Showing posts with label New Democratic Party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label New Democratic Party. Show all posts

Sunday, August 16, 2020

More on that failed fusion experience: a report from the past

Introduction

John Riddell, in his “Inquest into a failed socialist fusion” published last November, cited a number of reasons behind the ultimate failure of the RWL/LOR[1] to live up to the ambitions of its founding components.[2]

One was the false rationale behind the fused organization’s “turn to industry,” initially a campaign to persuade a large number of comrades to take jobs in Canada’s major industrial unions. The “industrial turn,” says John, “was based not on existing reality but on a prediction regarding future conditions. Such a future-based orientation is impervious to the test of experience.” John’s analysis largely focuses on the period after 1980, the year in which the RWL and I parted company.

In a parallel critique of the fusion experience cited by John, Bernard Rioux points to a related factor, in my opinion of more importance in the first years following the 1977 fusion: political differences within the new organization over the course of the class struggle in the Canadian state.

“The first year of the LOR/RWL (1977-78) was marked by some definite successes in the building of a Trotskyist organization in the Canadian state.

“But significant political differences soon reappeared: in our activities, in writing articles, and in the educational content of the members. Was it necessary to call ‘For an NDP government,’ the traditional slogan of the LSA/LSO, or should we have been advocating abstention in the elections, the traditional position of the GMR? Would we call for an NDP vote in English Canada while rejecting it in Quebec? How were we to explain our support for independence? Responses differed as the issues arose in quick succession.

“The differences were expressed around three sets of problems: what was the weight of the Quebec national question in the Canadian revolution; what form and rhythm was our involvement in the unions to take; and what weight should be given to the new radicalizing layers among women and gays and lesbians?”

A significant minority within the RWL/LOR leadership began to dispute the answers the majority leadership was posing to these questions. The following report, which I gave to our united leadership on behalf of the Political Committee minority in May 1979, explains our view of the issues at that time.

The political context was the preparation of the RWL/LOR’s approach to the May 22 federal election. Our debate occurred in the wake of the organization’s April 1979 convention, where these differences were first clearly expressed. My report reflected the valuable input of such comrades as Riddell, Ernie Tate and the late Colleen Levis. I think it stands up well, even now. Apologies for its length; I have never been a “man of few words”!

Worth noting are a few pseudonyms. Tyson is Steve Penner. Samuels is Judy Rebick. My byline replaces the pseudonym used in the report as published in the RWL/LOR, from which I have scanned the text.

Incidentally, here are the results registered in the May 22 federal election, when the Conservatives under Joe Clark were elected to office with less than a parliamentary majority.

Richard Fidler

* * *

Report to Political Committee on federal election campaign, May 6, 1979

By Richard Fidler

The following report reflects the line of the PC minority. It was rejected by a vote of 5 for, 8 against.

(The information on the CLC campaign in this report was compiled with the assistance of Comrade Dennis Marlon of the Toronto branch.)

I want to deal with four things in this report: 1. the Canadian Labor Congress campaign in support of the NDP; 2. the question of the NDP in Quebec; 3. the election statement and draft platform of the majority leadership; and 4. what we should be doing with the RWL campaign.

Political Context

Any bourgeois election campaign presents an important opening for a small propaganda group like the RWL to fight for our ideas and our program. This is all the more true in the current context—one of rising class struggle, both internationally and in Canada.

We are now in the fifth straight year of capitalist “austerity.” Workers’ real wages continue to decline; unemployment remains at post-Depression records and threatens to rise still further. Slashing cutbacks in social services continue apace; democratic rights are under attack on all fronts.

Lacking a class-struggle leadership, workers have taken some harsh blows from the capitalist offensive. Yet they have suffered no decisive defeats. Their combativity remains intact, and is rising. Strikes are increasing in number; they are harder fought (Inco, CUPW). Nationalist sentiment continues to deepen in Quebec. This pattern in Canada reflects a similar pattern internationally—from the revolutionary up­surge in Iran to the rising workers’ struggles in Western Europe and the United States.

Among working people there is less and less confidence in the ability of the capitalist system to “deliver the goods”—to maintain, let alone improve, the standard of living and rights of the masses. Everywhere we find growing receptivity to socialist ideas.

These developments must shape our approach to the election campaign. Above all, we must be concrete: the basic themes of our class-struggle program must be directly linked to the experiences of the mass of working people.

Our central axis must be class political independence from the bourgeoisie. On all the major questions facing the workers and their allies, we outline a class-against-class response. This includes the fight against the imperialist war drive; against capitalist austerity and the anti-working class offensive, for the shorter workweek and the sliding scale of wages; for the rights of the oppressed, above all active defense of Quebec’s right to self-determination in English Canada and the fight for independence and national liberation in Quebec.

At the apex of our program is the concept of the workers and farmers government, a government of the workers and their strategic allies that governs in their interests.

This program must be linked to the actual struggles of working people as they are unfolding today—from solidarity with the struggles of the Iranian workers and peasants, to the fight against nuclear power.

In the election campaign, as in all our activities, we advance a program to unite the working class and the oppressed in struggle independently of the bourgeoisie.

1. The CLC campaign in support of the NDP

The Canadian Labor Congress’s campaign to mobilize union support behind the NDP is the most
favorable opening for us in this election—both for what it means in the class struggle, and as an opportunity to turn the RWL outward and get a feel for the situation in the unions.

Some of the main aspects of this campaign were described in the article in the April 9 issue of Socialist Voice (“Unions mobilize behind NDP election effort”). The campaign is without precedent; it is probably the CLC’s most important involvement with the NDP since the founding of the labor party in the early 1960s. The campaign is “separate but parallel” to the NDP’s. Seminars have been held at various points across the country, involving up to 500 or more union stewards, local presidents and executives, committee people, business agents, and in some cases rank-and-file militants. Local unions are distributing leaflets,
stickers, and buttons at plant-gates, on the shop floor, and door to door; the theme is “The perfect union—me and the NDP” (in French, “L’union fait la force”).

Union newspapers carry extensive coverage on the NDP; examples are the four-page inserts in the CBRT&GW’s Canadian Transport and the CUPE newspaper, The Public Employee. Most of this material appears also in the French-language editions of the union newspapers. In addition, the Quebec Federation of Labor has put out a special eight-page election edition of its monthly Le Monde Ouvrier; besides listing all the NDP candidates in Quebec, and calling on workers to support them, it contains numerous articles on the struggle against wage controls, the fight of the postal workers, unemployment, inflation, women’s rights, health and safety in the workplace, the situation of working farmers, and the RCMP and repression.

Phone banks have been established in many areas; the goal is to contact union members individually to talk about the NDP with them. Immigrant workers are reached in their own language.

Many union officials and newspapers compare the election effort to labor’s mobilization in the cross-country strike against wage controls on October 14, 1976. It is certainly labor’s biggest mobilization since then.

The model frequently cited is a federal by-election in Newfoundland last fall, when unions—in particular, the Canadian Paperworkers Union and the Newfoundland Fishermen’s Union—mobilized in support of the NDP, increasing its vote from 4 percent in the previous election to 44 percent and electing an MP.

The basic theme of the union campaign is that it is not enough to “defeat Trudeau.” Workers must vote for a party that is based on the unions, and that can defend the interests of working people. Union literature emphasizes the need to defeat both Trudeau and Clark, and with them the parties of big business. The pro-NDP campaign is explained as a continuation of labor’s campaign against the wage controls.

