in the world.” This territory became the “Loma Santa” in the “Casa Grande” where the Mojeño Trinitarios, Yuracares, and Tsimanes Indigenous peoples sought refuge during the “rubber rush” in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The region was declared a national park in 1965, and in 1990, after the first indigenous March for Territory and Dignity, it assumed the double status of national park and Indigenous territory. On February 13, 2009, the Yuracaré, Tsimane, and Moxeño Trinitario peoples obtained the deed for 1,091,656 hectares, a small fraction of the initial request due to settlements by Andean migrants and the use of the valleys for coca leaf plantations in the area known as “Polygon 7” of TIPNIS.

In 2008, the government of Evo Morales hired the Brazilian company OAS to build a highway that would divide the protected area of TIPNIS without ever carrying out a comprehensive environmental impact assessment of the three sections into which the road fragmented the park.

In October 2011, the Eighth Indigenous March, after being repressed by police forces in the town of Chaparina, achieved the enactment of Law 180 for the protection of TIPNIS, Article 3 of which expressly prohibited the Villa Tunari-San Ignacio of Moxos road or any other road crossing TIPNIS.

Six years later, in 2017, Law 180 was repealed by Law 969, which is what led this case to be presented before the International Rights of Nature Tribunal.

The report by the International Observer Commission that visited Bolivia from August 15 to 23 of 2018, presented sufficient evidence that the highway will expand the deforestation already present in Polygon 7, lead to the expansion of coca leaf production, and affect biodiversity, causing the irreparable loss of natural beings. The report also presents evidence that there was no consultation for the free, prior, and informed consent in good faith of the Indigenous peoples of TIPNIS, and that the colonization processes in Polygon 7 is already having negative impacts on life of these people.

Based on all of this evidence, the International Rights of Nature Tribunal deems proven the allegation that the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and in particular the Government of Evo Morales Ayma, have violated the rights of Mother Earth in the TIPNIS case. Likewise, the Tribunal believes that the Bolivian State has violated the collective and individual rights of the nations and Indigenous peoples of TIPNIS.

The Tribunal’s sentence proposes several reparations to be made immediately, including:

  • An immediate and definitive end to any type of progress in the construction of road infrastructure in “Section II” from Isinuta to Monte Grande in the interior of TIPNIS.
  • The repeal of Law No. 969 and the subsequent preparation and enactment of a law guaranteeing the conservation and protection of TIPNIS.
  • The recognition of the territorial rights and autonomy of the area of the former Bosque de Chimanes forest concessions in favor of a Multiethnic Indigenous Territory (TIM, for its initials in Spanish), to guarantee the control and management of the northern zone of TIPNIS.
  • The adoption of effective measures to halt the advance of colonization toward the central area of TIPNIS.
  • The cancellation of plans for oil expansion in TIPNIS.
  • The identification and punishment of those responsible for human rights violations in Chaparina in 2011.
  • The recognition of the State’s responsibility in the lack of justice so far and a public apology by the president of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
  • The implementation of the Mother Earth Ombudsman’s Office, which has yet to begin operating nine years after its establishment under Law No. 71.
  • The cessation of all pressure designed to discipline and control organizations that defend Mother Earth and the issuance of guarantees to fulfill this task, which is essential for the reproduction of life on Earth.

The International Rights of Nature Tribunal was created in 2013. Its sentences are based primarily on the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth adopted at the first World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which was held in April 2010 in Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia. The Tribunal’s resolutions and sentences have an ethical character that is essential for building a true Earth community to prevent a sixth extinction of life on Earth. Without ethics, no government, institution, or person can recover the humanity that is needed now more than ever to prevent the collapse of the Earth’s vital cycles.

The Tribunal is made up of judges of recognized ethical and scientific authority regarding the Rights of Nature that have been appointed by defenders of Mother Earth from different parts of the world. In the particular case of this sentence and given that the Morales administration promotes the rights of Mother Earth internationally, it has requested that the sentence be reviewed and signed by other judges who have participated in different hearings by the International Rights of Nature Tribunal. The members of the Extended Tribunal listed as signatories are:

Tom Goldtooth (Dine’ and Dakota, USA), Cormac Cullinan (South Africa), Vandana Shiva (India), Osprey Orielle Lake (USA), Simona Fraudatario (Italy), Fernando “Pino” Solanas (Argentina), Ute Koczy (Germany), Yaku Pérez (Kichwa, Ecuador), Blanca Chancoso (Kichwa, Ecuador), Maristella Svampa (Argentina), Ruth Nyambura (Kenya), Nnimmo Bassey (Nigeria), Ashish Kothari (India), Enrique Leff (Mexico), Francesco Martone (Italy), Antoni Pigrau (Catalonia), Casey Camp Horinek (Ponca, USA), Antonio Elizalde (Chile), Horacio Machado Aráoz (Argentina), Rita Segato (Argentina), Valerie Cabanes (France), Arturo Escobar (Colombia), Rocío Silva Santiesteban (Peru), Patricia Gualinga (Kichwa Sarayaku), Atossa Soltani (USA, Iran), and Mario Melo (Ecuador).

* * *

Note: The full text of the tribunal’s judgment may be downloaded here in Spanish and English. The English translation is legible albeit apparently unrevised in a few places. For example, the last sentence in para. 48 should read that “57 of the 58 [communities consulted] indicated their rejection of intangibility,” if it is to correspond with the original Spanish text.

The tribunal’s judgment is, as it says, “ethical” and is not binding on the Bolivian government. For the government’s initial response to the 2011 TIPNIS protests, see Geopolitics of the Amazon, by Vice-President Álvaro Garcia Linera, published in English translation in several posts on this website and subsequently as a pamphlet in pdf format by Climate & Capitalism.

Wednesday, February 14, 2018

Latin America: End of a golden age?

Franck Gaudichaud interviews Miriam Lang and Edgardo Lander

Translated from the Spanish text published in Viento Sur, January 23, 2018

Following their participation in the international symposium that we coordinated last June on “Progessive governments and post-neoliberalism in Latin America: End of a golden age?” at the University of Grenoble, France,[1] we thought it would be worthwhile going back over the Latin American context with the sociologists Edgardo Lander (Venezuela) and Miriam Lang (Ecuador). Both of them have a sharp critical view, very often at odds concerning the present scene, and both have participated actively in recent years in the debates on the initial balance sheets of the progressive governments of 1998-2015, in particular those of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Miriam’s case[2] and of the Transnational Institute in Edgardo’s case.[3]

For example, they have written probingly on such topics as the problematics of development and the state, neocolonialism and extractivism, the lefts and the social movements, and both have tackled the difficult issue of conceiving roads of emancipation at times in which humanity is going through a profound ecosystemic crisis of civilization, challenges that mean, inter alia, re-inventing the left and (eco)socialism in the 21st century. -- FG

Franck Gaudichaud: In the recent period there have been many debates concerning the end of a cycle of progressive and national-popular governments in Latin America, or rather their possible retreat and loss of political hegemony. What are your thoughts about this debate? From where you stand, can we say that this debate is going beyond the question of an end to a cycle? And what can we say about the present situation compared with the progressive experience from 1999 to 2015?

Edgardo Lander: This is indeed a very intense debate, especially in Latin America, because there had been many expectations about the possibilities for profound transformation in these societies beginning with the victory of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998. That was the point of departure of a process of political change that led to the majority of the governments in South America being identified with something referred to as progressive or left-wing in one of their versions. These expectations of transformations that will lead to post-capitalist societies posed severe challenges both in terms of the negative experience of the socialisms of the last century and in terms of new realities like climate change and the limits of the planet Earth that it was necessary to confront. To think about transformation today necessarily means something very different from what it meant in the past century. At a time when the discourse of socialism had practically disappeared from the political grammar in much of the world, it reappears in this new historical moment in South America. Based especially on the struggles of the indigenous peoples, some of these processes seem to incorporate in a very central way a profound questioning of fundamental aspects of what had constituted socialism in the 20th century. Centrally present in part of the imaginaries of the transformation were themes like pluriculturalism, different forms of relationship with the other networks of life, notions of the rights of nature, and conceptions of buen vivir that pointed to a possibility of transformation that could take into account the limitations of the previous processes and open new horizons to address the new conditions of humanity and the planet.

FG: So, we’re talking about the initial period, the beginning, in the early 2000s, when resistance from below was combined with the creation of socio-political dynamics more or less rupturist and post-neoliberal depending on the case, which also happened to emerge on the national electoral and governmental plane.

EL: Yes, in a period in which extraordinary hopes were developing that radical transformations were beginning in society. In the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, the new governments were a result of the processes of accumulation of forces of social movements and organizations fighting neoliberal governments. The experience of the Indigenous Uprising in Ecuador and the Water War in Bolivia were expressions of societies in movement in which social sectors that were not the most typical in the political action of the left played protagonistic roles. It was a plebeian emergence, social sectors previously invisibilized, indigenous, peasants, urban popular forces, that came to occupy a central place in the political arena. This gave rise to extraordinary expectations.

However, over time severe obstacles appeared. Despite the high-flown rhetoric, important sectors of the left that had leading roles in those processes of struggle had not submitted the experience of 20th century socialism to sufficiently critical thinking. Many of the old ways of understanding leadership, party, vanguard, relations between state and society, economic development, relations with the rest of nature, as well as the weight of the Eurocentric monocultural and patriarchal cosmovisions were present in those processes of change. The historic colonial forms of insertion in the international division of labour and nature were deepened. Obviously, any project that aims at overcoming capitalism in the present world must necessarily deal with the harsh challenges posed by the profound crisis of civilization now facing humanity, in particular the hegemonic logic of endless growth of modernity that has come to overload the planet’s capacity and is undermining the conditions that make possible the reproduction of life.

The experience of the so-called progressive governments is occurring in times in which neoliberal globalization is accelerating, and China is becoming the workshop of the world and the major economy on the planet. That produces a qualitative leap in the demand for and price of commodities: energy resources, minerals and products of agro-industry such as soy. In these conditions, each of the progressive governments has opted to finance the promised social transformations via the deepening of predatory extractivism. This has not only the obvious implications that the productive structurerof these countries is not questioned but also that it is deepened in terms of the neocolonial forms of insertion in the international division of labour and nature. Also, the role of the state is increased as the major recipient of income from the rents produced through the export of commodities. Thus, over and above what the constitutional texts say about plurinationality and interculturalism, there is an overriding conception of the transformation centered primarily on the state and the identification of the state with the common good. This inevitably leads to conflicts over territories, indigenous and peasant rights, struggles for the defence of and acess to water, and resistance to megamining. These popular and territorial struggles have been viewed by these governments as threats to the national project presented, designed and led by the state as representing the national interest. To carry forward their neo-developmentalist projects in the face of this resistance governments have resorted to repression and are taking on increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Defining from the centre which are the priorities, and viewing anything that stands in the way of this priority as a threat, there is established a logic of raison d’état that requires the undermining of the resistance.

In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador this has led to a certain demobilization of the major social organizations as well as divisions promoted by the government in the movements, which has resulted in fragmentations of their social fabric and weakened the democratic transformative energy that characterized them.

FG: In contrast to this analysis, and particularly to what you say about raison d’état, militants and intellectuals participating in those processes as part of the governments and members of pro-government parties argue that in the last analysis the only way to pursue an authentic post-neoliberal course in Latin America was, first, to recover the state through the social and plebeian mobilizations that overthrew the old party-based elites, and after overwhelming anti-oligarchic electoral victories begin using the state (but with links to those below) to distribute and reconstitute the possibility of a “real” alternative to neoliberalism.

Miriam Lang: Before getting into that, I would like to go over again what Edgardo said, because the term “end of cycle” suggests somewhat that we are looking at the whole region in light of the Argentine and Brazilian experience where the Right has indeed come back. However, a more appropriate reading would be to look at how the project of transformation has changed during the years of progressive governments and why now we are in all respects in a different situation than we were 10 or 15 years ago, including in those countries where there are still progressives in the government, as in Bolivia or Ecuador. I am referring to what some call the transformation of the transformations and also the diversity of political tendencies that make up those governments, in which the transformative lefts are not in fact necessarily hegemonic but where the processes have become successful projects of modernization of capitalist relations and insertion in the global market.

FG: After all, you both have a clear critical position on the international division of labour, commodities, the use of extractivism, the problem of the state (often authoritarian and clientelist even today), phenomena that have certainly not disappeared and have even been consolidated in various ways under the progressive governments. But you do not mention here the balsas familia [family allowances], the big reduction in poverty and inequality, the incorporation of subaltern social classes into politics, the reconstruction of basic service systems, of public health, the spectacular growth of infrastructures, etc. during the decade-long golden age of the progressive governments. In short, if I can act as a spokesman for the logic of García Linera, the Bolivian vice-president, you would be those “coffee-shop critics” that he denounces[4] as not having a genuine empathy toward the popular sectors and their day-to-day living conditions. That is, to say the least, a classic argument of the progressive government supporters in their present debate with the critical left.

ML: Well, it depends somewhat on how each of us looks at the reality. If you look, for example, at the new constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador, the transformation project delineated therein goes much further than the reduction of poverty. The previous social struggles, whatever they sought, went much further than a small distribution of income. In saying that I do not want to ignore the fact that the day-to-day life of many people has become easier, at least in those years of high prices for hydrocarbons. But we also have to look beyond the poverty statistics. We can say that so many people have risen above the poverty line, and that’s great, but we can also take a closer look and ask what type of poverty are we talking about? In Latin America poverty is still measured in terms of incomes and consumption; this measures to what degree a household is participating in the capitalist way of life and possibly it says a little about the quality of life of that household. What it does not reveal is the dimensions of the subsistence economies, the dimensions of the quality of human relations, etc. To what degree were people able to really express their needs according to their context? To what degree have these policies of redistribution of income strengthened or expanded territorially the logics of the capitalist market in countries where a large part of the population, because of the enormous cultural diversity that exists, still did not live completely under capitalist precepts?