The context of the campaign, as I have mentioned, is the increasing politicization of workers and their unions in response to the capitalist crisis. It corresponds to and is an extension of similar developments we have noted outside the federal election arena—for example, the growing involvement of the Metropolitan Toronto labor council with the NDP at the municipal level, as in the recent campaign in the city’s Ward 4 aldermanic by-election, and the slate of NDP-Labor Council candidates in last November’s civic elections.

The campaign is centered in key industrial unions that we have targeted for colonization—Steel, Auto, the IWA, as well as the CPU and other unions like CUPE. It involves many unions not affiliated to the NDP, or not previously identified with the party. An example is the Public Service Alliance of Canada, one of the country’s largest unions; the pro-NDP campaign is the concrete form taken by PSAC’s earlier proposal to form “Political Action Committees” during the election to fight Bill C-22. At a CLC election strategy meeting in Toronto March 1, unions representing about 90 percent of the CLC’s 2.3 million members were present. Only 10 percent of CLC members are actually affiliated members of the NDP.

Response to the campaign

The campaign is strongest in the industrial union centers—union bastions like Sudbury, Brantford, and Windsor in Southern Ontario. At a union election seminar in Windsor, the 600 militants present adopted a proposal to publish a leaflet on women’s issues in the campaign.

In Winnipeg, unions have focused their activity in Bird’s Hill riding, where the NDP has strong chances of election. The unions’ May Day rally was to feature NDP candidates as speakers. In Vancouver, the Steelworkers and IWA are in the forefront of the campaign.

It was reported in the Toronto branch that in Hamilton, the new leadership in the 10,000-member Steel local 1005 at Stelco, led by the ex-”Waffle” militant Cec Taylor, campaigned to “put 1005 behind the NDP.” This is particularly significant because the Liberal party has traditionally played an influential role in that union.

In Toronto, the UAW held a “cadre school” on the elections attended by some 300 local union officers and militants. Comrade Joe Flexer attended; he reports he received a good response when he criticized the NDP program in the framework of supporting the CLC’s initiative. The CLC campaign is relatively weak in Toronto; one factor is the slow pick-up by Steel locals, most of which have been immersed in local elections until last week.

I’ll deal with Quebec at greater length later in this report. It’s worth noting, however, that at Sept-Îles on the Côte Nord, one of the centers of the May 1972 upsurge, a leader of the Steelworkers union, the main union in the area, is running as an NDP candidate. At Ste-Thérèse the president of the UAW local at General Motors is the NDP candidate. Comrade Joe Young went up there and found that the local was discussing support for the NDP campaign at its membership meeting.

At the Ontario Federation of Labor women’s conference, as Linda Blackwood reports in the April 30 Socialist Voice, the question of the NDP was a dominant theme.

Perhaps most interesting is the shop-floor response to this campaign. Everywhere, comrades report, the distribution of pro-NDP literature in their factories sparks political discussions. As Comrade Art Young says, it “changes the atmosphere in the plant,” politicizing it.

The bourgeoisie is paying close attention to the CLC campaign. The Financial Post and Globe and Mail, two leading big-business mouthpieces, have in particular described its impact in the unions, and speculated publicly on the longer-term implications for the labor movement. The New York Times has also discussed its importance.

Some weaknesses

It’s easy to spot the weaknesses in the CLC campaign. In the Voice article we listed four main ones.

  1. The “critical support to a (capitalist) minority government” line of the CLC and NDP leadership. The union brass are focusing their efforts on only 60 ridings, where they estimate the NDP has the best chances of victory. The aim is to elect enough NDP MPs to hold the “balance of power” in the next Parliament, should neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives get a majority. We have explained what is wrong with this approach. However, we should note that the logic of the campaign is to center less and less on that narrow electoralist goal, and increasingly on the general theme: “more New Democrats.” The “balance” of parliamentary power is not a perspective with much appeal to rank-and-file unionists!
  2. The campaign is not conceived as a break from tripartism and class collaborationism. For the union brass, it is their complement; by increasing NDP strength it is designed to increase the CLC’s ability to press for tripartite deals with the employers and government. In this, of course, the CLC’s approach does not differ at all with the NDP’s program, which is class-collaborationist to the core. As we have always pointed out, the fact that the unions are campaigning in support of the NDP’s program, a program that doesn’t differ substantially from the program of the capitalist parties, seriously undercuts the potential political impact of the campaign.
  3. The CLC campaign is organized strictly from the top down. It is not designed to encourage rank and file members to mobilize on their own behind the NDP. Few mass meetings are being organized during the campaign; instead, the union brass have focused their efforts on individual contact with workers, as through the “phone banks.”

We countered this in the Voice article by citing the experience in the Newfoundland by-election, when the Corner Brook paperworkers twice shut down the mill in strike action and canvassed support for the NDP. We have also pointed to the need to take the defense of workers struggles into the campaign—for example, by challenging the NDP and CLC to take up the defense of the postal workers union and the Inco strikers, and to speak out in defense of Quebec’s national rights.

  1. A glaring weakness, of course, is the campaign’s relatively limited character in Quebec. I’ll deal with that later.

A big step forward for labor movement

These are all important weaknesses of the CLC campaign, and we shouldn’t hesitate to explain them. But they should not blind us to the overriding positive nature of the campaign.

The analogy with the October 14, 1976 mobilization is an appropriate one. We see the same kind of contradictions: a mass mobilization of the union ranks for a class-collaborationist project. In the case of October 14, the general strike action was designed simply to build pressure for the CLC bureaucracy’s proposed “tripartite” labor-management-government collaboration in administering the capitalist economy. That didn’t stop us from seeing the immensely progressive nature of the proposed action; we jumped right in, and together with union militants everywhere helped to build it. We should recall that it was the rank-and-file activists, not the CLC brass, who ensured the success of October 14—making it a powerful demonstration of labor’s rejection of the capitalist austerity program. Likewise, it would be a big error to turn our backs on the current CLC campaign with ultimatist rhetoric and abstract denunciations, because of the reformist political content the union brass give it.

The campaign by the unions to build support for the NDP—even conducted as it is around programmatic support for the NDP, and with strictly electoralist methods—is highly progressive. The vast majority of workers in this country do not yet understand even the necessity to stop supporting the parties of the capitalists; according to one study, only 20 percent of trade unionists’ votes went to the NDP in the 1974 federal election, while the Liberals’ share was 51 percent.

We should get into this campaign and build it, as an important step in the direction of independent labor political action. The CLC-NDP campaign should be the central focus of our press, our candidates, and our forums during the election campaign.

Unfortunately, the approach of the majority leadership of the RWL has been exactly the opposite, up to now. The election statement published in our press takes a sectarian stance. In the English version, it mentions the CLC campaign only in negative terms. In the French version, there is no mention of the CLC campaign. In the draft platform the majority comrades have submitted to this PC meeting, they seem to have modified this position. The draft states: “The CLC campaign is an important step forward for Canadian labor and should be supported by all socialists.” (I presume that also means we think workers should support it, too.) But that is still the only positive thing we say about it. The rest is all badmouthing of the campaign, counterposing it to mass action by the union ranks for their demands. In other words, the R WL majority leadership accepts the framework imposed on the campaign by the CLC bureaucracy.

Our approach should be just the opposite. We should get into this campaign, and take our program into all the debates around it. We should link it with our proposed solutions to the capitalist crisis, including our program of mass-action struggle for transitional, democratic, and immediate demands.

There are some other things we should note about this development. We’ve debated whether we should favor affiliation by unions to the NDP. (The convention voted to favor affiliation when the Tendency 3 reporter on the national question incorporated the Tendency 4 amendments into the majority resolution.) Essentially what we were debating was whether it is progressive for unions to strengthen their ties with the NDP. That is the meaning of the CLC campaign: it is the concrete form today of the unions’ efforts to increase labor’s weight in the labor party. To the degree that the ranks become involved, this will increase the weight of workers in the party against the petty-bourgeois elements that predominate in the party’s leadership.

It is unclear at this point what the electoral impact of the CLC campaign will be, whether it will result in a qualitative increase in the NDP’s popular vote. But what is clear already is that it will have an impact on the unions going far beyond May 22, election day. It will shake up the whole CLC—not only in the narrow sense that the McDermott leadership has staked its reputation on the success of this maneuver, but more significantly in its implications for the unions and the union ranks. It puts the question of labor political action on a new footing. The NDP becomes more of a factor in labor’s struggles. Linked with the perspective of electing the NDP, labor’s struggles take on a greater political dimension.

This increased identification between the unions and the NDP will tend to raise the question of affiliation to the NDP in a number of local unions. We have already encountered that in CUPE’s Ontario Division.

Above all, it tends to raise political questions in the unions that we are in—unions that are central to the class struggle in this country. We have to be part of that process.

It is in the CLC campaign that we see motion in the working class in this election. Workers are mobilizing around this campaign in much greater numbers in this election that they are on the Quebec national question—important as the latter is in our program. The CLC-NDP campaign is the concrete form today of labor’s struggle for governmental power.

2. Quebec and the struggle for the labor party

In Quebec, we are fighting for a labor party that can lead the struggle for independence and socialism, the fight for a workers government. We advocate that the unions present workers candidates in elections—that they take the initiative in establishing a mass workers party.

In this framework, it was correct to support the initiative by the Rassemblement des Militants Syndicaux (RMS) and the GSTQ for 75 workers candidates” in the federal election. But our support should have been critical support—which it wasn’t. There were major errors in the RMS campaign.

  1. It was presented solely in a national framework. The workers’ candidates were to fight for Quebec’s national rights, and virtually nothing else. The campaign failed to address the question of government.
  2. It was sectarian with respect to the NDP in English Canada. The RMS petition denounced the NDP’s position on Quebec while failing to give the party critical support against the capitalist parties. In fact, it failed to make any distinction between the NDP and the capitalist parties. Moreover, while advocating a full slate of “workers’ candidates” in Quebec, the RMS failed to speak to the logic of this position—the need for a labor party in Quebec.
  3. The most important error, however, was that supporters of the RMS campaign did not take it into the unions as such. The entire axis of the campaign was to get individual signatures on a petition, instead of trying to get local unions to take the initiative in nominating candidates, and talking up the need for the unions to run candidates with the union membership, on the job. For the GSTQ and the RMS, the goal of the campaign was simply to mount pressure on the union bureaucracy, not to encourage action from below.

The draft election platform drawn up by the RWL majority leadership falls into the same trap, when it says that “the union federations rejected an appeal... for labor candidates.” The task was not to pressure the federations to field candidates, but to take the proposal for workers candidates to the ranks. For example, the Montreal transit workers union, with a relatively strong base of GSTQ and RMS supporters, might have been won to running a candidate.

The RMS campaign won significant support; the petition was signed by about 2,500 union members, including some secondary leadership elements. That is a significant demonstration of support for moves toward independent labor political action. Nevertheless, the campaign was, as Lutte Ouvriêre now says in its current issue, “a failure.” No workers candidates resulted from the campaign.

So what is the situation today in the Quebec labor movement, with respect to the federal election? In no other part of the country is the union bureaucracy so completely immersed in overt class-collaborationist politics. The leadership of the teachers union (CEQ) has issued a scarcely veiled call to vote for the Créditistes, an especially reactionary bourgeois party. In this it echoes the Parti Québécois leadership. The Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) leadership says defeat Trudeau at all costs, and condemns all the parties, including the NDP, equally. The leaders of the CLC’s Quebec affiliate, the Quebec Federation of Labor (FTQ), say defeat Trudeau ... by voting for NDP candidates.

As for the majority leadership of the RWL, it says (in this draft election platform) that “The FTQ support to the NDP is a bad joke.” (There is no criticism of the voting formulas of the other union federations.) The election platform counterposes the FTQ’s support of the NDP to the struggle for a labor party, just as Comrade Tyson did in his document on the NDP, when he said the FTQ stance was a “block” to the creation of a labor party (in Thesis 38). And Comrade Samuels echoes this position today in her report for the majority.

This approach is fundamentally wrong.

How is the FTQ’s endorsement of NDP candidates an obstacle to the fight for a labor party—the struggle for the unions to fight politically in opposition to the bourgeois parties? The FTQ at least draws a class line in the electoral arena. Are the CSN or CEQ positions any better? Aren’t they worse? The CSN and CEQ are on the wrong side of the class line. (And so are the FTQ leaders in cases where they support, covertly or overtly, candidates of the bourgeois parties.)

It is the labor bureaucracy’s support of bourgeois parties that constitutes the main obstacle to independent labor political action in Quebec, not the Quebec NDP.

True, the NDP in Quebec is not the form that an indigenous Quebec labor party will likely take. But it is a workers party. It is a current in the workers movement, as are the Maoists, the CP, the RWL, the GSTQ, etc. Unlike those other organizations, the Quebec NDP is linked to the mass party of the English-Canadian labor movement. And it has much greater electoral support than they do. Its vote has ranged in recent years between 5 and 10 percent of the total popular vote. That’s not much in comparison with what it gets in most areas west of Quebec. But it is more, by the way, than the NDP gets anywhere else east of the Ottawa River with the exception of parts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. (In the New Brunswick provincial election last fall the NDP got 4 percent of the total vote; the Parti Acadien, with a nationalist program oriented to the one third of New Brunswick that is Acadien, got 2 percent. In Prince Edward Island the NDP was able to nominate only five candidates in the recent provincial election.)

If we had forces in the FTQ unions, which are among the major industrial unions in Quebec, how could we have responded to the Canadian Labor Congress campaign in support of the NDP? Instead of opposing it, we could have grasped it and sought to turn it into a weapon to advance the struggle for a Quebec labor party. We could have pointed to how the unions in English Canada were mobilizing behind the NDP, explained the need for a labor party in Quebec that could fight for power, and urged that the FTQ unions present their own candidates in the election on a program of class-struggle demands. They could invite non-FTQ, non-CLC unions to join with them in this effort, perhaps through holding an inter-union conference, just as the unions in the Montreal area did in 1970 in launching the Front d’Action Politique to contest the municipal elections.

We would call on the NDP and the CLC to support these workers candidates. The CLC should give them the same money and resources it would contribute to NDP candidates in English Canada. And we would encourage these union-nominated candidates to tour in English Canada, to argue the case for Quebec’s right to self-determination (and other class-struggle demands) to trade unionists and NDP supporters in the other nation.

Independent workers candidates nominated by the unions could fight for independence and socialism; and they could explain the need to fight for government in alliance with their class brothers and sisters in English Canada, around a perspective of a government of the Quebec labor movement and the NDP.