We could say that this diversity of ways of life constituted a significant transformative potential in terms of horizons for overcoming capitalism. And if we look at the ecological conditions of the planet, many peasant, indigenous, Black or popular urban communities, instead of being labelled as poor or underdeveloped, could have been viewed as examples of how we can consume less and be more satisfied. However, what has happened is precisely what I call the “mechanism of underdevelopment”;[5] in the context of “ending poverty” they are told: your way of life, which requires so little money, is undignified, you have to become more like the urban, capitalist, consumerist population that has to manage money, and the form of exchange in the capitalist market, no other forms of exchange are valid. So-called financial literacy, which was part of the progressive anti-poverty policy, has helped financial capital to establish new credit markets among the poorest people and at much higher interest rates. And the famous introduction to consumption tends to occur in third-rate conditions. So in the end, we have populations that are indebted through consumption because needs have been generated for them that they may not have had in the past. So it depends a little on how we look at these things. It’s a problem of values and perspective, of how we want future generations to live. It’s not simply a question of democratizing consumption; the commitment was to build a world that is sustainable for at least five, six, seven generations to come, and I have serious doubts as to whether this form of erradicating poverty has contributed to those objectives.

EL: In the Venezuelan case, the use of the petroleum rent in a form that differed from how it had been used historically had huge consequences during the first decade of the Chávez government. Social spending came to represent something like 70 percent of the national budget. This public expenditure on health, education, food, housing and social security effectively signified a profound transformation in the living conditions of a majority of the population. Venezuela, which like the rest of Latin America has historically been a country of deep inequalities, not only reduced poverty levels quite significantly (measured by monetary income), but it also managed to sharply reduce inequality. The CEPAL [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLA, a UN regional commission] has pointed out that Venezuela came to be, along with Uruguay, one of the two least unequal countries on the continent. This was a very major transformation, and it was expressed in such vital matters as a reduction in infant mortality and an increase in the weight and height of children. These are not in any way secondary issues.

On the other hand, this was accompanied from the political standpoint by processes of very broadly based popular organization in which millions of people participated. Some of the most important social policies were designed in such a way that they required the organization of the people in order to function. The best example of this was the Barrio Adentro Mission, a primary healthcare service providing broad coverage to the popular sectors throughout the country, and made possible principally by the participation of Cuban doctors. It was a program that held out the possibility of other forms of understanding public policies in a non-clientelist way that required the participation of the people.

With Barrio Adentro, important steps were begun to transform the country’s healthcare system. It went from a medical system that was fundamentally hospital-based to a decentralized regime with primary services located in the local communities. From a situation in which, for example, a child who was dehydrated in a Caracas neighborhood in the middle of the night had to be transferred, outside the public transit schedule, to the nearest hospital, where the family had to deal with the tragic scenes in the emergency wards, to a situation in which the primary care module, where the physician lives, is a short distance from the child’s home and at any time one can knock on the door and be attended to.

Barrio Adentro was conceived as a project that required community participation in order to function. The doctor, alone, especially if he or she was a Cuban who did not know the neighborhood or the city, could only work with support from the community. This meant, among other things, conducting a census of the community, identifying the women who were pregnant, the children with problems of undernourishment, the elderly, and in general the people with special needs. This was a conception of social policy completely different from some gift from above because it made the community a co-participant in its operation. There was in this dynamic an extraordinarily rich potentiality.

FG: So, has this constituent potentiality, disruptive of the process, been exhausted? Is that what you are saying?

EL: During the years covered by the Bolivarian process not only has the country’s productive structure not been altered but the country has become more highly dependent on petroleum exports. The public policies directed to the popular sectors have been characterized at all times by their distributive character, with a very limited drive toward alternative productive processes to petroleum extractivism. This dependency on high petroleum revenues imposed severe limits on the Bolivarian process.[6]

The dynamic, motivating nature of the popular organizational processes of the public policies was exhausted for various reasons. First, because not all of the Missions (the generic name for the various social programs) were given the resources they had in such areas as the literacy program and Barrio Adentro. But also because the larger-scale organizational processes including the Communal Councils and Communes were processes in which there was always a strong tension between the tendencies toward self-government, autonomy, self-organization, etc., and the fact that almost all the projects that these organizations could carry out depended on transfers of resources from above, from some state institution. This has generated a recurrent tension between the political-financial control from above and the possibilities for more autonomous self-organization. These tensions have operated in quite varied ways, depending on the existing conditions in the location: whether or not local leaderships were present previously; whether or not the community had had experiences in organizing themselves politically prior to the Bolivarian process; and the political conceptions of the functionaries and militants of the PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela) responsible for relations between the state institutions and these organizations.

The fact is that there has been an extraordinary dependence on the transfer of resources from the state. Most of the popular base organizations had no possibility of autonomy because they lacked their own productive capacity. When the transfers of resources to these organizations declined with the onset of the present economic crisis in 2014, they tended to weaken and many of them went into crisis. Another factor in this weakening has been the creation of the Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP) as a mechanism for the distribution of highly subsidized basic food products to the popular neighorhoods. In practice, these have become clientelist organizational methods dedicated exclusively to the distribution of food and lacking any autonomy, and they tend to replace the Communal Councils.

The policies of Latin American solidarity and cooperation have also been highly dependent on petroleum revenues. To carry out international programs like the subsidized provision of oil to Central American and Caribbean countries, or the financial support to Bolivia and Nicaragua, and various other initiatives taken by the Venezuelan government in the Latin American context, it was necessary to guarantee an increase in oil revenues in both the short and medium term. When Chávez passed away in 2013, petroleum accounted for 96 percent of the total value of the exports, and the country was more dependent on oil than it had ever been.

In the history of the Venezuelan oil industry, the first decade of this century was the moment in which there were the best conditions possible for Venezuelan society to debate, think about, and begin to experiment with other practices and other possible futures beyond petroleum. It was a privileged moment for addressing the challenges of the transition toward a post-petroleum society, a conjuncture in which Chávez counted on an extraordinary leadership and legitimacy. He had the ability to give Venezuelan society a sense of direction, and, with oil prices as high as US$140 a barrel, the resources existed to meet the needs of the population and take, albeit initially, steps to a post-petroleum transition. But the opposite occurred. In those years there was a repetition of the intoxication with affluence, the imaginary of the Saudi Venezuela that had characterized the time of the first Carlos Andrés Pérez government in the 1970s.

No one in Venezuela thought it was possible to decree the shutdown of all the oil wells overnight. But government policies, far from taking steps, even timid and initial steps, to overcome dependency on oil, served to deepen that dependency. In conditions of an over-abundance of foreign exchange, with an end to any attempt to slow down capital flight, an absolutely unsustainable controlled exchange rate parity was established. This had the effect of accentuating the so-called Dutch disease, contributing to the dismantling of the country’s productive capacity.

The income distribution programs and the state political initiatives did improve the living conditions of the population and they helped to strengthen the social fabric, with plenty of experiences of popular participation. However, this was not accompanied by a project of transformation of the country’s productive structure. This marked the limits of the Bolivarian process as a project of transformation of Venezuelan society. It means that the broadly-based organizing processes that had involved millions of people were based on redistribution and not on the creation of new productive processes.

FG: Now, again referring to García Linera (as he sometimes summarizes more intelligently what other opinion-makers, followers, and what I call palace intellectuals are trying to say and write along these lines) – according to this Bolivian sociologist and government leader these tensions between state and self-organization, between government and movements, between the demand for buen vivir and extractivism, in the short term, are normal creative tensions in a long process of revolutionary transformation in Latin America. In his view, the radical left critics of the progressive processes do not understand that they are necessary tensions, and he alleges that they want to proclaim socialism by decree.

ML: One problem is that the progressive governments, to the degree that their members came from social movement processes and protests with a left-wing political identity, have taken on a sort of vanguard identity, as if they know what people need. So spaces for real dialogue and partnership with people of a diverse nature have been lost. And political participation has become a type of applause for whatever project the government leaders are proposing. That’s exactly where there is an impoverishment. There are many examples in European history that incline me to think this is an inevitable dynamic, one that we underestimate a lot. The lefts that come to lead in the state apparatus end up immersed in powerful dynamic characteristic of those apparatuses and they are transformed as persons, through the new spaces in which they move, because the logics of their responsibilities provide them with other experiences and begin to shape their political horizons as well as their culture. Their subjectivity is transformed, they embody the exercise of power. And then, if there is no corrective on the part of a strong organized society, that can complain, correct, protest, and criticize, that necessarily has to divert the project.

On the other hand, it is not so much a question of criticizing the time it takes to change things – because in this, I agree, profound transformations need much time, they need a cultural change and this can take generations. It’s a question of looking at the directionality that a political project takes, that is, whether it is going in the right direction or not, at its rhythm. And here I think the question of deepening extractivism and finishing off nature in a country simply cancels out other possibilities of future transformation. If we are closing off certain future options that mattered to us through more short-term calculations, or because of difficulties that occur at the time, then we cannot say it is a question of a temporary nature; it is a question of directionality. You can commercialize or decommercialize, but if you say first I am going to commercialize everything and later decommercialize, it doesn’t seem to me there is much logic. If you say I am decommercializing but I am going to take more time, however here they can see that I am taking steps in the direction indicated, that would be fine. So that way, I think there is a fundamental difference in the reading of the processes.

EL: In the critical debates on extractivism, one of the things I think is essential is, What do we mean by extractivism? If we think of extractivism simply as an economic model, or as Álvaro García Linera says as “a technical relation with nature” that is compatible with any model of society, it could be concluded that it is necessary to deepen extractivism not only in order to meet social demands but also for the purpose of accumulating the necessary resources to invest in alternative productive activities that can help to overcome extractivism. But if extractivism is undertood in broader terms, if it is understood as a relationship of human beings with nature, that it is part of a pattern of accumulation of global capital, a specific form of insertion in the world capitalist system and the international division of labour and nature, and that extractivism generates and reproduces some definite institutionalities, some state models, some behavioural patterns of the state bureaucracy; and if it is understood that extractivism generates social subjects and subjectivities, that it builds a culture, you necessarily reach different conclusions.

Suffice it to look at the hundred years of extractivism in Venezuela. We have established an extremely deep culture as a rich country, an affluent country. Since we have the biggest petroleum reserves on the planet we deserve to have the state satisfy not only our needs but also our aspirations as consumers. We imagine that it is possible to be a society with rights but not responsibilities. We deserve to have free gasoline. These cultural patterns, once they are firmly rooted in the collective imagination, constitute a severe obstacle to a possible transformation not only to overcome capitalism but to confront the crisis of civilization that humanity is now going through. These imagineries of ever-growing material abundance serve to sustain economist/consumerist conceptions of life that leave out a wide range of fundamental matters that we have to confront today. This blocks the possibility of recognizing that the decisions that are taken today have long-term consequences that differ absolutely from what is proclaimed in the official discourse as the future horizon for Venezuelan society.

Based on this gilded imaginery of a land of infinite abundance, large-scale mining in the so-called Arco Minero del Orinoco, for example, is deemed necessary. Through a presidential decree Nicolás Maduro in early 2016 decided to open up 112 thousand square kilometers, a territory the size of Cuba, 12 percent of the national territory, to the major transnational mining companies. This is an area that forms part of the Amazon forest (with the importance this has in the regulation of global climate systems); an area inhabited by various indigenous peoples whose territories were to be demarcated under the 1999 Constitution and whose culture, and their life, is now severely threatened; a territory in which a major portion of the basins of the principal rivers in the country, the principal sources of fresh water, a territory of extraordinary biological diversity, and in which hydro-electricity dams that produce 70 percent of the country’s electricity are located. All of this is threatened in an opening that has been initiated by a call for tenders issued to 150 transnational corporations. It is being designed as a special economic zone that cannot comply with fundamental aspects of the Constitution and laws of the Republic, such as the rights of the indigenous peoples and the environmental and labour legislation. And this is for the purpose of creating more favourable conditions to attract foreign investment. That is how decisions are being taken that are designing a country-wide project that may have consequences over the next 100 years.

FG: Another essential subject for discussion, as I understand it, is the geopolitical problematic, and in this case the advances in regional integration connected to the assessment of the new strategies of imperialism and its interference on the continent. Left critics (Marxists, eco-social activists, feminists, etc.) are often criticized for allegedly underestimating the impact of U.S. intervention or destabilization, and for focusing essentially on an internal critique of the processes and governments. That is what the Argentine sociologist Atilio Borón, among others, says: a number of his writings argue that we have to understand that, moderate as the progressive governments are, they have opened a new wave of integration without the United States, and that this represents a giant step forward in regional history from a Bolivarian perspective. So what do you think about the state of Latin American integration, what are the advances and the limits as of now in this regard?

ML: Ten years ago there were real initiatives and important and encouraging proposals at a global level coming from Latin America, in the sense that regional integration was posed in a different direction from that of the European Union in its neoliberal constitution, especially in the idea that the Banco del Sur was to promote projects of sovereignty and sustainability and not of development in classical terms. Another example was the SUCRE. Unfortunately, these initiatives have not prospered throughout the decade, above all because of resistance from Brazil, which obviously has an important role in the region and is much more oriented toward its partners in the BRICS and prioritizes its interests as a world power.

EL: In the end, Brazil agreed that the Banco del Sur as such should be just one more development bank...

FG: If we look now at the deep crisis in Venezuela, a subject, a drama that has polarized the intellectuals a lot (as of course Venezuelan society), that polarization was presented to us in translation around two international appeals. The first, with Edgardo’s active participation, originated in Venezuela: “Urgent International Call to Stop the Escalation Of Violence in Venezuela. Looking at Venezuela beyond polarization,”[7] that you both signed, the second, the response entitled “Who Will Accuse the Accusers?,[8] by the members of the etwork of Intellectuals and Artists in Defense of Humanity (REDH), which is quite hostile. One of the central arguments of the REDH members is that the crisis in Venezuela, in their view, is above all a product of imperialist agression and an insurrection of the neoliberal right as well as an “economic war.” They argue that we are in a regional context of a right-wing return, citing the [parliamentary] coup in Brazil, and that this obliges the left to close ranks behind the governments that are confronting this agression, setting aside “secondary contradictions.” The call that you signed, on the contrary says:

“we do not believe, as certain sectors of the Latin American left affirm, that we should acritically defend what is presented as an ‘anti-imperialist and popular government’. The unconditional support offered by certain activists and intellectuals not only reveals an ideological blindness, but is detrimental, as it – regrettably – contributes to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime.”

At this point, how do you read this debate, which was expressed in a number of other documents and exchanges that were sometimes clearly offensive on both sides?

ML: A short while ago a colleague told me that she thought geopolitical views tend to obscure the interests and voices of the peoples. And I don’t know if that is a secondary contradiction. It seems to me that the form in which this confrontation developed was very regrettable because it tended more to close off spaces for reflection than to open them. I think what we need at this point is precisely deeper thinking, spaces for debate and not for closure, if we are to find some solution to the Venezuelan crisis. And I have the feeling that the more alienated people are from the Venezuelan process the more need there is to affirm a sort of identity in solidarity, which is more a sort of anti-imperialist reflex that is fairly abstract, delinked from what goes on day to day in Venezuela. I think the solidarities that we need to build are different. They should not revolve around ourselves, our needs to affirm a political identity like a profession of faith, but be more a joint search for paths forward among concrete peoples. Solidarity should be with the actually existing people, who often do not have the same interests as the government.

And this brings me to a self-criticism, Recently, I returned to Venezuela and had an opportunity to chat with some sectors of critical Chavismo, and it was only then that I learned how that camp has been transformed in recent years. And how complicated it is to express solidarity, in a critical and differentiated way, in the hyperpolarized scenario that exists today. The call that I signed at best should have been given more thought, more discussion before it was circulated, and I should have taken more time discussing it with the various sectors of critical Chavismo before signing it, precisely in order to be more coherent with my own thinking. While I continue to think that it is necessary to defend democratic institutionality and certain liberal values, as the call does, we have to broaden and deepen them while at the same time defending them as results of past struggles. And above all, I think that external agression can never justify the errors that are being made internally.

This polarization that has occurred in Venezuela and in other countries as well, which does not allow any grey shading beyond black and white, is very negative and very harmful to the transformation. It makes it very hard to express solidarity without causing damage on one side or another. As a feminist, I also feel that the form in which this whole debate is taking place is extremely patriarchal, plagued with simplistic binaries, agressive logics and self-gratifyng egos while what we should be doing is building links and other forms of doing politics, that is, accompanying ourselves in the search for alternative roads.

FG: In fact, it seems that a certain dialectic of critical thinking has been lost in this debate.[9] Concerning the polarization in Venezuela, the unconditional defenders of Maduro argue that the polarization is principally between the right wing allied with imperialism vs. the “people” and the Bolivarian government. This analysis is based, of course, on concrete aspects of the coordinates of the present conflict but leaves no space for understanding the tensions, differentiations, and contradictions internal to Chavismo as well as within the popular camp.

ML: There is a kind of artificial construction of a unity between government and people, as also occurred often in relation to Cuba, for example. That is, the Cuban people is one, and only one, and the one that speaks for the Cuban people is necessarily their government. As if there were no relations of domination and conflicts of interests in Cuban society. Between men and women, but also between state and society, or between Blacks, Mestizos and whites, or between countryside and city. From this perspective, which unifies government and people in a single symbolic bloc, nothing really emancipatory can arise. Finally, the challenge before us is reducing or overcoming these relations of domination, if I understand the task. In this dichotomous construction, polarization, war-like logics reappear, a cultural legacy that has been borne by the left since the Cold War, and that now in this historical moment has enabled us to avoid many of the things we need to learn. It is a legacy that was somewhat partially overcome by the ’68 revolt with its cultural impact on societies, but is now suffering a reactualization that I feel is quite distressing.

FG: Edgardo, on the military logic and the situation in Venezuela. How can an attempt be made to confront the Venezuelan crisis from below and from the left? Personally, I did not sign either of the international appeals, because I genuinely felt that neither responded at the time to the urgency of the situation, to the necessary denunciation of imperialist agression, the right wing and its openly coup-oriented sectors and, at the same time, on the other hand, was capable of issuing an open, clear critical analysis of the authoritarian drift of Madurismo; but away from not only the formal defense of the 1999 Constitution but also from the necessary recovery of the forms of popular power, the experiences of self-organization, the communal project that was still alive, notwithstanding everything, in the interstices of the process....

EL: Obviously, there has been a sustained offensive by the Empire, by the United States. From the beginning of the Chávez government there were attempts by the government of the United States to undermine this process for reasons that were both geopolitical and economic. We know that Venezuela’s oil reserves, and its gold, coltan, uranium and other abundant mineral reserves in the south of the country are essential for the United States, either for itself or to limit access to them for its global rivals. Since 1999, Venezuela has represented a point of entry for changes in the continent, and that is why the US also supported the 2002 military coup and the 2002-2003 business lock-out in the oil industry that paralyzed the country for two months, with the express intention to overthrow the government of President Chávez. We know that groups and parties of the Venezuelan far right have relied on permanent advice and funding from the State Department. The financial blockade and the explicit threats of armed intervention formulated by Trump can not in any way be taken lightly. There have also been important interventions by Uribism and Colombian paramilitarism. This type of aggression is part of the panorama of the current crisis in Venezuela, and no one from the left can avoid it or put it in the background.

Now the problem of the Bolivarian process is: What is it that we want to defend? and How should we defend it? Do we have to defend any government with a discourse confronting the United States? Or are we to defend a collective process of a democratic, anticapitalist and anti-imperialist nature that points to a horizon that responds to the profound civilizational crisis we are going through? Do we have to defend the increasingly authoritarian government of Maduro, or do we have to defend the transformative potential that emerged in 1999? Today, the preservation of power for the Maduro government, clientelism and the threats of cutting off access to subsidized basic goods (in conditions in which for a high percentage of the population this is the only way to have access to food) play a much more important role than the appeal to popular participation. And, in the background, a matter for debate is what do we understand today by the left? Can we think of the left without questioning what was socialism of the last century? When forces that sought to overcome bourgeois democracy ended up being authoritarian, vertical, totalitarian regimes. ... Today, in Venezuela, we have to ask ourselves if we are moving in the direction of deepening democracy or if the doors to direct participation of people in the orientation of the country’s destiny are closing.

In Venezuela, in 1999 a Constituent Assembly (CA) was held with very high levels of participation, a referendum was organized to decide whether a CA was to be carried out, the constituent members were elected with high participation, the results were approved by a majority of 62% of the votes, enormous resources were spent to modernize the electoral system, establishing a totally digitized, transparent system with multiple control mechanisms, and audit. A reliable electoral system, virtually fraud-proof, as has been recognized by numerous international organizations and electoral experts around the world. But, in December 2015, the opposition wins the parliamentary elections with a large majority, and the government is faced with the dilemma of respecting these electoral results and remaining faithful to the constitution of 1999, or on the contrary, doing everything possible to remain in power, even if this meant ignoring the will of the majority of the population or sacrificing the electoral system that had conquered such high levels of legitimacy. It clearly opts to remain in power at all costs.

Step by step decisions are made that define an authoritarian drift. The holding of the recall referendum in 2016 is prevented, the election of governors in December that year is unconstitutionally postponed, the attributions of the National Assembly are not recognized and these are usurped between the Supreme Court of Justice and the Executive Power. As of February 2016, the President begins to govern by way of a state of emergency (“economic emergency”), expressly violating the conditions and time limits established in the Constitution of 1999. Assuming powers that under the Constitution are attributed to the sovereign people, Maduro issues a call for a National Constituent Assembly, and electoral mechanisms are defined to guarantee total control of that assembly. A monocolour National Constituent Assembly is elected, its 545 members are identified with the government. This assembly, once installed, proclaims itself supra-constitutional and plenipotentiary. Most of its decisions are adopted by acclamation or unanimously without any debate. Instead of addressing the task for which it was supposedly elected, the writing of a new draft Constitution, it begins to make decisions referring to all areas of public powers, dismisses officials, calls elections in conditions designed to prevent or make very difficult the participation of those who do not support the government. It approves what it calls constitutional laws, which in fact results in the abolition of the 1999 Constitution. They adopt retroactive laws, such as the decision to outlaw those parties that did not participate in the mayoral elections of December 2017. The participation of left-wing candidates different from those decided by the PSUV leadership is prevented. Meanwhile, the National Electoral Council fraudulently blocks the election of Andrés Velázquez as governor of Bolivar State. ...

What is at stake here is not the formal defense of the Constitution of 1999, but the defense of democracy, not a formal bourgeois democracy, but the opening towards the deepening of democracy that the 1999 Constitution represented. Without any single milestone defining a clear break with the democratic constitutional order created in 1999, that democratic constitutional order has been sliced ​​up step by step, successively, like a salami, until we find ourselves in the current situation, which is no longer recognizable.

FG: Then, in light of this very complex panorama where progressives experience brusque or gradual setbacks, where the critical or radical lefts fail to emerge as a massive popular force, where the actually existing replacement electoral forces are, at the moment, aggressive neoliberal rightists, even insurrectional in some cases, such as Venezuela, how can we think of concrete alternatives in this end to the hegemony of progressivism and the rebound of a late neoliberalism? From the perspective of buen vivir and ecosocialism, from criticism to the limits and contradictions of progressive governments, from popular or decolonial feminism, how are we to imagine utopias with concrete perspectives for Our America?

EL: In Venezuela, the only source of optimism for me at this moment is the fact that the crisis has been so deep and has impacted the collective consciousness in such a way that it is possible that the charm of oil, of rentism and of the Magical State as beneficient provider is slowly beginning to dissipate. All the left-right political debate in recent decades has operated within the parameters of the oil imaginery, within this notion of Venezuela as a rich country, owner of the largest oil reserves on the planet. Politics have revolved around the demands that different sectors of society make on the state in order to access these resources.

I am starting to see signs, still lamentably weak, of an acknowledgment that it is not possible to continue on that path. There is the beginning of an acceptance that a historical cycle is drawing to an end. People are starting to scratch their heads, and now what? I have had relations for years with what is the most continuous and most vigorous process of popular organization in Venezuela, CECOSESOLA.[10] This is a network of cooperatives operating in several states in the center and west of the country that links a wide network of agricultural and artisanal producers with urban consumers, as well as a splendid cooperative health center and a funeral cooperative. I have been impressed by the presence of topics such as the recovery and exchange of seeds in everyday conversations. The recognition of a before and an after the beginning of the current crisis.

Recently, when someone in a farming community came down from a nearby town, he was told to remember to bring back a can of tomato seed. That was an every day occurrence. These were seeds of imported, selected and hybrid tomatoes that did not reproduce, that were not necessarily transgenic but they were sterile after the first sowing. With the economic crisis, that access to seeds is abruptly cut off. Ancestral peasant practices are resumed. They begin holding meetings between farmers in which it is asked, who has seeds of what? Indigenous seeds that were only preserved on a small scale begin to be exchanged – potato seeds, tomato seeds, etc. This opens up new possibilities. We are going to wake up from this dream (which turned out to be a nightmare) and think about the possibility that we are somewhere else, in another country, in other conditions and life goes on but now it is taking a new path.

FG: Miriam, what Edgardo says is interesting but he describes, for the moment, very small embryos of popular power, which may seem inoperative in the face of immense regional challenges, financial globalization, world chaos. ...

ML: Of course, that is, it depends a little from where you are looking at it. I think that here, for example, in Europe, what we have to do is start to become aware of the effects that the intensive consumption lifestyle, which everyone assumes is completely natural, cause in other parts of the world. It seems to me that the scale of destruction that this causes, not only in environmental terms but also in the social fabric, of subjectivities, is much more important than what is assumed in Europe, where it all remains practically invisible, camouflaged by consumer environments that are pleasant and anaesthetizing.

EL: Or the belief that the standard of living of the North does not depend on extractivism in the South.

ML: Some of us call this the imperial way of life, which automatically assumes that the natural resources and cheap or enslaved labour of the whole world are for the wealthiest 20 percent of the world population who live in the capitalist centers or the middle and upper classes of the peripheral societies. And if it’s cheap, that’s good. It provides a sensation that the planet is going to collapse ecologically and socially because of the enormous quantity of gadgets that are produced, which nobody really needs except “the markets” for everything that capitalism suggests as artificially constructed needs. So, here in the capitalist centers there is a very important task of reducing the amount of material and energy that is expended. For example, the movements around degrowth have a good perspective in terms of cultural transformation, where because of the discomforts with neoliberalism that you mentioned before, people rediscover other non-material dimensions of the quality of life, and also the wealth of self-production of clothes, or honey, or other things.

FG: Yes, here in France too, there are currently a lot of alternative rural networks, collective self-managed experiences, areas to defend (ZAD), alternative currencies, etc. but they are still very small.

ML: Of course, they are small networks for now, but the important thing is to transmit to more people these imaginaries of different kinds of well-being, so that the change is made not by force, or not by the crisis, but by the desire itself. So that people can feel, experience in their own flesh that there are other dimensions of the good life that can easily compensate for having less materially, and that a decrease does not have to be experienced as a loss.

EL: Nor as a sacrifice to stop having things. ...

FG: In fact, here, there is more and more talk about the necessary conquest of a cheerful sobriety and voluntary austerity in the face of consumer waste. It is an interesting, powerful concept that can be connected to buen vivir and ecosocialism.

ML: I feel every time I go to Europe that there is a lot of discomfort with this super-accelerated lifestyle that prevails here. I have many friends who get sick, if not physically, they get sick psychologically, from stress, depression, burnouts, panic attacks. The dimensions that this acquires are hidden quite systematically in the dominant discourses that continue to associate wellbeing with economic growth, and much more so in what is perceived from the global South. Seen from Latin America, here in the central countries, everything is necessarily a wonder. Then, to visualize these discomforts and make visible the other forms of life that already result from them, would be an important step. Because in the South, curiously, everyone believes that it is better to live in the city, while in Germany or Spain, on the contrary, there is an increase in the numbers of ecological communities that go to the countryside. In other words, it would be a step to help break this hegemony of imitative development, which forces the South to repeat all the mistakes that have already been made in Northern societies, such as clogging cities with cars, for example. But some of these errors, as in the division of labor between men and women here in the North, are being overcome also by the new generations, Now, from my generation on down, it has become more normal to share the tasks of care not only in the couple but beyond the couple, perhaps in the building, in the community where a reduced space for coexistence, can be generated.