Comrade Samuels, in her report today, complained that the FTQ leaders used their support of the NDP to avoid taking a stand on the RMS campaign for workers candidates. But if the RMS had taken its campaign for workers candidates into the union ranks in the way I’ve outlined above, I think it is safe to say that the FTQ brass would have had much more difficulty in getting away with this excuse. It is true that the FTQ is not waging a campaign for the NDP of a scope comparable to the CLC unions’ campaign in English Canada. But it is equally true that they are under very little pressure to take any other course, such as sponsoring independent workers candidates and fighting for an autonomous Quebec labor party. And with the RWL’s current blind eye toward the reality of the FTQ’s support to the Quebec NDP, we contribute to that problem.

‘Spoil your ballot’—or vote NDP?

Whatever we might have done, whatever might have happened, the fact is that nominations are now closed. Who are the “workers candidates” in Quebec—the candidates we should urge workers to support? (Let’s not forget that most Quebec workers intend to vote in this election.) One of those candidates, obviously, is Michel Dugré, the RWL candidate in Hochelaga-Maisonneuve.

Another is René Denis, a GSTQ leader running in Montréal-Rosemont. It is not yet clear on what basis Denis is running; he says he hopes to become the candidate of those who signed the RMS petition. Samuels suggests we can support him because he is for Quebec’s independence. That is insufficient
programmatic grounds; would we support the Parti Québécois? I think we can support René Denis for one reason alone, which we should explain clearly in motivating our position: his campaign is independent of the capitalist parties and, as a member of the GSTQ, he is identified with the program of revolutionary Marxism.

The other candidates we should support in the remaining 73 Quebec ridings are the NDP candidates. The Quebec NDP has presented a full slate of candidates; 22 are members of FTQ unions; seven are members of the CEQ; five are members of the CSN; and one is a member of the union of small farmers, the Union des Producteurs Agricoles. (In fact, union members are probably a higher proportion of the NDP candidates in Quebec than they are in English Canada. Where the party’s electoral prospects are more favorable, it tends to run more lawyers, clergy, and professors—those the leadership sees as potential parliamentarians.) In a few cases, as we noted earlier, local unions have become involved in the NDP candidates’ campaigns.. The NDP candidates are the “workers’ candidates” in this election.

All the arguments that I have heard for withholding support to the NDP candidates in Quebec in this election come down to one programmatic criterion: the federal NDP’s opposition to Quebec’s national rights. That is not sufficient reason to reject a vote for the Quebec NDP candidates, as I have explained elsewhere (see “For a Government of the NDP and the Quebec Unions,” Preconvention Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 12, March 1979). Quebec is not on the verge of insurrection, and the NDP is not spearheading federalist opposition to Quebec’s rights.

Moreover, opposition to an NDP vote misses the potential to exploit contradictions in the NDP’s situation. Most NDP supporters in Quebec don’t agree with the federal party’s stand on Quebec. At its March convention, the Quebec NDP voted against Broadbent’s “national unity” line, and in support of Quebec’s right to self-determination. The convention also voted to withdraw from the federalist Pro-Canada committee and denounced Trudeau’s federal referendum bill, which has been supported by the Broadbent leadership.

Quebec is the only place in the Canadian state, to the best of my knowledge, where the trade union leaders who support the NDP—and the NDP candidates themselves—are openly critical of the NDP’s program on an important subject, in this case the Quebec national question. FTQ president Louis Laberge has sharply attacked the federal NDP’s position on Quebec, on several occasions.

In the May 4 issue of La Presse we read that the Quebec NDP leaders have attacked Laberge because he came out in support of Conservative Roch Lassalle and Créditiste Fabien Roy. Laberge says the NDP shouldn’t have run a full slate, and charges that not enough of its candidates are trade unionists; the NDP replies that it wants to offer an electoral alternative in all the ridings, and boasts of how many trade unionists it is running. The same issue of La Presse reports that the Quebec convention of CUPE debated whether to support the NDP candidates; one workshop called for supporting the NDP, while three others voted against, and one workshop said “no party seems to represent the interests of the Quebec workers.”

The point is that there is motion on this question. Class-conscious Quebec workers sense they are in a real dilemma. In the major political event now taking place, how are they to register an independent class position? Their leaders for the most part tell them to put their confidence in candidates of the bourgeois parties. Many workers are rightly skeptical of this line. They are debating and thinking about alternatives.

For the comrades of the RWL majority leadership, all of this seems to be a closed book. Comrade Bob Mills, in his report on the RWL convention in Socialist Voice, speaks of the “pure trade unionism” of Quebec unions. The English version of the majority’s election statement says that “In Quebec the labor leadership has been silent during the elections....” The draft election platform of the majority says “In Quebec the labor movement has been totally inactive in the campaign.” All these statements are false. The union leadership is not “silent”—most of them are calling for support of bourgeois candidates and parties. On the other hand, there is some motion in the direction of independent labor political action, even though feeble—and it’s expressed primarily around the NDP campaign, with at least the verbal support of the Quebec Federation of Labor.

And the RWL’s answer to this? “Spoil your ballot.” This slogan on the election poster in Quebec (“annulation”) does not appear in the collection of slogans on the English version of the poster. Were the comrades afraid to let English-Canadian workers know the poverty of their political intellects in Quebec?

How does this “spoil your ballot” position demark us from the rest of the confused “left” in Quebec? We’re the “sick joke,” not the FTQ leaders. We allow Laberge of the FTQ, with his “critical support of the NDP” line, to appear to have more of a class line than we do in these elections! It shows how completely out of touch we really are.

3. Critique of the RWL election program

I don’t have time to make a detailed criticism of the majority leadership’s election statement, published in two somewhat different versions in our English and French language press. A few comments are in order, however.

The worst feature is its abstract and sectarian character. It is completely removed from the real clash of class forces in the election—and from developments in the overall class struggle. An example is the treatment of the CLC’s pro-NDP campaign, which is the concrete form today in both nations of labor’s struggle for power. There is not a word on this campaign in the Lutte Ouvriêre version of the statement; in the Socialist Voice version, it receives only passing condemnation.

The supplementary “platform” the comrades have now drafted is no improvement. There are lots of “themes” ‘—sometimes good themes—but no attempt to link them to the real action of the class. None of this material has any educational value.

For example, on Quebec. What about the union resolutions on self-determination? What about the fight by militants in the NDP in support of Quebec’s rights? What about the evidence that the bourgeoisie’s “national unity” drive—its attempt to make the Québécois the scapegoats for the economic crisis, among other things—is failing among workers in English Canada? This is a fact of immense importance for us, which we have yet to discuss, let alone explain adequately. Trudeau’s Pepin-Robarts Task Force on National Unity noted this; it’s one of the main themes of the report. But in analyzing the report in Lutte Ouvrière, the comrades simply repeated the old clichés about the danger of the “sword” being used, ignoring the real class dynamics of the national question revealed by the Task Force.

On the shorter workweek. What about the CLC’s formal commitment to the 32-hour workweek, or the postal workers’ heroic strike for the 30-hour week? Don’t these deserve a mention?

On nationalization. Why not explain it by reference to the Inco strike; the workers of Steel Local 6500 have raised the demand for nationalization in the course of their struggle. Shouldn’t we pick up on that, and link it to the need for socialized planning under workers control?