This is also another important element, building community against forced individualization, both in the countryside and in the city. I do not mean the community understood as the small ancestral peasant village, fixed in time, but political communities in movement, which incorporate their tasks of care as collective tasks and then reorganize life around what life reproduces, and not around what the market or capital demands. And I think we should make visible all the efforts that are already being made in this sense, where people live relatively well, both in the North and in the South. In the South, in part, they will be ancestral communities, but there are also new ones, while in the North they are usually newly constituted. It’s about changing monolithic thinking and looking at the things that exist, you do not have to invent everything from scratch.

For example, there is a view that urban suburbs are hell, in the global South above all. But if you are going to look closer, there are many logics there that are absolutely anti-capitalist, the logic of not working, of giving priority to fiestas, of exchanges not mediated by the logic of money. ... Maybe it’s not the model. Anyway, there is no model and there should not be, that is very important to emphasize. We are not, after 20th century socialism, going to have a new unique recipe which we will all enroll in and follow, but rather it is a question of allowing that diversity of alternatives, so that they can be built from each culture and context, from the people who are involved in them. Buenos vivires in the plural.

We also have to generate a culture of alternatives that allows us to err, to make mistakes, to learn from mistakes. These spaces of social experimentation in which we say good we are going to try that, it does not work, we are going to try something else, but in cohesion and without competing, according to the principle of cooperation and not competition. A book called The Future of Development[11] states that the percentage of the world population actually inserted in the circuits of the neoliberal globalized market is barely half, and that the rest is still in what we would call the margins. That provides hope, it also means that half the world population is in something else, beyond the dominant model, so we should start looking around.

FG: Very good, thank you very much.

Transcription of interview by Alejandra Guacarán (Master LLCER, Université Grenoble-Alpes. Revision, correction and updating by FG, EL and ML.


[1] Some of the papers and videos of the presentations by Pierre Salama, Miriam Lang and Eduardo Lander may be viewed at http://progresismos.sciencesconf.org.

[2] www.rosalux.org.ec.

[3] https://www.tni.org.

[4] Álvaro García Linera, “Conferencia Magistral en el Teatro Nacional de la Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana,” Quito, Ecuador, 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DeZ7xtBJT8U.

[5] Miriam Lang and Dunia Mokrani (ed,), Más allá del desarrollo, Fundación Rosa Luxemburg/Abya Yala, Quito, 2012, www.rosalux.org.mx/docs/Mas_alla_del_desarrollo.pdf.

[6] Edgardo Lander, The implosion of Venezuela's rentier state, TNI, 2016, https://www.tni.org/es/publicacion/la-implosion-de-la-venezuela-rentista?content_language=en.

[7] http://llamadointernacionalvenezuela.blogspot.fr/2017/05/llamado-internacional-urgente-detener_30.html.

[8] www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2017/06/01/la-red-de-intelectuales-redh-responde-a-una-declaracion-en-la-que-se-ataca-al-proceso-bolivariano-de-venezuela/. For a critical assessment from a Marxist perspective of these and similar statements, see Claudio Katz, “The Left and Venezuela,” http://lifeonleft.blogspot.mx/2017/06/the-left-and-venezuela.html. – RF.

[9] For an initial balance sheet on the Venezuelan crisis, with a plurality of opinions: Daniel Chávez, Hernán Ouviña y Mabel Thwaites Rey (ed.), Venezuela: Lecturas urgentes desde el Sur, CLACSO, 2017, www.biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/se/.../Venezuela_Lecturas_Sur.pdf.

[10] http://cecosesola.net.

[11] Gustavo Esteva, Salvatore Babones, and Philipp Babcicky, The Future of Development: A Radical Manifesto, Policy Press, Bristol, 2013.

Friday, September 23, 2016

‘Vivir Bien’: Going beyond capitalism?

To overcome the systemic crisis of humanity and Mother Earth we must turn to indigenous ecological concepts, says Pablo Solón in his new book

Introduction

by Richard Fidler

In his balance sheet of Bolivia’s “process of change,” published recently on this site, Bolivian intellectual and activist Pablo Solón advanced some proposals for a new course inspired by the ideas of Vivir Bien, a philosophy associated with the indigenous peoples of the Andean countries of South America. Vivir Bien, roughly translated as “living well,” is incorporated as a guiding principle of the state in the new constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia.[1]

Ecuador’s constitution refers to it as Buen Vivir and describes it as “a new form of citizen cohabitation, in diversity and harmony with nature.”

Bolivia’s constitution defines it in general terms as an ethical or moral principle of the plural society, in which the state is said to be “based on the values of unity, equality, inclusion, dignity, liberty, solidarity, reciprocity, respect, interdependence, harmony, transparency, equilibrium, equality of opportunity, social and gender equality in participation, common welfare, responsibility, social justice, distribution and redistribution of the social wealth and assets for well being.” (Art. 8)

Es posible el vivir bien - coverIn a book published in August,[2] Solón elaborates on these ideas in presenting what he terms a “systemic alternative,” one of many on offer today, he says, such as ecosocialism, degrowth, ecofeminism, etc. My translation of the book is posted below. A pdf version of the English translation is available here.

Vivir Bien (sumaq qamaña in Aymara, sumak kawsay in Quechua) is an intellectual construct based on a contemporary understanding of how precolonial peoples lived, with their cosmovisions, knowledges, representations, their rationality, everything in relation to their material situation and their relation to Nature.[3]

It is derived from oral traditions handed down often clandestinely over more than 500 years from societies whose material bases, cultures and visions of the world were almost destroyed by colonization and later republican regimes established by the white creole settlers — a genocide combined with ethnocide.

Vivir Bien borrows from surviving traditions of communal living in indigenous rural and agrarian communities. It is a concept under permanent construction and reconstruction, especially in societies like Bolivia’s, where the indigenous are not only a majority of the population but are now predominantly urban, and where the governing party’s professed adherence to a “socialist horizon” in its development policy purports to build on the precolonial precepts of buen vivir.

As this suggests, Buen Vivir encompasses a number of concepts that sit in uneasy coexistence. On the one hand, it is philosophically a critique of modernity and the idea of linear progress through constant expansion of material production of commodities. It questions the ontology of the West and its scientific and technological vision of historical progress, its anthropocentric vision of development. But it also advances proposals for cultural, economic, and political reconstruction of society that often seem akin to a redefined modernity.

It is based on a utopian concept of community space in which there is reciprocity and co-existence in harmony, social responsibility, consensus — a new model of life applicable not just to the indigenous peoples but to the entire planet. It implies social equality, equity, solidarity, justice, peace. In short, a harmonious relationship between humanity and with Madre Tierra. Given the inherent competition, violence and ecological devastation of capitalist society, Vivir Bien as an objective is necessarily a vision of a post-capitalist society.

The concept emerged with new force on the state and political level in the last few decades as the indigenous peoples came to the fore in vast social struggles directed against the destruction of ecosystems, industries, public services and societies under the neoliberal phase of capitalism, and in the search for concepts opposed to its logic.

In this sense, it is anticapitalist and ecological. And as such it has informed the programs of governments and parties that self-define as socialist (as in Bolivia under Evo Morales and his Movement for Socialism) and (at the same time) of intellectual and activist movements developing in opposition to the economic reliance of all countries in Latin America on extraction and export of natural resources, both non-renewable (hydrocarbons, mining) and renewable (agribusiness) with their ecologically destructive consequences.

Indigenous societies are not a homogeneous bloc, nor are they socio-cultural islands within the broader society. So their interpretations of Buen Vivir differ. Many defenders of sumaq qamaña and sumak kawsay are suspicious of the materialist aspects of socialism, which tend to treat nature as both use value and exchange value. Some look not for alternative development but alternatives to development.

But other Buen Vivir proponents see parallels with the ecosocialism of Joel Kovel and Michael Löwy, or “socialism of the 21st century” (Hugo Chávez), building on Karl Marx’s concept of how capitalism provokes separation between man and nature, making nature a pure object for humans, a simple thing of use. It is often forgotten that Marx spoke of communism as the reconciliation of man with nature, a dialectical return to their unity. This current points to ways in which underlying concepts of Buen Vivir indicate a path toward fighting climate crisis.

If I read him correctly, Pablo Solón has a greater affinity with the latter approach than he has with the “anti-extractivists” who are seeking alternatives to development tout court. In a subsequent article, I will discuss how the MAS government describes its strategy for development, the goal of which, it says, is “communitarian socialism toward Vivir Bien.”

Solón, who writes as a partisan of Bolivia’s “process of change,” broadly defined, presents his approach as an alternative to the government’s current development agenda, one that is more consistent with the original objectives of Vivir Bien. I would argue, however, that his concept also has much in common with communitarian socialism as described by the MAS, although not necessarily with the government’s practice.


[1] In an English translation of Bolivia’s Constitution, available here, the phrase is variously translated as “the good life,” (Preamble), “live well” and “well being” (Article 8).

[2] ¿Es posible el Vivir Bien?: Reflexiones a Quema Ropa sobre Alternativas Sistémicas (La Paz, Fundación Solón, 2016).

[3] François Houtart, “The concept of Sumak Kawsay (Living Well) and how it relates to the Common Good of Humanity.” An abridged English version is available as chapter 4 of Birgit Daiber and François Houtart (ed.), A post-capitalist paradigm: The common good of humanity” (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Brussels) A note explains that this paper was prepared for the Institution of Superior National Studies on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ecuador, 2011.

* * *

Is Vivir Bien possible?

Candid Thoughts about Systemic Alternatives

by Pablo Solón

Why systemic alternatives?

We are living through a systemic crisis that can only be overcome through systemic alternatives. It is not only an environmental, economic, social or institutional crisis that confronts humanity. It is a crisis of humanity and of the Earth as a system. It is a systemic crisis caused by a set of factors, an egregious one being the capitalist system’s relentless search for profits at the expense of the planet and humanity. This system is leading to the extinction of species, to major losses of biodiversity, to the degradation of the human being; it is exceeding the absolute limits of nature. It is not a cyclical crisis, or even a crisis of capitalism, which in the wake of a depression will recover to continue its expansion, setting new records of growth. It is a much more profound crisis which has extended to all aspects of life on Earth and which now has its own dynamic without the possibility of reversal within the framework of the capitalist system.

Our most urgent task, if we wish to stop this collapse of life, is to overcome capitalism. Far from imploding from its internal contradictions, capitalism is reconfiguring itself and will continue its pursuit of profit until it has squeezed the last drop of blood from people and planet. Everything can be commodified. Everything is converted into a business “opportunity”: natural disasters, financial speculation, militarism, human trafficking, war, etc. Capitalism knows no limits. Super-exploitation, overconsumption and waste are the principal motors of this system as it pursues infinite growth in a finite planet. Increasing inequality and the destruction of vital cycles of nature are its legacy.

The alternatives to this system can only be constructed if we deepen our understanding of the process by which capitalism reconfigures itself. Capitalism has shown that it has great flexibility to adapt, capture, remodel and create ways out for itself. What begins as an idea or a progressive movement is coopted, transformed and incorporated in order to maintain and reproduce the system. The challenge is to build alternative societies capable of breaking with the logic of capital and of avoiding cooptation by capitalism. The alternatives do not arise in a vacuum, they emerge in the struggles, experiences, initiatives, victories, defeats and resurgence of social movements. The alternatives arise in an often contradictory process of analysis, practice and proposals that are validated in reality.

There is no single alternative. There are many. Some come from the indigenous peoples, such as “Vivir Bien.” Others, such as “degrowth,” are being built in industrialized societies that have gone beyond the limits of the planet. The “global justice” movement is a reaction to the globalization of the transnational corporations. “Ecosocialism” is an attempt to rethink alternatives from a non-anthropocentric perspective. “Food sovereignty” is a proposal that develops the concrete alternatives originating among the small farmers, peasants and indigenous peoples. “Ecofeminism” contributes the women’s dimension that is essential to overcoming the patriarchy linked with anthropocentrism. The “rights of Mother Earth” are designed to construct new relationships with nature. The concept of “the commons” emphasizes the self-management of human communities. The “economy of solidarity,” the “economy for life,” the “economy of transition”... all of them contribute from various perspectives. Each has strengths, limitations, contradictions and points in common. All are ideas under construction. They are pieces in a puzzle that has many responses, and that will constantly change with the worsening of the systemic crisis. Our purpose is to understand these alternatives in their process of development, to identify their potentialities, and to look for the complementarity among these distinct visions in order to tackle the systemic crisis.

In what follows we will focus on one of these ideas: Vivir Bien (Bolivia), Buen Vivir (Ecuador), sumaq qamaña (Aymara) or sumak kawsay (Quechua). Our objective is to analyze the way in which the concept of Vivir Bien is constructed, to point to some of its essential elements in the construction of systemic alternatives, to assess how it has been implemented in Bolivia and Ecuador — with greater emphasis on the first country owing to the author’s involvement and knowledge — and attempt to reply to a question that many are asking after a decade of progressive governments in the Andes: Is Vivir Bien possible beyond the indigenous community? After a decade of governments that embraced this indigenous vision, are we closer to understanding and implementing it? And if we have lost our way, how can we return to the path of Vivir Bien?


Development of the concept

Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir is a process that has passed through different stages of enchantment and disenchantment. Vivir Bien is a concept under construction, one that is disputed. Big business institutions now speak of Vivir Bien, but in a way that is very different from what its promotors imagined more than a decade ago in the fight against neoliberalism. Vivir Bien is a space of polemic and controversy in which there is no single absolute truth. There are many truths as well as countless lies that today are canonized in the name of Vivir Bien.

The concept of Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir has gone through different phases. Three decades ago almost no one in South America was talking about this vision. What existed then was the Aymara sumaq qamaña and the Quechua sumak kawsay, which express a set of ideas centered in the systems of knowledge, practice and organization of the native peoples of the Andes of South America. Sumaq qamaña and sumak kawsay were living realities of the Andean communities, the subject of studies by anthropologists and Aymara and Quechua intellectuals. During almost the entire 20th century this vision went unnoticed by broad sectors of the left and the workers’ organizations, especially in urban areas.

Sumaq qamaña and sumak kawsay had arisen some centuries earlier and still continued to exist in Andean communities, although retreating ever more under the pressure of modernity and developmentalism. Among other indigenous peoples of Latin America there also existed similar visions and terms such as Teko Kavi and Ñandereko of the Guaraní, Shiir Waras of the Shuar and Küme Mongen of the Mapuche.

The concept of Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir began to emerge and be theorized toward the late 20th and early 21st century. Perhaps sumaq qamaña and sumak kawsay would never have given origin to Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir without the devastating development of neoliberalism and the Washington consensus. The failure of Soviet socialism, the absence of alternative paradigms, the advance of the privatizations and the commodification of so many spheres of nature inspired a process of relearning the indigenous practices and visions that had been devalued by capitalist modernity.

This process of revalorization occurred in both theory and practice. The dismissal of tens of thousands of workers through the application of the neoliberal measures provoked a change in the class structures of the Andean countries of South America. In the case of Bolivia, the miners who for almost a century were the vanguard of all the social sectors were relocated and in their place the indigenous peoples and peasants came to the fore.

The indigenous struggle in defense of their territories not only generated solidarity but awakened interest in understanding this self-managing vision of their territories. Sectors of the left and progressive intellectuals that had lost their own utopias through the fall of the Berlin wall began to take a close look at what could be learned from these indigenous cosmovisions. That is how the concept of Vivir Bien and Buen Vivir emerged. In reality, both terms are incomplete and insufficient translations of sumaq qamaña or sumak kawsay, which have a more complex set of meanings such as “plentiful life,” “sweet life,” “harmonious life,” “sublime life,” “inclusive life” or “to know how to live.”

Vivir Bien and Buen Vivir, as new concepts, had not yet matured when suddenly a new phase began with the arrival of the governments of Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006) and Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007). The terms were institutionalized by both countries in the new state constitutions and transformed into referents for various normative and institutional reforms. Vivir Bien came to be a central part of the official discourse and the national development plans of both countries incorporated the terms as references.

The triumph of these concepts at a constitutional level prompted the complementarity of alternatives with other visions, such as Thomas Berry’s “Earth Jurisprudence,” generating the development of new proposals like the rights of Mother Earth and the rights of nature, which had not been present originally in Vivir Bien. The impact of Vivir Bien was so strong that a set of other systemic alternatives internationally like degrowth, communes, ecosocialism and the like turned their attention to this vision.

However, this constitutional triumph of Vivir Bien was also the beginning of a new phase of controversies, and the central one came to be its concrete application in the reality of both countries. This new stage, which initially was accompanied by great hopes, very quickly turned into profound disputes. Is Vivir Bien really being applied? Are we moving toward this objective or have we lost our way?

The application of Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir, which both governments proclaimed nationally and internationally, led to a redefinition of the concept. What really is Vivir Bien? Is it an alternative vision to extractivism or is it a new form of development, more human and friendly to nature?

In Bolivia and Ecuador alike there now exist different interpretations of what is meant by Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir. Simplistically, we can say that in actuality we have an official vision, another one that is challenging and rebellious, and still another that is passable even for financial institutions like the World Bank. As the years pass, the positions and differences have become sharper. Today important longstanding proponents of Vivir Bien in both countries think the respective governments are not practicing Buen Vivir and broad sectors of the population think these alternatives have remained only in the discourse. Vivir Bien as a paradigm in both countries is in crisis because it has lost credibility in their societies. However, its essence subsists and still nurtures processes of national and international thinking.

Is Vivir Bien really possible at the level of a country or a region? After a decade of governments claiming adherence to Vivir Bien, what are the errors committed and the lessons to be drawn? How can we advance toward a practice that accords more with the postulates of this vision?

We do not know what the future of Vivir Bien will be. Perhaps it will end as mere distractionist rhetoric or as a new form of conceptualization of sustainable development. Today the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia want the concept to adjust to their practice, and not for their policies to actually follow the subversive road of Vivir Bien. In the attempt to canonize their vision of Vivir Bien, they have in their favour innumerable media and the complicity of international institutions that have seen that the best strategy for blurring this proposal is to appropriate it in their language.

In this context of controversy, relearning and an uncertain future it is fundamental to go to the essence of this proposal if we are to advance in its actual implementation.


The core elements

There is no decalogue of Vivir Bien or Buen Vivir. Any attempt to define it in absolute terms would stifle this proposal under construction. What we can do is to approximate its essence. Buen Vivir is not a set of cultural, social, environmental and economic prescriptions but a complex and dynamic mixture that starts from a philosophical conception of time and space and proceeds toward a cosmovision pertaining to the relation between human beings and nature.

In this document we do not pretend to address all of its facets but rather to focus on those that can be central to the theoretical and practical construction of systemic alternatives. In our opinion the strength of Vivir Bien in comparison with other alternatives like the communes, degrowth, eco-feminism, deglobalization, ecosocialism, etc., is in the following elements: (1) its vision of the whole or the Pacha; (2) coexisting in multipolarity; (3) the pursuit of equilibrium; (4) the complementarity of diverse subjects; and (5) decolonization.

The whole and the Pacha

The point of departure of any systemic alternative transformation is its comprehension of the whole. What is the totality in which the process of transformation we wish to undertake operates? Can we carry out a profound change in one country alone? Can we be successful if we focus only on economic, social and institutional aspects? Is the global capitalist system the whole subject matter or is it part of a larger whole?

For Vivir Bien the whole is the Pacha. This Andean concept has often been translated simply as Earth. That is why we speak of Pachamama as Mother Earth. However, Pacha is a much broader concept that includes the indissoluble unity of space and time. Pacha is the whole in constant movement, it is the cosmos in a permanent state of becoming. Pacha refers not only to the world of humans, animals and plants but also to the world above (Hanan Pacha), inhabited by the sun, the moon and the stars, and the world below (Ucu Pacha), where the dead and the spirits live. For Vivir Bien all of this is interconnected and the whole makes up a unity.

In this space the past, present and future co-exist and interrelate dynamically. The Andean vision of time does not follow Newton’s mechanics, which state that time is a coordinate independent of space and a magnitude that is identical for each observer. To the contrary, this cosmovision reminds us of Einstein’s famous sentence: “The distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent.” Within the concept of the Pacha the past is always present and is recreated by the future.

For Vivir Bien time and space are not lineal but cyclical. The lineal notions of growth and progress are not compatible with that vision. Time advances in the form of a spiral. The future is connected with the past. In any advance there is a return and any return is an advance. Hence, as the Aymara say, let us walk with our backs toward the future and our eyes on the past.

This spiral vision of time questions the very essence of the notion of “development,” of always advancing toward a higher point, of the search to always be better. This ascendant becoming is a fiction for Vivir Bien. Any advance involves turns, nothing is eternal, everything is transformed and is a re-encounter of the past, present and future.

In the Pacha there is no separation between living beings and inert bodies, all have life. Life can only be explained by the relation between all the parts of the whole. There is no dichotomy between living beings and simple objects. Similarly, there is no separation between human beings and nature. All are part of nature and the Pacha as an entirety has life.

According to Josef Estermann, the Pacha

“is not a machine or a giant mechanism that organizes itself and moves simply by mechanical laws, as stated by the modern European philosophers, especially Descartes and his followers. Pacha is rather a living organism in which all parts are related to one another, in constant interdependence and exchange. The basic principle of any ‘development’ should be, then, life (kawsay, qamaña, jakaña) in its totality, not only that of humans or animals and plants, but of the whole Pacha.”[1]

The objective of human beings is not to control nature but to care for nature as one cares for the mother who has given you life. That is the sense of the expression “Mother Earth.” Society cannot be understood in relation to human beings alone; it is a community that has nature and the whole at its centre. We are the community of the Pacha, the community of an indissoluble whole in a permanent process of cyclical change.

Suma qamaña and sumak kawsay are Pachacentric, not anthropocentric. The recognition and relevance to the whole is the key to Vivir Bien. The Andean cosmovision places the principle of “totality” at the core of its existence.

Vivir Bien means we have to centre ourselves on all aspects of life. Material life is only one aspect and cannot be reduced to the accumulation of things and objects. We have to learn to eat well, dance well, sleep well, drink well, to practice one’s beliefs, work for the community, take care of nature, appreciate elders, respect whatever surrounds us and learn as well how to die, because death is an integral part of the cycle of life. In the Aymara way of thinking, there is no death as understood in the West, in which the body disappears into a hell or a heaven. Here death is just another moment of life, because one lives anew in the mountains or the depths of the lakes or rivers.[2]

In this sense, the whole has a spiritual dimension in which the conceptions of self, of the community and of nature are based on and linked cyclically in space and time. To live in accordance with the whole means living with emotion, concern, self-understanding and empathy toward others.

This cosmovision has a series of concrete implications. Namely, favourable policies are those that take account of the whole and not only some parts. To act only according to the interests of one part (humans, countries of the North), elites, material accumulation, etc.) will inevitably generate imbalances in the whole. Any measure must try to understand the multiple dimensions and interrelations of all the parts.

Coexisting in multipolarity

In the Vivir Bien vision, there is a duality in everything since everything has contradictory pairs. Pure good does not exist, good and bad always coexist. Everything is and is not. The individual and the community are two poles of the same unit. An individual is a person only in as much as he or she works for the common good of his or her community. Without community there is no individual and without singular beings there is no community. A person is not strictly speaking a person without his or her partner. The election of authorities is by twos: man-woman, as a couple. This bipolarity or multipolarity of partners is present in everything. The individual-community polarity is immersed in the humanity-nature polarity. The community is a community not only of humans but of non-humans.

Vivir Bien is learning to live together in this duality. The challenge is not “to be” but “to learn to interrelate with the other contradictory parts of the whole. Existence is not something given but a relational concept.

In the Andean communities individual private property coexists with communal property. There are differences and tensions between members of a community. To manage those tensions various cultural practices are carried out oriented to producing certain levels of redistribution. This means, for example, that the wealthiest pay for the fiesta of the entire community or are responsible for other acts or services that benefit everyone.

And there are the distinct practices of collaboration within the community. In the Minka everyone performs collective labour for the community. In the Ayni some members of the community support others and in return the latter repay this with support to the former during the seeding, the harvest or in some other way. In the Andean communities, the principal milestones are not limited only to the individual or his or her family, but are shared with the entire community. When a child is born, the whole community celebrates. Marriage is not only the union of two persons but the union of two families or communities.

The indigenous communities worldwide are very diverse. They vary from region to region and country to country. But notwithstanding their differences they share the sense of responsibility and belonging to their communities. The worst punishment is to be expelled from the community; it is worse than death because it is to lose your membership, your essence, your identity. In contrast to this indigenous practice, the western societies tend to focus on the individual, on personal success, on the rights of the individual and above all on the protection of one’s private property through laws and institutions.

Vivir Bien is not egalitarian; that is an illusion because inequalities and differences always exist. The key thing is not to remove them but to coexist with them, to prevent inequalities and differences from becoming more acute and polarizing until they destabilize the whole. In the framework of this vision the fundamental thing is to learn or relearn to live in community respecting the multipolarity of the whole.

Vivir Bien is a call to redefine what we mean by “well-bing.” To be rich or poor is a condition, to be human is an essential characteristic. Vivir Bien is concerned less with “well-being” (the condition of the person) and more with the “being well” (the essence of the person).

The pursuit of equilibrium

For Vivir Bien the objective is the pursuit of equilibrium among the various elements that make up the whole — a harmony not only between human beings but also between humans and nature, between the material and the spiritual, between knowledge and wisdom, between diverse cultures and between different identities and realities.

Vivir Bien is not a version of development that is simply more democratic, non-anthropocentric, holistic or humanizing. This cosmovision has not embraced the notion of progress of the western civilizations. In opposition to permanent growth it pursues equilibrium. This equilibrium is not eternal or permanent. Any equilibrium will give rise to new contradictions and disparities that call for new actions to rebalance things. That is the principal source of the movement, of the cyclical change in space-time. The pursuit of harmony between human beings and with Mother Earth is not the search for an idyllic state but the raison d’être of the entirety.

This equilibrium is not similar to the stability that capitalism promises to achieve through continuous growth. Stability, just like permanent growth, is an illusion. Sooner or later any growth without limits will produce severe upheavals in the Pacha, as we are seeing now in the planet. Equilibrium always is dynamic. The objective is not to arrive at a perfect equilibrium without contradictions, such does not exist. Everything moves in cycles, is a point of arrival and departure for the new disequilibria, for new and more complex contradictions and complementarities.

Vivir Bien is not to achieve a paradise, but to pursue the well-being of everyone, the dynamic and changing equilibrium of the whole. Only by understanding the whole in its multiple components and in its becoming is it possible to contribute to the search for new equilibria and to live in conformity with Vivir Bien.

According to Josef Estermann, in the Andean vision human beings are not owners or producers but rather “caretakers” (Arariwa), “cultivators” and “facilitators.” The only force that is strictly productive is Mother Earth, the Pachamama, and its various elements such as water, minerals, hydrocarbons and energy in general. Human beings do not “produce” or “create,” they cultivate or grow what Pachamama gives them. Human beings are those who help to give birth to Mother Earth.[3] The role of humans is to be a bridge (chakana), a mediator that contributes to the pursuit of equilibrium, cultivating with wisdom what nature has given us. The challenge is not to be more or have more but to search continuously for equilibrium between the different parts of the community of the Earth.

This essential component of Vivir Bien has major implications because not only does it challenge the dominant paradigm of growth but it promotes a concrete alternative with the pursuit of equilibrium. A society is vigorous not by its growth but because it contributes to equilibrium both between human beings and with nature. It is fundamental in this process to overcome the concept of human beings as “producers,” “conquerors,” and “transformers” of nature, and to substitute that of “caretakers,” “cultivators,” and “mediators” of nature.

The complementarity of diverse subjects

Equilibrium between contraries that inhabit a whole can only be achieved through complementarity. Not by canceling the other but by complementing it. Complementarity means seeing the difference as part of a whole. The objective is how, between these different parts, some of which are antagonistic, we can complement and complete the totality. Difference and particularity are part of nature and life. We shall never all be equal. What we must do is to respect diversity and find ways to articulate experiences, knowledges and ecosystems.