On women’s rights. What about the struggles for abortion rights—a major issue across the country, and especially in Quebec? What about the strike struggles for equal pay, and the need for affirmative action programs and job quotas for women and oppressed minorities? The NDP program talks about those things. Why not the RWL’s?

On international questions. These were totally missing in the English version of the statement, and got only a short paragraph in the French version. A strange performance for internationalists! The platform at least talks of “solidarity” with international workers’ struggles. It even mentions Iran. Fine. Why not bring that up front a bit, and say something about the lessons of the tremendous upsurge in Iran? And why don’t we clarify our position on defense of the workers states in face of the imperialist war drive?

On unity of the working class. Why not explain how it takes shape concretely in defense of the demands and needs of all the exploited and oppressed, using some examples: the struggle against wage controls, the need to defend CUPW, women’s struggle against the federal abortion law—as well as defense of Quebec’s rights.

Why the high degree of abstraction in these leadership pronunciamentos? In large part, it reflects our isolation from the class struggle, particularly from the industrial unions that are now at the heart of labor’s response to the capitalist offensive. But that observation in turn begs an explanation. A major reason is suggested by the framework of the election statement, in which the entire social and political context of the election—and the class struggle—is presented as the national question. This method reaches the point of absurdity when the statement, in its French version, argues that all the ills of capitalism are the result of the “national unity” drive of the ruling class.

It’s a schema, based on the false concept that the Quebec national struggle is the key to unlocking all the contradictions of the class struggle in the Canadian state. The schema blinds us to a lot of other things that are happening—things that are often only distantly related to the national struggle, if they are related to it at all. And in Quebec it has led us into a blind alley of sectarianism with respect to the most important feature of this election campaign: the very limited but nevertheless real motion that is taking place around the NDP.

A small revolutionary propaganda group like the RWL can make mistakes—even grave mistakes—and survive. But the mistakes we are making today are unnecessary mistakes. We are miseducating our cadres. We are dropping class criteria in our approach to key political questions. The error on the Quebec NDP vote may not loom large in the overall picture of the class struggle in Canada. But it is symptomatic of an underlying problem in the RWL—the increasing divorce of a majority of our membership and a major part of our leadership from the workers movement. We have already paid a heavy price for this course, in the loss of valuable cadres and disorientation of our program. We cannot afford to continue it any longer.

4. The R WL at this stage in the campaign

How can we use our participation in the election campaign to win support for our class-struggle program? It is not enough to present RWL candidates running on the full program of revolutionary Marxism. The five candidates we are running ensure that the RWL has a public presence in its own name. That is good. But the program they put forward, and that the whole organization defends in these elections must be related to the real struggles of the masses of working people.

We must take our program and our campaign into the unions above all, and use this election to help turn the RWL outward into active involvement in the class struggle.

The key here is to get into the CLC campaign. Branch executives—not just NDP or trade union fractions—must take responsibility for directing our participation in this campaign We should mobilize the branch memberships behind it. In Winnipeg, for example, I understand that the comrades have decided to make the unions’ campaign in Bird’s Hill their primary emphasis; only a few comrades are assigned to Larry Johnston’s campaign as their main assignment. We will try to take the Johnston campaign into the unions, especially to those union members involved in the Bird’s Hill CLC-NDP campaign. It is in the framework of overall support for the unions’ fight to elect the NDP that we will gain the widest hearing for our programmatic proposals and our criticism of the union-NDP program, as indicated by Comrade Flexer’s experience cited earlier.

Above all, we should put the CLC campaign at the center of our campaign. We should talk it up everywhere, identify with it, and seek to build it in our union locals. We should use the opportunity provided by this election campaign to conduct a real probe of what is happening in the labor movement right across the country. That means our press should carry lots of information on what’s happening in the union campaign, and the NDP campaign as a whole. Press sales should center on unions and plants where the campaign is getting particular attention. We should write educational polemics in our press on various aspects of the union-NDP program; an example is Comrade John Riddell’s critique of the NDP’s “industrial strategy” in the April 30 Socialist Voice, the first in a series he will write. The more we get into the unions and this kind of campaign, the more we will be confronted with the need to arm our comrades to answer the reformists’ program, not just denounce it. That means we must follow closely what the NDP and union leaders say in this campaign, and pay particular attention to the response the campaign gets among rank and file workers with whom we are in contact.

In short, we should consciously seek to use our participation in the CLC-NDP campaign to deepen our as-yet fragile roots in .the unions, as part of our central task of moving the RWL into the strategic centers of the proletariat in this country.

From the Summary

Comrade Foco spoke of the “indifference of workers in English Canada” to the national rights of Quebec. I don’t think that is quite accurate. Generally, workers in English Canada are not indifferent to the rights of the oppressed. If they are conscious of a real threat to those rights, they are prepared to mobilize in support of them. Recall the NDP’s opposition to Trudeau’s War Measures in October 1970. I think that position - a very unpopular one with the ruling class - reflected something more profound in the base of the NDP and the unions.

The real question is how to harness workers’ underlying sympathy for the Québécois and other oppressed. We have to be concrete. The CLC campaign behind the NDP is an important opening. We should take into it the resolutions a number of unions — inclu­ding for the most part CLC affiliates — have passed in sympathy with Quebec’s rights. That’s what Dennis Lomas did at the Ontario NDP convention. He took the adopted position of his union, CUPE, in defense of Quebec’s right to self-determination and challenged the CUPE secretary-treasurer Kealey Cummings to defend it before the NDP delegates. We could cite many other examples, of course.

There was an interesting discussion here about the relative importance of the national question in the election. The polls are unanimous in saying that for workers everywhere, including in Quebec, “national unity” ranks way down the list of their concerns behind such items as inflation and unemployment. Comrade Connolly pointed out that it was only in the wealthy Anglophone bastion of Westmount in Montreal that “national unity” ranked as the top concern. That doesn’t mean that the national question, or binational unity, are not key issues that we want to raise. But we should think about how to raise them.

I think many comrades have at best an abstract understanding of how the unity of the workers in both nations will be built. It will be built not just on explicit references to the national question and national demands, but around concrete struggles on issues of central concern to the workers in both nations. The struggle against wage controls, conducted jointly in both nations, did much more to cement binational unity of the working class against the federal state than all the trade union convention resolutions on Quebec self-determination. That’s a fact.

Our program for binational unity of the working class is our entire program of class-struggle demands, directed against the employers and their government and central state. You can’t reduce it to simply the defense of Quebec’s national rights, important as that is.

And it should be added that the defense of Quebec’s rights can’t be reduced to relatively abstract concepts like self-determination and independence. It involves defending the language rights of Québécois, fighting against wage discrimination, etc. Worker comrades in Quebec all say that it is the question of language discrimination that bears heaviest in workers’ minds when they think of the national question. That’s where it hits them in the guts.

Comrade Rivière told us the national question was the key issue in this election because it has to be resolved if workers’ struggles are to have an “outlet” (débouché) — that is, a perspective of victory. It’s true that without a real perspective of binational unity the struggle for governmental power cannot succeed — in either nation, in my opinion. But Rivière’s formulation suggests that united binational struggles of the workers are virtually ruled out unless and until workers in English Canada have been won to explicit support of Quebec’s right of self-determination. Here again, this stands the dialectic of binational workers’ unity on its head. The workers of English Canada will come to an understanding of the importance of Quebec’s rights in the course of common struggles with their Québécois comrades — that understanding cannot be a prior condition of those struggles.