Capitalism operates under a very different dynamic. According to the logic of capital, what is fundamental is competition to increase efficiency. Whatever restricts or limits competition is negative. Competition will ensure that each industry or country specializes in something in which it can gain. In the end each will become more efficient at something and will encourage innovation and increase productivity.

From the perspective of complementarity, competition is negative because some win and others lose, unbalancing the totality. Complementarity seeks optimization through the combination of strengths. The more one works together with the other, the greater is the resilience of each and of all. Complementarity is not neutrality between opposites but recognition of the possibilities that provide the diversity to balance the whole.

In concrete terms this means that instead of seeking efficiency through equal rules for unequal groups, industries or countries, we should promote asymmetrical rules that favour the most disadvantaged so that all can rise. Vivir Bien is the encounter of diversity. “Knowing how to live” is to practice pluriculturalism, to recognize and learn from difference without arrogance or prejudice.

Accepting diversity means that in our world there are other Buen Vivires in addition to the Andean version. Those Buen Vivires survive in the wisdom, knowledge and practices of peoples who are pursuing their own identity. Vivir Bien is a plural concept, both in the recognition of human pluriculturalism and in the existence of diversity of ecosystems in nature (Gudynas and Acosta, 2014). Vivir Bien proposes an intercultural encounter between different cultures. There is no single alternative. There are many, which complement each other in order to make up systemic alternatives.

Vivir Bien is not a utopian regression to the past, but the recognition that in the history of humanity there have been, there are and there will be other forms of cultural, economic and social organization that can contribute to overcoming the present systemic crisis to the extent that they complement each other.

Decolonization

In the vision of Vivir Bien there is a continual struggle for decolonization. The Spanish conquest 500 years ago initiated a new cycle. That colonization did not end with the processes of independence and constitution of the republics in the 19th century, but it continues under new forms and structures of domination.

To decolonize is to dismantle those political, economic, social, cultural and mental systems that still rule. Decolonization is a long-term process that does not happen once and forever. We can achieve independence from a foreign power and be more dependent on its economic hegemony. We can conquer a certain economic sovereignty yet continue being culturally subjugated. We can be fully acknowledged in our cultural identity by the new Bolivian constitution and yet continue to be prisoners of a western consumerist vision. This is perhaps the most difficult part of the decolonization process: liberating our minds and souls, which have been captured by false and alien concepts.

To build Vivir Bien we have to decolonize our territories and our being. The decolonization of territory means self-management and self-determination at all levels. Decolonization of the being is even more complex and includes overcoming many beliefs and values that impede our re-encounter with the Pacha.

In this context, the first step in Vivir Bien is to see with our own eyes, to think by ourselves, and to dream with our own dreams. A key point of departure is to encounter our roots, our identity, our history and our dignity. To decolonize is to reclaim our life, to recover the horizon. To decolonize is not to return to the past but to put the past in the present, to transform memory as an historical subject. As Rafael Bautista puts it,

“The linear course of time of modern physics is no longer of use to us; that is why we need a revolution in thinking, as part of the change. The past is not what is left behind and the future is not what is coming. The more we are conscious of the past the greater the possibility of producing the future. The real subject of history is not the past as past but the present, because the present is what always needs a future and a past.”[4]

Vivir Bien is a plea to recover the past in order to redeem the future, amplifying the overlooked voices of the communities and Mother Earth.[5]

Decolonization means rejecting an unjust status quo and recovering our capacity to look deeply so as not to be trapped by colonial categories that limit our imagination. To decolonize is to respond to the injustices that are committed against other beings (human and non-human), to break down the false limits between humanity and the natural world, to say aloud whatever we think, to overcome the fear of being different, and to restore the dynamic and contradictory equilibrium that has been shattered by a dominant system and way of thinking.


Constitutionalization and implementation

Any institutionalization and formalization of a cosmovision always entails a dismemberment of that vision. Some aspects will be featured and others left aside. Some meanings will stand out while others are lost. In the end there remains a mutilated corpus that may reach a wider audience although it is incomplete.

That is what occurred with Vivir Bien and Buen Vivir under the governments of Evo Morales and Rafael Correa. For the first time, after centuries of exclusion, the indigenous peoples’ vision was recognized and incorporated as a core element in the political agendas of both countries. Suma qamaña and sumak kawsay were made central points of reference in the official discourse. Everything began to be done in its name.

Vivir Bien and Buen Vivir were included, in differing wording, in the new constitutions of both countries in 2008 and 2009. In Ecuador’s case, the term “sumak kawsay” appears five times and “Buen Vivir” 23 times, even giving rise to a Chapter (Rights of Buen Vivir) and a Title (Rules of Buen Vivir) in the new constitution.

However, when we take a close look at how this concept is developed, we find it has been incorporated as:

1. An ideal to achieve: A new form of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature, to achieve the good way of living, the sumak kawsay (Preamble)

2. A way of life: The State shall promote forms of production that assure the good way of living of the population... (Art. 319)

3. A set of rights such as: water and food, healthy environment, information and communication, culture and science, education, habitat and housing, health, labour and social security (Title II, Chapter 2)

4. A concept of what is entailed by development and productivity:

The development structure is the organized, sustainable and dynamic group of economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems which underpin the achievement of the good way of living (sumak kawsay). (Art. 275)

Planning national development ... to enable access to the good way of living (Art. 3)

To develop technologies and innovations that promote national production, raise efficiency and productivity, improve the quality of life and contribte to the achievement of the good way of living. (Art. 385)

In the case of the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, “Vivir Bien” is mentioned seven times and “suma qamaña” once. Unlike the Ecuadorian version of rights of Buen Vivir, the Bolivian text presents it as a set of ethical-moral principles: The State adopts and promotes the following as ethical, moral principles of the plural society: ama qhilla, ama llulla, ama suwa (do not be lazy, do not be a liar or a thief), suma qamaña (live well), ñandereko (live harmoniously), teko kavi(good life), ivi maraei (land without evil) and qhapaj ñan (noble path or life). (Art. 8)

Similarly, in the new Bolivian constitution it is presented as an ideal to achieve, a way of life, and it is linked to productive development of the industrialization of natural resources. (Art. 313)

To summarize, the Ecuadorian version puts greater emphasis on a vision of rights while in the Bolivian version it is closer to an ethical-moral concept. Nevertheless, in both constitutions those concepts co-exist with, are hinged on and instrumentalized in terms of a dominant developmentalist and productivist vision throughout the text.

Without denying the importance and the major difficulties involved in the drafting and approval of these constitutions, it is obvious that in their incorporation Vivir Bien, Buen Vivir and sumak qamaña lost much of their substance. They were transformed more in symbolic terms of recognition of the Andean indigenous peoples than in points of inflection for the capitalist developmentalist model that still exists under the so-called “plural economy.”

But beyond its formal inclusion in the constitution, the laws and development plans, it is fundamental to appreciate what has happened to this vision during the last decade. How has it been implemented? To what degree has it been given concrete expression in various aspects of life in these two countries?

To answer these questions, let us look at what has occurred at the level of the economy, nature and the strengthening of the communities and social organizations which, at the end of the day, will always be the principal protagonists of any process of change.

Populist extractivism

Both governments contend that we are following the road of Vivir Bien notwithstanding the difficulties and problems. The proof, they say, is in the statistics of GDP growth, the reduction of poverty, the increase in their international monetary reserves, the increase in public investment, the expansion of infrastructure in roads, health care, education, telephones and many other indicators.

The figures are real and in some cases very significant. GDP has grown by an average 4.2% per year in Ecuador and 5.0% in Bolivia: poverty has been reduced to 11% of the population in Ecuador and in Bolivia extreme poverty has fallen to 16%. This is due principally to an increase in public investment, from 4.2% to 15.6% of GDP in Ecuador and from 14.3% to 19.3% of GDP in Bolivia. This increase has made way for various social programs, bonos or conditional cash grants as the World Bank calls them, and in both countries inequality of income, as measured by the Gini index, has declined.

These achievements of the last decade were due to an increase in state revenues from the boom in raw materials prices and the renegotiation in some cases of the contracts with the transnational corporations. In Bolivia the nationalization of hydrocarbons did not mean statization of foreign companies but a renegotiation of the distribution of profits. The share of total profits the gas transnationals get through earnings and recoverable costs declined from 43% in 2005 to only 22% in 2013. This meant that the Bolivian government had eight times more revenue, rising from $673 million in 2005 to $5.459 billion in 2013. This increase in state revenues has allowed a leap in public investment, the award of bonos, the development of infrastructure projects, the extension of basic services, the increase in international reserves and other measures.

There is no doubt that the conditions of life have improved for various sectors of these populations, and that explains the popular support still enjoyed by both governments. However, are we really on the road to Vivir Bien?

Today the prices of hydrocarbons and raw materials have dropped as a result of the deceleration in China’s economy and both countries are moving dangerously toward economic crisis. Their revenues from raw materials exports have begun to fall, the international reserves are beginning to decline and external indebtedness is rising. Factories that were previously statized — for example, Bolivia’s ENATEX — are closed. President Correa is signing free trade treaties with the European Union that he previously rejected. Bolivia has put up for sale $1 billion in bonds on Wall Street and Evo Morales travels to New York to attract foreign investment.

Why are we in this situation? Simply because of external factors or because of an inconsistency with Vivir Bien?

Ecuador and Bolivia, like Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, were captivated by the easy money from raw materials exports during the past decade. Although Bolivia and Ecuador, in their official discourse, told themselves the central objective was to reduce dependency on raw materials exports, cease being mono-export countries, diversity the economy, promote industrialization, increase productivity and add value to what they produced, there is no denying that today these economies are more dependent on exports of raw materials than before.

The diversification of the economy has not occurred because it was more profitable in the immediate context to bet on extractivism and raw materials exports. The progressive governments wanted to show immediate results, with public works and bonos, and the quickest way to obtain resources was to continue pursuing the course so often criticized in the past. With a discourse of Vivir Bien that was sometimes anticapitalist and progressive, they promoted a reinforcement of dependency on exports accompanied by some mechanisms of redistribution of income that did not alter the essence of the system of capitalist accumulation.

Notwithstanding the speeches, the transnationals and national oligarchies to a large extent continued to enrich themselves and benefit from this extractivist-populist model. In the case of Ecuador,

“The main economic activities are concentrated in a few companies: 81% of the soft drinks market is in the hands of one company; likewise, one company controls 62% of the market in meat; five sugar mills (with just three owners) control 91% of the sugar market; two companies, 92% of the cooking oil market; two companies control 76% of the market for hygienic products, and we could go on.... The profits of the hundred largest firms increased by 12% between 2010 and 2011, and they are close to a staggering $36 billion. It should be noted that the profits of business groups in the period 2007-2011 grew by 50% over the previous five years, which was the neoliberal period.” (Acosta, 2014)

In Bolivia the situation is similar. The profits of the banking system rose from $80 million in 2006 to $283 million in 2014. At the present time two transnational companies, PETROBRAS and REPSOL, handle 75% of the natural gas production. The minister of housing himself, in an “appeal to the conscience” of private enterprise that it invest in Bolivia, noted that residential construction industry profits increased from $900 million in 2005 to $4 billion in 2014.

In Bolivia the interests of the great majority of pre-2006 landlords have not been affected. Land surveys and titling that largely favoured the indigenous and peasants have been promoted but no attempt has been made to dismantle the power of the latifundistas. GMO-produced soy, which in 2005 represented only 21% of total exports of that product, accounted for 92% in 2012.

In practice the slogan “We want to be partners, not bosses” has been used to re-articulate a new alliance of the plurinational state with the old oligarchies. The government’s prevailing strategy has been to make agreements with the economic representatives of the opposition even while persecuting their political leaders. A sort of economic carrot and political stick which has meant that many sectors of the bourgeoisie that initially were in opposition have since come over to supporting the government.

Now that the time of the fat cows has ended, the old and new rich allied with these governments are beginning to take their distance from them and to build their own political alternatives. The exports share of the revenue pie chart has shrunk and the sectors with the most weight want to preserve their profits as best they can at the expense of the state and the rest of the population. Hence the return of post-populist neoliberalism. A return that comes not only from outside the “progressive governments” but also from within now that the governments themselves are beginning to adopt criteria of efficiency and neoliberal profitability, closing factories and trimming increases in benefits instead of affecting the dominant sectors in the economy that have been enriched during the last decade.

The economic crisis is eroding the popularity of the progressive governments and the Right that was previously their ally is sabotaging them from outside as well as inside by carrying out coup-like actions, as we have seen in Brazil. We are witnessing the end of the cycle of the progressive governments and also of that populist extractivism that has been applied in the name of Vivir Bien.

Abuse of nature

One of the postulates of Vivir Bien that is most disseminated is that of harmony not only between human beings but also with nature. The governments of Bolivia and Ecuador initially won renown for their emphasis on Mother Earth in their discourse. The Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 recognized the rights of nature. Bolivia followed suit in 2009 when it got the United Nations to back an international day of Mother Earth and in 2010 adopted the law on the rights of Mother Earth in its legislation.

Everything seemed to point to a change in the relationship with nature, especially in light of concrete proposals such as the Yasuni ITT initiative in Ecuador. In the latter case, President Correa promised to keep an area in the Yasuni National Park, a region rich in biodiversity, free of petroleum exploitation in exchange for economic compensation from the international community. Specifically, Ecuador would leave an equivalent of 856 million barrels of oil below the ground in return for payment by developed countries of $350 million annually. This was the first time a country had proposed to break with extractivism in order to conserve nature and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

However, Ecuador’s offer was not followed by the expected economic compensation. In 2013 Rafael Correa declared the Yasuni ITT initiative terminated and announced the beginning of petroleum exploitation in the area without even allowing a citizens’ consultation on the matter to take place.

Bolivia likewise began with great promise. Art. 255 of its new constitution provided for the “prohibition of importation, production and commercialization of genetically modified organisms.” However, in 2011the Plurinational Legislative Assembly adopted Law No. 144 concerning the Communitarian Agricultural Productive Revolution, which in Art.15 replaces the prohibition with a requirement of registration and labelling of GMOs: “Any product destined directly or indirectly for human consumption that is, contains or is derived from genetically modified organisms, shall be duly identified and indicate this condition.” Five years after the adoption of this law there is still no labelling of GMO products and production of GMO soy for export has increased exponentially.

Similarly, the protection of national parks and protected areas has been called into question. The government has approved norms and projects for oil and gas exploration and exploitation in such areas, and has attempted to build a highway through the middle of the TIPNIS national park, although its construction was paralyzed by the opposition of indigenous peoples in the region along with other sectors of the population.

Deforestation annually affects between 150,000 and 250,000 hectares of native forests, to the benefit above all of agro-industry, cattle raising and real estate speculators. The government has simply promised to end illegal deforestation by 2020 and has made no commitment to stop native deforestation in the current year, as recommended in Sustainable Development Goal 15.

Many mining, hydroelectric, petroleum and infrastructure projects are being approved and implemented without real environmental impact assessments. The government has even adopted projects for nuclear energy development despite the contrary provisions in the constitution and the Rights of Mother Earth law.

Between discourse and reality, between law and practice, there is a huge chasm in both countries. It is impossible to cite any example during the last decade in Bolivia in which the rights of Mother Earth have prevailed over the interests of extraction, pollution and depredation of nature. The law has remained on paper with no implementation of such provisions as the establishment of a Defensor de la Madre Tierra [Mother Earth ombudsman].

As Rafael Puente says: “The botton line seems to be: we denounce the abuse of Mother Earth by all the developed countries to the whole world, but we reserve for ourselves the need to mistreat Mother Earth until such time as we have reached a minimum level of development.”

Eduardo Gudynas maintains that the progressive governments “feel most comfortable with such measures as campaigns to stop using plastic or to replace light bulbs but they resist environmental controls over investors or exporters.” And he concludes that “the caudillos feel that environmentalism is a luxury that only the wealthiest can afford, so it is not applicable in Latin America until poverty is overcome.”

Weakening of the community and the social organizations

The essence of Vivir Bien is in the strengthening of the community, the promotion of complementarity in contrast to competition, and the pursuit of equilibrium in opposition to boundless growth. How have we advanced in those aspects? Are the indigenous communities and social organizations stronger today? Are they more complementary to each other? Have the differences, hierarchies and privileges been reduced? Is there much greater creativity on the part of the social movements? Has there been an increase in their capacity for initiative and recreation of alternative imaginaries?

If we look at Bolivia, where the process of change has relied from the beginning on strong indigenous and social organizations, we can say that in general the social movements and indigenous communities have been weakened, not strengthened, in the last decade.

What has happened is a sort of paradox. The indigenous communities and social organizations have received a series of material goods, infrastructures, credits, conditional cash grants and services. But instead of contributing to their strengthening as living and self-managing organisms, they have been weakened, even fragmented.

Before the 2005 election victory, the social movements in Bolivia had the capacity not only to stop some privatizing projects around water and gas, but also to bring together a major part of the population behind the proposal of recovery of territory, nationalization of hydrocarbons and redistribution of wealth. In other words, the indigenous peoples and social organizations were capable of building a societal alternative to neoliberalism. Today that dynamism has been lost; instead we have entered a phase of sectoral bargaining in which each and every sector has its demands and mobilizes in an effort to get from the Plurinational State the most it can in terms of public works, credits, tax shares, bonos, etc.

The property granted by the government to leaders of indigenous communities and social organizations has generated a clientelist logic of patronage. The social movements have ceased to be the protagonists of change and have been transformed into clients seeking things and works from the government. Each seeks to improve its particular situation through exerting pressure on the state as benefactor. It is no longer a question of changing Bolivia but of getting the best cut. In reality, the idea of building a new society based on indigenous values has been lost.

The indigenous communities, which for centuries resisted the Spanish conquistadors’ so-called modernity and capitalism have now become prisoners of this mirage thanks to the practices and discourse of their indigenous government, which tells them the task is to achieve a 5% increase in GDP growth per year over the next 15 years. The modernity of consumption and efficiency that in the past were resisted by the indigenous communities are now beginning to be accepted. Projects that previously were rejected by the peasant organizations, such as megadams, or were considered unthinkable, like a nuclear plant, are today accepted in the name of modernity. What the Conquest, the Republic and neoliberalism were unable to do over centuries, the present government has achieved in a decade: transforming the imaginary of a majority of indigenous peoples. Perhaps that is why the last census revealed a striking fact: the number of persons who considered themselves indigenous, far from increasing, had declined from 62% in 1990 to only 41% in 2013.[6]

An example of this expansion of capitalist modernity that erodes the communities and the indigenous vision is the high-risk Dakar competition that will travel through Bolivia for the fourth year in 2017. For any humanist, environmentalist and anticapitalist activist, the Dakar is a deplorable event that was brought to us through the direct intervention of the president of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. This year the government will pay $4 million to the organizers of this competition in order to get half of its journey to be held in Bolivia, including Lake Titicaca and La Paz.

The Dakar has nothing to do with the Bolivian reality or with Vivir Bien. It is a competition in which one needs at least $80,000 to participate; the competitors promote major transnational enterprises. The Dakar is a sort of Roman circus of the decadent era of fossil fuels. Each year some pilots and spectators are killed. The archeological damage and environmental impact are a real scourge for Mother Earth. The Dakar is a colonizing spectacle in violation of nature and human conscience. It is so widely questioned and the cost is so high that Chile and Peru no longer participate in it. However, the Dakar survives in Latin America thanks to the help and support of the indigenous and plurinational government of Bolivia.

The authorities justify and extol the Dakar, saying it is a performance that brings us closer to modernity, that it generates “economic movement” of more than $100 million, and that it serves to promote Bolivia as a tourist destination. If the objective really were to publicize the country the government could promote another class of events based on our cultural traditions, such as the Chasqui, for example. That is, an event in which one crosses Bolivia by foot, as the ancient Chasqui did, sharing experiences, knowledges of different regions and ecological strata, seeking complementarity among distinct knowledges, encouraging solidarity among participants and promoting the values of Vivir Bien and respect for nature.

However, the incredible thing is that there has been no discussion about this within the government or the social organizations. Critical voices are marginal and do not in fact come from the indigenous peoples, who were always critics of these practices. If it had ever occurred to any of the neoliberal governments to bring the Dakar to Bolivia, you can be sure that the social organizations would have organized road blockades in some of its stretches. However, no it is the indigenous government of the process of change that promotes it, and that completely reverses the values and principles they defended for centuries.

The social and indigenous organizations have also been eroded by corruption. Having more available resources, their leaders directly administering some funds, some have been corrupted or have ended up being accomplices by omission.

The indigenous, social and civil organizations that have opposed policies of the central government have been marginalized, ignored, worn down and even divided. The indigenous solidarity that was once a natural practice has broken down when indigenous sectors were repressed (TIPNIS and Takovo Mora) and the rest of the peasant and indigenous organizations have said nothing.

In short, Vivir Bien has been absent and confined solely to speeches.

 

Vivir Bien Is Possible

If what we have experienced is the application of an extractivist-populist model in the name of Vivir Bien, what might have been a practical implementation of Vivir Bien more consistent with its principles and vision? Is Vivir Bien possible in the reality of one country? Where is the problem? In its inapplicability beyond the limits of the indigenous communities? In the lack of understanding of this vision? Is this proposition ahead of its time?

It is not easy to answer these questions. A series of concrete proposals for its implementation have been advanced throughout the last decade but almost all have been partial or specific to a sector. There has been no articulated, integral and coherent proposal of measures to advance along the road of Vivir Bien in either Bolivia or Ecuador. Only some very useful approaches but of a particular character without a comprehensive complex of initiatives that would allow us to transform the reality in its many dimensions. The questioning of the poor or contradictory implementation of Vivir Bien, or of its lack of implementation, has not been accompanied by a holistic set of proposals at various levels. When it comes to applying Vivir Bien, we have forgotten one of its most important postulates: totality and completeness.

Overcoming statism

A key error was to think that Vivir Bien could be fully developed using state power, when in reality Vivir Bien is a proposal that is built on the basis of the society. The constitutional recognition of Vivir Bien and Buen Vivir deepens this illusion and encourages the belief that advances toward Vivir Bien could be made through a national state-based “development” plan when the secret of this vision in fact lies in the strengthening of the community, in boosting its capacity for complementarity with other communities and in the self-management of its territory.

In the case of Bolivia, the vice-president is the principal exponent of this statist vision which, applied in its extreme, is the opposite of Vivir Bien. As Álvaro García Linera has put it:[7]

The State is the only actor that can unite society. It is the State that takes on the synthesis of the general will, plans the strategic framework and steers the front carriage of the economic locomotive. The second carriage is Bolivian private investment. The third is foreign investment. The fourth is small business. The fifth is the peasant economy and the sixth, the indigenous economy. This is the strategic order in which the country’s economy must be organized.”

This vision of an all-powerful state that oversees everything is contrary to Vivir Bien. It is society that must determine its own course if we are to counteract the perverse dynamic that any state power involves.

In the Bolivian case we have always spoken of an internal struggle between the exponents of “developmentalism” and the “pachamamistas,” between the “modernists” and the adherents of Vivir Bien. However, it must be said that the error of the “pachamamistas” and supporters of Vivir Bien was that we too were profoundly statist. We thought that in opposition to the neoliberalism that had dismantled the state the fundamental thing was to give more power to the state, ignoring the essence of the logic of power.

The “pachamamistas” and the developmentalists have differed over the orientation that the empowerment of the state ought to take. For Bolivia’s vice-president, the fundamental objective was to enlist our forces

“in the implementation of a new economic model that I have provisionally called ‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism’. That is, the construction of a strong state that regulates the expansion of the industrial economy, extracts its profits and transfers them to the community in order to strengthen forms of self-organization and commercial development that are specifically Andean and Amazonian.”[8]

The discussion of this proposal was centered on the concept of “Andean-Amazonian capitalism” but not on the conception of the state that it implied. That was in the time of the “nationalization of hydrocarbons” and whatever pointed to the strengthening of the state seemed correct. The differences were more over the rationale of a strong state: was it to build Vivir Bien or to develop a new phase of capitalist construction?

The role of the state in the construction of Vivir Bien cannot be, nor should it be, that of an organizer and planner of society as a whole. The state must be one more factor that contributes to the empowerment of the communities and social organizations through practices that are not clientelist. That means that before providing the communities and social organizations with material goods such as vehicles, union headquarters or sports fields, it is necessary to encourage them to study, learn, analyze, debate, question, construct public policies and in many cases carry them out without awaiting a green light from the state. The concepts of sumaq qamaña and sumak kawsay survived for centuries in struggle against the Inca state, the colonial state, the republican, nationalist and neoliberal state. These were weighty communitarian visions and practices albeit without recognition by the established powers in each of those epochs. By “statizing” Vivir Bien we began to undermine its power as a force for self-management and interrogation.

Normally, for the Marxist left the objective is to take power in order to change society. This entails capturing and transforming the state in order to change society from above. However, the experience with “progressive” governments of the last decade would demonstrate to us that for Vivir Bien the taking of power should be in order to encourage even more the process of emancipation and self-determination from below, questioning and subverting all of the colonial structures that persist, including the new state forms that arise in the process of change.

Empowering the local and communitarian

Thinking in terms of the whole means that the economy must not be placed at the center in the construction of a new society. What we have seen in recent years is an obsession on the part of the misnamed governments of Vivir Bien with growth in terms of GDP that measures only the part of the economy that is commodified, that is, the production of goods and services that enter the capitalist market in a way that destroys nature and human beings.

Instead of economic growth for the capitalist market, efforts should be oriented to promoting the recovery of equilibrium at all levels — a search for equilibrium between different sectors of the economy and society that cannot be achieved without attacking the structural causes of inequality.

The present inequality, which is severe, cannot be overcome through conditional cash grants or transfers of money to the poorer sectors. Redistribution cannot be limited to the reassignment of the fraction of revenue that is not appropriated by the economically more powerful sectors. The search for equality between human beings cannot be reduced to welfare programs while the big landlords, extractive enterprises and big bankers continue to accumulate substantial profits.

The experience of the last decade shows that the transnational enterprises and domestic oligarchies, when obliged by social pressure, may accept a redistribution of income so as not to lose all their profits. However, when the bonanza of international prices comes to an end and hits them in their pockets, they deploy all kinds of actions to remove the “progressives” from government and apply the most savage neoliberal policies.

It is not possible to modify substantially the redistribution of wealth without substantially altering the power of the powerful. What was done was to renegotiate contracts with the transnationals, put some enterprises under state ownership, and try to get on well with the banks, the agro-industrialists, some business sectors and to attract foreign investment that can be invested “fairly.”

This model — in first place the state, in second place domestic private investment, in third place foreign investment, in fourth place micro-enterprises, in fifth place the peasant economy, and in the last place the indigenous economy — has failed. The so-called “plural economy” was a delusion because it pretended that everyone was going to be recognized and enjoy equal conditions when in reality an hierarchical and pyramidal structure survived, in which the state substantively increased public investment while the private (national and foreign) sector simply reaped its profits without reinvesting and the micro-business, peasant and indigenous sector was relegated to a role as recipients of some public welfare programs.

Where could our efforts have been directed? Toward ensuring that the new economy be centered precisely on the peasant and indigenous economy and small-scale local economies. Toward ensuring a real redistribution of the wealth concentrated in the hands of the financial, extractivist and agro-industrial sectors. To do this it was fundamental to go back and redistribute the property of the big landlords, to regulate private banking more effectively and gradually bring it under state ownership, to make more efficient use of the resources of the extractive industries in order to promote projects that would help us escape extractivism, and to promote the strengthening of the local and communitarian economies and small and medium business owners through strengthening their capacity for self-management and complementarity.