On the Quebec side of the equation, I think we have to be much more conscious of how nationalist parochialism has poisoned the left and the labor movement. Rivière cited the new book by Roch Denis, a leader of the GSTQ: Luttes de classes et question nationale au Québec. There’s a very interesting section in that book in which Comrade Denis describes the split in the labor party forces in Quebec in the early 1960s. The “gauche nationale” (national left) that broke from the NDP to establish a party independent of both the NDP and (as it happened) the trade unions was largely motivated by nationalist as opposed to class considerations. Denis quotes extensively from the documents of this current, which argued explicitly against a party based “on the interests of the working class” in favor of a party based “on the interests of patriotism.” This current also argued that because of the unique national character of the Québécois, it was impossible to envisage a common binational struggle for governmental power.

Whatever the wisdom of the move at that time to establish a distinct Parti Socialiste du Québec independent of the NDP (and I think we were correct to participate in this movement) there can be no doubt that much of the argumentation behind it was false, as the material in Denis’ book indicates.

We should also be clear on why the union bureaucrats in, Quebec — including the FTQ bureaucrats — don’t really want to build support for the NDP. They say it’s because of the NDP’s position on the national question. But of course if they wanted they could change that position; all they have to do is mobilize a little union muscle within the NDP. No, they fear any mobilization behind the NDP for the same reason they fear any moves in the direction of a labor party, including the running of independent workers’ candidates. They are dead opposed to taking any serious steps toward a break with the bourgeois parties — in particular, with the Parti Québécois. If they mobilize the unions against the bourgeois parties on the federal level, the question will inevitably arise — why not on the Quebec level? Why not build a union-based alternative to the PQ? That’s just what they want to avoid.

Comrade Dubois asked if I was advocating that we join in the campaign for the NDP now, in Quebec. Sure, why not? Now that it’s clear that the NDP candidates are the only “workers candidates” in most of Quebec, we should get into that campaign with our own program, and see what’s happening. Efforts to elect NDP candidates in Quebec in this election can only help build support for the labor party; NDP supporters necessarily include union militants who are trying to grapple with the real problem posed by their lack of a viable working-class political alternative. We want to meet those militants, talk to them, struggle with them.

Yes, Comrade Klément, I propose that the axis of our election intervention in Quebec, as elsewhere, be the CLC’s campaign. In the conditions that exist today, it is a step forward to support NDP candidates in Quebec, and to the degree that it helps, even minimally, to pose the need for independent labor political action, it will assist the process of forging binational workers’ unity.

May 6, 1979


[1] John’s title on both parts of his article misstates the fused organization’s name: Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue ouvrière révolutionnaire (RWL/LOR).

[2] See Statement of Principles of the Revolutionary Workers League.

Monday, July 20, 2020

What to do about the police: How some socialists, decades ago, addressed these issues

The mass protests and public debate over what to do about the police sparked by the brutal police murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis have brought to the fore popular demands to defund, disarm and disband the police. These issues and demands arise at frequent intervals under late capitalism, as deepening neoliberal austerity features increasingly violent attacks on working people and national and ethnic minorities, and their democratic rights, by the repressive forces of the state.

Canada, a colonial-settler state built on the expropriation and oppression of the Indigenous peoples and the marginalization of the Québécois, has been no stranger to such conflicts. In the 1970s, when the RCMP’s Security Service was exposed as engaging in a wave of illegal interventions against the Quebec nationalist movement and its leftist sympathizers, the federal government was led to establish a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, better known as the McDonald Commission after its chair, Justice David McDonald.

Among those groups that took advantage of the Commission’s proceedings to expose political police activities was a group to which I belonged at the time, the Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue Ouvrière Révolutionnaire. The RWL/LOR had been formed in 1977 through a fusion of four groups in Quebec and Canada associated with the Trotskyist Fourth International.[[1]] Our brief to the McDonald Commission is published here, and an introductory essay describing the context is published here.

Many of the demands in relation to police powers now being raised by groups like Black Lives Matter parallel those that were raised in the Seventies by community, labour and left opponents of political policing. As the author of the RWL/LOR brief, I had occasion to address these and similar issues in a report I wrote within the League at the time. The text is published below, the only changes being that I have substituted my name for a pseudonym I used at the time, and added a few notes to explain some references for today’s readers. (R.F.)

Why we don’t agitate for abolition of the RCMP

by Richard Fidler

Appendix to Bureau Minutes No. 9, 02/18/78

We have recently received some correspondence from comrades asking why, in our brief to the McDonald Commission and in Socialist Voice, we do not call for abolition of the RCMP.

My position is that we should not advance this demand. Here is why:

1. A confusionist demand

As an agitational slogan the call for abolition of the RCMP does not focus on the particular police activities that are the subject of the current debate.

The RCMP is not just a political police force, although of course political policing is one of its major functions. In eight of the ten provinces, the RCMP is the provincial police force and in towns and villages it is the local police, too. It handles traffic duties and criminal investigations, and enforces a wide range of laws that have little or nothing to do with specifically political functions.

Of course, in the prosecution of these duties the RCMP’s racist, reactionary character is evident. For example, Native people, immigrants, and labor militants are especially victimized, as they are and would be by any capitalist police.

But the RCMP is the police force in many parts of the country, so the slogan for its abolition can be interpreted as a call for the dissolution of the police as such.

That is not the main point we want to make in connection with the current RCMP scandal.

As part of our program for a workers government, and for the transition to socialism, we pose the need to destroy the repressive apparatus of the capitalist state, and the need to replace it through the arming of the workers, the formation of workers’ militias. That’s all in our general propaganda. We also point out that in a workers’ state we won’t need to rely on a political police to deal with political dissent. As the first government that governs in the interests of the majority, our police will not need to repress dissent that does not challenge the constitution and laws of the workers’ state. It will not need to police dissent as such.

But in the current RCMP scandal, the main point we want to make is precisely that the capitalists do need to rely on such practices, repressing dissent in order to retain their rule.

We should focus our agitation on the need to end such practices: to open the files, stop political spying on dissenters, end the harassment and disruption of the left and the mass workers’ organizations by the capitalist state. We also emphasize that the workers’ movement must take the initiative in raising and pressing forward these questions.

On these points, I think our position, as expressed in our newspapers and the brief, has been very clear.

2. Structural reform — a false debate

The call for dissolution of the RCMP gives rise to another false debate, centered on structural reform of the police rather than the need for self-defense and political independence of the working class.

The demand to abolish the RCMP inevitably raises the question, what is it to be replaced with?

Now, most people are not revolutionary. They take for granted the framework of the capitalist state as something given, and they will judge all agitational slogans from that standpoint. They assume there must be some force; so what is to take the place of the RCMP?

The ruling class is now debating what to do about the RCMP. Some sectors are calling for increased parliamentary scrutiny of the force; some urge the formation of a “civilian” security agency; some want to confine the RCMP to federal policing and create more provincial police forces, and so on. Many of those who advance these proposals are seeking to obscure the thought-control role of the RCMP, and even to strengthen the political police function by giving it a veneer of “democratic” parliamentary sanction.