The true potential of countries like Bolivia is in agro-ecology, agro-forestry, the strengthening of food sovereignty based on the indigenous and peasant communities. In that perspective the fundamental role of the state should not be to create communitarian enterprises from above but to empower the networks of production, exchange, credit, traditional knowledges and innovation at the local level and with the active participation of the local actors. But what predominated was not the strengthening of the communitarian social fabric but the production of dazzling and showy works that would have immediate demonstrative impact. Ecological production free of transgenics was left to the speeches while in the deeds the consumption of agro-toxins and glyphosates was increased in the country during the last decade.

The promotion of mega-infrastructure projects, mega-dams, and nuclear research centers is part of an obsolete model of capitalist development from the last century. Far from trying to proceed by way of this “modernity,” which is beginning to be abandoned by the countries of the North themselves, it is necessary to leap over stages and to take advantage of the most recent advances in science from a communitarian, social and not privatizing perspective. That means looking to community, family and municipal solar and wind energy to transform Bolivians from mere consumers of electrical energy into producers of electricity.

The empowerment of communities must include benefiting from ancestral practices and knowledges and combining them with the most recent technological advances provided that they help to re-establish equilibrium with nature and strengthen human communities. Renewable energies are not in themselves a solution to the systemic crisis since they can also be used to displace populations, gain control over resources and reconfigure capitalism.

The experience of the last decade clearly shows that a plural economy can only be achieved if the domination of capital is overcome. This is not done through making anticapitalist speeches but by taking effective measures in opposition to the finance capital that is the backbone of capitalism. If measures are not taken to dismantle big business, the other components of the plural economy will always be marginalized and ignored.

Placing local and community production in the center does not mean abandoning or setting aside state enterprises and public services which, by their very nature, can best be managed and provided at the state and national level. This applies, for example, to banking or essential public services like education, health care and telecommunications that must be universal in nature. However, such state undertakings and public services should be accompanied by effective mechanisms for citizen participation in order to avoid their bureaucratization and corruption, and be adapted to the realities experienced in each region.

We have always criticized the expression “export or die,” which was coined by the neoliberal governments. However, the “progressive” governments have fallen for the same dynamic. The production they favour is one that produces foreign exchange, so they allow the big agribusiness corporations to export GMO-produced soy or accept a free-trade treaty with the European Union in order to promote banana exports.

In the Vivir Bien framework, the objective is to generate greater resilience in the local and national economies faced with the vagaries of the crisis-ridden global economy. It is not a question of abandoning exports but of ensuring that the economy does not revolve around the export of a handful of products. The goal is to be more sovereign, strengthening the local human communities and ecosystems of the Earth.

Free-trade agreements have a distinct logic. They force countries, industries and companies that are completely unequal to compete as if they were equal. In such conditions the winners will always be the transnational corporations, the big agribusiness interests and the most powerful sectors of finance capital. The free-trade rules of the World Trade Organization, the regional and bilateral free-trade treaties, undermine the possibility of building a society of Vivir Bien because they privilege the big corporations to the prejudice of the small producer.

The experience of the last decade shows us that it is not sufficient to reject or overturn the free-trade treaties; it is necessary to advance by implementing measures to control foreign trade, to achieve a [state] monopoly over foreign trade and effective control of smuggling. Without the application of this type of measures, competition from transnational production and contraband will manage to undermine local, community and national economies as has occurred under the so-called progressive governments.

In the present global economy it is not possible to achieve full import substitution in one country. The small economies will always be more dependent on imports. Accordingly, it is very important to regulate imports to ensure that foreign exchange is not oriented to excessive consumption and is instead directed to items that are essential to the strengthening of the local economies.

This objective cannot be achieved only through mechanisms to control foreign trade but requires as well the effective promotion of cultural patterns of sustainable consumption. Under the progressive governments the income of sectors of the population has improved, but the same practices of consumption and waste of capitalist societies have continued.

To be nature

The slogan sembrar el petróleo [“sow the oil”], that is, to promote more extractivism in order to diversify the economy, embraced by President Correa, is an illusion. Just as alcoholism cannot be overcome by ingesting more alcohol, extractivism cannot be overcome by promoting more extractivism.

In dependent capitalist countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, the struggle against extractivism becomes extremely difficult through the articulation of the logic of capital and the logic of power. Extractivism is the quickest way to obtain dollars, and that is essential for retaining governmental power. Thus extractivism creates a perverse addiction that undermines the efforts at diversification of the economy and construction of Vivir Bien. In Bolivia today everyone is more addicted to the rent derived from hydrocarbons: the central and departmental governments, municipalities, universities, armed forces, indigenous leaders and the general population.

To break with this addiction it is necessary to recognize, first, that it exists. If, in Bolivia’s case, a fraction of the billions of dollars in public funds invested in oil and gas exploration were invested in solar energy and community wind power, not only could we satisfy the entire national demand but we could also envisage exporting clean electrical energy instead of continuing to sell fossil fuels that further climate warming.

The same can be said in relation to deforestation. Instead of drawing up plans for reforestation, which is extremely costly, takes too long to yield results, has uncertain outcomes, and will never compensate for the wealth and biodiversity of the native forests we have destroyed, what should be done is to learn from the indigenous communities that live in coexistence with the forest, and promote agroforestry initiatives. The argument that without deforestation we cannot guarantee the food security of Bolivians is a false one. According to official statistics, since 2001 more than 8.6 million hectares have been deforested, while the total area of the country that is under cultivation has increased by only 3.5 million hectares, of which 1.9 million hectares are devoted to industrial agriculture, predominantly soy for export (1.2 million hectares).

The reason why the rights of nature have remained on paper up to now is that the progressive governments have no desire for authorities that effectively limit their extractivist projects. The rights of nature and of Mother Earth require autonomous mechanisms and regulations to reduce and punish the constant violations that are committed against ecosystems, and above all to promote the restoration and recovery of those areas that have been affected.

The nationalization of natural resources like oil does not mean that they can be exploited to the last drop. State ownership of polluting or consumerist industries does not convert them into clean and sustainable enterprises. The experience of the last decade teaches us that it is not enough to nationalize or statize the means of production (mines, oil and gas deposits, etc.); it is necessary to transformer them and replace them with other means that allow the flourishing of more just and equitable ecosocieties.

As was stated in the People’s Agreement drafted and adopted in the first World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, it is productivism, and not just capitalism, that must be overcome:

“The Soviet experience has shown us that a predatory production system with devastating conditions that make life similar to that of capitalism was possible with other ownership relationships. The alternatives must lead to a profound transformation of civilization. Without this profound transformation, it will not be possible to continue life on planet Earth. Humanity is faced with a huge dilemma: continue down the road of capitalism, patriarchy, Progress and death, or embark on the path of harmony with nature and respect for life.”[9]

Full cultural diversity

One of the greatest strengths of the changes that have occurred under the progressive governments has to do with the recognition of cultural diversity. In Bolivia’s case, the concept of a Plurinational State is an achievement that, if applied to the realities of other countries, can be of assistance in the coexistence of different nationalities and nations within the same territory. Other very important advances are the recognition of native languages, the requirement that civil servants speak at least two languages (Castellano and an indigenous language), recognition of the indigenous autonomies and the native indigenous campesino justice system.

However, many of those propositions have remained only in the Constitution and some laws, and in reality have encountered major problems in their implementation. In Bolivia, of the twelve municipalities that opted in 2009 to be indigenous autonomies only one has managed to complete the entire legal process for becoming an indigenous autonomy. The law has been characterized as “an obstacle race” by the indigenous communities and the Tierras Comunitarias de Origen.[10] There has been no effective policy under the indigenous central government for encouraging the constitution of indigenous autonomies that are self-governing, exercising communitarian democracy without political parties, and with the right to be consulted concerning proposals for the exploitation of natural resources in their territories.

Indigenous law has been recognized but restricted to the communities, the regular justice system having de facto supremacy over indigenous justice. There is little recognition of the great contribution that could be made through the establishment of a more flexible justice system that is free of charge, respectful of nature and seeks resolution of disputes through participative consensus.

Depatriarchalization

In constitutional and legal terms there have been important advances in gender equity and the participation of women in government and the parliament. A set of norms has been adopted in relation to land, equality of opportunities, violence against women, maternal breast-feeding, women’s health, job security for mothers, retirement, etc. These are an advance in legal terms. The proportion of women in the National Assembly, municipal councils, the cabinet and other governmental bodies is among the highest in the world.

However, Bolivia still has a long way to go in breaking from patriarchal customs and prejudices. And the latter are reinforced by a series of male chauvinist practices and images based on expressions, jokes and valuations that issue from the central core of the government, which is still essentially made up of men.

The patriarchal order located in the family, communal and state structures survives and is reproduced in multiple forms which sometimes go unnoticed. Chauvinist jokes and comments by senior officials are not answered by ministers and members of the Assembly, and instead are sometimes justified. The greater presence of women in positions of political responsibility has not been translated into actions aimed at dis-establishing power relationships that reproduce the subordination and oppression of women. Discriminatory stereotypes and cultural patterns persist and are fueled by the conduct of the most influential men.

The model of production and redistribution of wealth to the detriment of women, the role of men and women in household labour, the separation between public and private life have not been substantially affected. Women’s autonomy over their bodies and their right to decide whether they will have children remain restricted, and violence against women, sometimes resulting in their death, continues to be an everyday reality.

In its original conception, Vivir Bien did not emphasize the subject of depatriarchalization at the level of the family, society and the state. However, it is clear that this is an essential component in advancing toward a society of equilibrium between all human beings and with nature.

Real democracy

Vivir Bien postulates respect, equilibrium and complementarity among the different parts of the whole. However, what we have seen in the progressive governments has been an attempt by the Executive to monopolize and control the other powers. The defeat of the most recalcitrant expressions of the neoliberal right has not translated into a relaunching of a vigorous democracy in which the parliamentarians propose, criticize and adopt rules based on their own criteria or those of their constituents. What we have seen instead is the replacement of neoliberal democracy by a democracy of hand raisers that simply follow the instructions of the central government.

In Bolivia the Executive has adopted manners and skills for controlling the major organs of justice, ensuring that proposals as novel as the election of judges in the most important positions of a judicial nature remain devalued and discredited. Likewise, the participation and social control established in the new Constitution have remained on paper.

Without a real and effective democracy it is not possible to advance in the self-management, self-determination and empowerment of the communities and social organizations that are essential to Vivir Bien. The exercise of democracy entails limiting the power of the powerful and the state itself. If the central government instrumentalizes popular participation, coopts the social organizations and controls the various powers of the state, the construction of a real democracy is crippled. This democracy is a key piece in the construction of Vivir Bien at the level of a country or a region because any government and people are going to make mistakes in the construction of a new ecosociety, and the only way to detect those mistakes, correct them and re-imagine new paths is with the collaboration of everyone.

International complementarity

The experience of this decade shows us clearly that Vivir Bien is not possible in a single country in the context of a global economy that is capitalist, productivist, patriarchal and anthropocentric. If this vision is to advance and thrive, a key element is its articulation and complementarity with other similar processes in other countries. This process cannot be limited to the promotion of agreements for integration that do not follow the rules of free trade, nor can it exist merely at the level of states or governments. One of the biggest shortcomings of the last decade was probably the failure of alliances of social and indigenous movements to develop independently of the progressive governments. Looking back, the global justice movement in Latin America, instead of becoming stronger, was weakened by its inability to articulate its own independent vision of change. It confused its utopias with the political plans of the progressive governments and lost its capacity to criticize and to dream.

If the processes of transformation are to flourish, they need to expand beyond the national borders and into the countries that now colonize the planet in different forms. Without that dissemination to the crucial centers of global power, the processes of change will end up isolating themselves and losing vitality until they have repudiated the very principles and values that once gave birth to them.

To that extent the future of Vivir Bien largely depends on the recovery, reconstruction and empowerment of other visions that to varying degrees point toward the same objective in the different continents of the planet. Vivir Bien is possible only through complementarity with and feedback from other systemic alternatives.


[1] Josef Estermann, “Crecimiento cancerígeno versus el Vivir Bien,” 2012.

[2] Pablo Mamani Ramírez, “Qamir qamaña: dureza de ‘estar estando’ y dulzura de ‘ser siendo,’ in Ivonne Farah H. and Luciano Vasapollo (ed.), Vivir bien: ¿Paradigma no capitalista? (CIDES-UMSA, 2011), pp. 65-75.

[3] Javier Medina, “Acerca del Suma Qamaña,” in Vivir Bien: ¿Paradigma no capitalista? (CIDES-UMSA, 2011), pp. 39-64.

[4] Rafael Bautista S., “Hacia una constitución del sentido significativo del ‘vivir bien’,” in Vivir Bien: ¿Paradigma no capitalista? (CIDES-UMSA, 2011), pp. 93-122.

[5] Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “Pachakuti: los horizontes históricos del colonialismo interno,” in Violencias (re) encubiertas en Bolivia (La Paz, 2010), pp. 39-63. English translation published by NACLA as “Aymara Past, Aymara Future.”

[6] The decline was even sharper than Solón indicates, as it occurred in little more than a decade. “The growing Andean nation's 2001 census showed that 62 percent, or 3.14 million, of the population over 15 years old identified as part of an indigenous group, while according to new data that figure has fallen to roughly 40 percent, or 2.8 million.” (Indian Country, “Where Have All the Indigenous Gone? Bolivia Sees 20 Percent Drop.”) – Tr.

[7] Garcia Linera, “Fue un error no liderar el pedido autonómico,” interview in El Deber, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 21 January 2007, quoted by Pablo Stefanoni in “L’Indianisation du nationalisme ou la refondation permanente de la Bolivie,” in the journal Alternatives Sud published by CETRI: “La Bolivie d’Evo. Démocratique, indianiste et socialiste?,” Vol XVI -2009/3, Louvain-la-Neuve. See Eric Toussaint, “Is Bolivia heading for Andean-Amazonian capitalism?,” http://www.cadtm.org/Is-Bolivia-heading-for-Andean.

[8] Álvaro García Linera, “El ‘capitalismo andino-amazónico’,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2006.

[9] The statement cited here appears not in the People’s Agreement but in the Final Conclusions of Working Group I at the conference, on the topic of Structural Causes. – Translator.

[10] TCOs: native community lands, one of the two territorial entities eligible under the Constitution to establish an indigenous autonomy, the other being a municipality with an indigenous majority. – Translator