Unfortunately, the reformist leaders of the NDP and the labor movement have a similar position. They support “security” — political — operations by the police; they simply want such operations to be directed against their opponents in the labor movement, and not against them.[[2]]

Most proposals to reform the RCMP are based on the assumption that the RCMP is not adequately performing the role assigned to it by the ruling class, and that some other police force, or other structure, could carry out these functions more efficiently or more fairly. We reject those arguments. We say the RCMP is not “out of control” of the ruling class; that its political spying conforms to the role assigned to it. We do not want the RCMP to be more efficient. We don’t think it can be more fair.

We also say that the problem is not how citizens can gain some “control” over the RCMP, but rather to challenge and roll back the concept that political dissidence is illegal or illegitimate.

There is no way under capitalism that workers can exert any control over police forces.

So we want to cut across the “reform the RCMP” or “reform policing” argument. It a trap, a diversion.

Instead of trying to reform the police, the workers’ movement should be leading the fight to defend the victims of the political police, through exposing these practices and mobilizing opposition to them.

“Abolish the RCMP” may sound quite radical. But those who advance the demand don’t necessarily have a revolutionary alternative to propose. A bizarre example is the ex-Socialist League (the Dowsonites). They call for abolition of the RCMP. But in its place they propose the creation of provincial police forces. (They tack on the demand “under civilian control.” I’ll deal with that later.)[[3]]

In failing to focus on the central political question — what’s wrong with political spying on anyone — the ex-SL adapts to all sorts of reformist concepts.

For example, they fall into the trap of urging that a distinction be made between dissent and subversion. At the recent Ontario NDP Convention an ex-SL leader, Harry Kopyto, was instrumental in gaining referral of a motion denouncing Security Service harassment of the labor movement to include a proposal that explicitly accepted RCMP surveillance of “subversives.”

The ex-SL even supports some form of “security” police force — to defend “national security,” they say. Positions like these could cause considerable confusion if and when their lawsuit against the RCMP comes to trial.

This is not to say that the slogan “Abolish the RCMP” is reformist. But it does not combat reformist illusions. It is not our “full” position, as opposed to lesser demands that speak only to some RCMP activities.

Our general answer to police repression is not to issue calls for abolition or reform of the police but rather to point to the need to abolish the capitalist state that stands behind those police forces. That is, we stress the need for independent labor political action. We emphasize that workers can rely only on themselves to defend and extend democratic rights, as to defend and advance all their interests.

Of course, we can and do say we are opposed to the existence of capitalist police forces like the RCMP. But that’s hardly an agitational slogan.

3. Evolution of our position

In this connection, I’d like to explain briefly the evolution of the position of the Trotskyist movement in Canada on the question of the police.

Historically, the position of the LSA/LSO was not free of ambiguity.

With respect to the RCMP and its political role, the only occasion I recall when the LSA/ISO analyzed this question was at the time of publication of the report of the 1960s Royal Commission on Security. An article by John Riddell in the July 14, 1969 issue of Workers Vanguard concluded as follows:

“[NDP leader] T. C. Douglas supported the report’s one suggested reform — a call for a Security Review Board (with limited advisory powers to act as a court of appeal for citizens against arbitrary government actions).

“But it’s high time to challenge the whole concept of a secret-police security force. The main danger to the security of Canadians is not communist spies. It is the continuing subversion of our rights by the giant corporations and their government and police apparatus.... A first step to guarantee these rights should be the outlawing of government “anti-subversive” letter-opening, wiretapping, and electronic snooping, and the abolition of the RCMP’s Security and Intelligence division.”

This article is clear and correct in its two demands: 1) end “anti-subversive” police activity; 2) abolish the Security and Intelligence division (today the Security Service).

But in other respects the LSA/LSO position was not so clear, It tended to slip into “reform the police” demands. This was particularly true on the level of municipal politics, where it is most difficult to pose the question of state power, and where there are the greatest pressures to adapt to reformist positions, simply because of the obvious limitations of municipal government.

In the LSA/LSO’s municipal election campaign propaganda throughout the 1960s, for example, it advanced two incorrect demands: 1) for an elected police commission — a variation of the concept of community control of the cops; and 2) disarm the police.

The LSA/LSO dumped these demands in its 1974 civic election campaigns after a discussion in the leadership that clarified its thinking.

The LSA/LSO rejected “community control” of the cops and its variants like an elected police commission for the same reason that we reject “community control” in general in a class-divided society. It ignores class distinctions, and actual control of the “community” by the bourgeoisie.[[4]]

Likewise, the LSA/LSO rejected the “disarm the police” slogan because it contributes to the illusion that the bourgeoisie can be disarmed “piece by piece” without destroying their control of the state. The municipal cops may be disarmed, but behind them there is the rest of the repressive apparatus of the state with its army and other police forces. (In the 1969 Montréal police strike, for example, “order” was restored by sending in federal troops and the Quebec Sûreté.)

Instead of calling for disarming the police, we should emphasize the right of the victims of police repression to defend themselves by whatever means are necessary. For example, we oppose “gun-control” laws that would leave Blacks disarmed while white cops and racists assault members of the Black community.

4. Dissolution of the Security Service

Does this mean that we reject all demands for the abolition of particular repressive forces? In the LSA/LSO debate on the question of municipal police, we accepted that we could demand the dissolution of special repressive forces whose specific function is the repression of political dissent, or of activities directed against a particular oppressed section of the population. Examples of such forces are the special “tactical squads” that have been formed in the municipal police forces of many North American cities. Their role is to terrorize the Black, Chicano, and immigrant communities, as well as to suppress labor struggles.

We might also include the special “anti-terrorist” squads in Montréal or their equivalent in other cities; their function is to harass and disrupt groups like the LOR/RWL, which are not guilty of any violent or illegal activity. We can call for the dissolution of these specialized repressive agencies, at the same time linking the demand to the need for self-defense by the victims against attacks of these official and semi-official police.

By extension, it is correct to call for the abolition of the RCMP’s Security Service, which is the political policing arm of the RCMP. (Some international examples: the comrades’ call for dissolution of the National Republican Guard in Portugal, or of the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité in France.)

In the case of these specialized repressive forces, there is a real potential for mass struggle around such demands, while there is not such potential for general demands directed against the capitalist police as such.

Such demands should always be firmly situated in the context of our central political thrust, which is to mobilize the victims of these repressive measures and agencies in struggles around our central political demands — for an end to the repression of political dissent.

The demand for dissolution of the SS can reflect and help concretize our major political demands: open the files, stop spying and harassment against opponents of the government.

In motivating this demand, we explain that the essential function of the SS is to curtail and suppress dissent, not to counter illegal activity as the bourgeoisie claims. (The ruling class tries to encourage the latter view through such means as its current campaign against Soviet “spies.”)

A caution is necessary, however. The demand for abolition of the SS should be used judiciously. It is clearly supplementary to our key political demands. We want to take the debate over the cops away from the structural questions and into the real political functions of security policing.

5. Slogans in Quebec

The Quebec comrades have raised the demand “RCMP out of Quebec.” That is consistent with our understanding that in relation to Quebec, an oppressed nation, the RCMP as the federal police force plays a special repressive role. In that sense it is correct to call for “abolishing” the RCMP in Quebec. (The LOR does not campaign for dissolution of the Sûreté — the “provincial” police — for the same reason that in English Canada we don’t raise the demand for dissolution of the RCMP.)

At the same time, the comrades of the LOR link the demand “RCMP out of Quebec” with other demands directed against any and all political policing, including by the Quebec government. They call for opposition to any political police or intelligence service, such as the Bourassa government’s “Centre d’Analyse et de Documentation” (CAD), or the Parti Québécois government’s plans to beef up its own security service. (See material below from the LOR internal bulletin and the exchange in the letters column of the February 1, 1978 issue of Lutte Ouvrière.)

Finally, a word on the small side-bar in the February 6 Socialist Voice entitled “SS stifles free speech.” Apparently, some comrades misunderstood its purpose. It was not intended as an explanation of our demand for the abolition of the Security Service, still less to explain why we don’t call for abolition of the RCMP.

The reason to abolish the SS is explained adequately, I think, in the brief to the McDonald Commission, including the excerpts published in that issue of Socialist Voice. The purpose of the side-bar was simply to give a flavor of the exchange between the RWL representatives and the members of the commission following presentation of our brief. Its function was more journalistic than didactic — although the two aspects should never he counterposed!

Attachment 1. Excerpt from the LOR Internal Bulletin, No. 5, January 1978: “Draft Resolution on Campaigns of the LOR”

Our slogans in this campaign [on the RCMP – Tr.] have already been largely developed in the report by Richard to the Political Committee and in the newspapers Socialist Voice and Lutte Ouvrière: Expose all police activities; Open the files of the RCMP, the immigration ministry, the army and any other repressive or information-gathering body; Down with police repression and all police activity directed against opponents of the status quo; Full compensation for all victims of police repression; Reveal the truth about the 1970 War Measures crisis; and Let the workers movement organize opposition to these police measures.

These slogans are valid for the entire Canadian state. In Quebec we add two specific slogans: No to any political police or intelligence service (like the CAD) of the Quebec government; and Army and RCMP out of Quebec! The first slogan is aimed at countering in advance any attempt by the PQ to extablish a “normal” bourgeois state apparatus for its sovereign Quebec. The second is intended to clarify the fact that the RCMP is not just any police force but an imperialist force and one of its most fundamental goals has always been to repress oppressed nationalities within the Canadian state, especially the Native peoples and the Québécois. This slogan concretizes the kind of independence we want.

Attachment 2. A letter to Lutte Ouvrière, and the editors’ reply (Lutte Ouvrière, February 1, 1978)

RCMP out of Quebec?

I have some comments with respect to the slogan “GRC hors du Québec” [RCMP out of Quebec] that appeared in the November 9 issue of Lutte Ouvrière (No. 4). Without denying the actual role that the RCMP plays in Quebec, that is, a police apparatus serving the Canadian confederation with the goal of preventing any form of autonomy or dissension in Quebec, I must say that the theme “GRC hors du Québec” displeases me somewhat.

A slogan should be clear and immediately comprehensible; but this one is too ambiguous. If we say there should be no RCMP in Quebec, does it mean that we want to export our problems to the English-Canadian workers? That we’re not disturbed at the prospect of what might happen in that event?

I think what Lutte Ouvrière is trying to do instead is to demonstrate that the primary purpose of the RCMP is related to the oppression of Quebec. The vast majority of misdeeds by this police force since its history began have taken place on Quebec territory. However, you can’t say “RCMP out of Quebec” as we said “U.S. troops out of Vietnam” or “French troops out of Algeria,” because of our geographical situation and the fact that we are not a colony but a nation.

I would add that it should be called “RCMP” (in French) as it has always been known, and not “GRC,” its Quebec “adaptation.”

André Fortier, Montréal, January 27

Our reader secs ambiguities in the slogan “GRC hors du Québec.” But he agrees that Quebec is an oppressed nation, even if it isn’t a colony, and that the RCMP is a “police apparatus serving the Canadian confederation.” That is why, in our view, defending the right of Quebec to self-determination means saying no to the interventions of the Canadian state apparatus. It meant saying no to the War Measures Act; it meant demanding the withdrawal of the Canadian army.

André Fortier also protests that this slogan suggests we want “to export our problems to the English-Canadian workers.” He has a point. The slogan should always be used in conjunction with others that oppose any political policing, whether in Quebec or in Canada, and whether it is federal or provincial.

In that sense, we were wrong to put “GRC hors du Québec” as the main front-page headline, isolated from other demands. – Ed.


[1] These were the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (LSA/LSO), the Revolutionary Marxist Group and the Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire.

[2] During the Cold War, many labour and social-democratic leaders encouraged the state to curtail the rights of unions allegedly controlled by the Communist party.

[3] Ross Dowson sued RCMP officers in 1978 alleging that poison pen letters they confessed to circulating to members of the LSA/LSO had caused such disruption within the organization that he had been forced to quit his job as its executive secretary. Dowson’s attempts to sue the RCMP failed when the Attorney General intervened to stay proceedings. Dowson had left the League in 1974 and founded what became the Socialist League.

[4] However, some First Nations seeking alternative forms of justice have raised demands for control by their communities of policing, and preferably by Indigenous officers — demands that deserve our support, in my opinion.

Sunday, October 20, 2019

Catalan independence leaders sentenced to heavy jail terms

The savage sentences handed down by Spain’s Supreme Court against nine Catalan independence leaders have been denounced by political leaders in Quebec, including Premier François Legault. In the forefront are the deputies of Québec solidaire, who will present a motion this week in the National Assembly condemning the repression and reaffirming the right of self-determination of peoples.

“Jailing elected members because they exercised their democratic duty does not make good sense,” said QS deputy co-leader Manon Massé. She was responding to a letter sent to QS by the president of the Catalan parliament asking them to find a way to help in resolving the political conflict in Spain. Massé, who had visited Catalonia in 2017 at the time of the independence vote, testified by videoconference in April during the trial of Jordi Cuixart, leader of one of the social movements supporting independence.

Campaigning in Canada’s federal election, Bloc Québécois leader Yves François Blanchet called on the leaders of the other parties, starting with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, to denounce the heavy sentences imposed on the Catalan leaders. Trudeau refused, arguing that it involved an internal Spanish affair. He invoked the same neutrality in 2017 when Spanish police beat Catalan voters who sought to exercise their right to vote. At the time Jagmeet Singh, newly elected leader of the New Democratic Party, denounced Trudeau, saying the right to self-determination was one of the most important rights.

In the article below, Dick Nichols reports on the massive protests that have erupted in Catalonia in response to the court sentences. Nichols is the Barcelona-based European correspondent of Green Left Weekly, from which the article is reproduced, with thanks.

Nichols’ article is followed by extensive excerpts from an article by Viento Sur editor Jaime Pastor critically dissecting the meaning of the Spanish court’s judgment, and in particular the parts in which the court attempts to distinguish the Catalan case from those of other national minority peoples in states of the geographical North, starting with Quebec. My translation from the Spanish.

Richard Fidler

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Vindictive sentence in Catalan leaders’ trial unleashes tsunami of protest

By Dick Nichols, Barcelona, October 18, 2019

The gap between the 75%–80% of Catalans who uphold their country’s right to self-determination, and the Spanish elites and parts of Spanish society that do not want to know anything about it, was already very wide before October 14.

But on that day, when the Spanish Supreme Court condemned nine Catalan political and social movement leaders to a total of 99.5 years jail, it most likely became unbridgeable.

Following the sentence of the leaders for their role in the October 1, 2017 independence referendum, popular outrage in Catalonia immediately exploded in mass protests involving tens of thousands of people.

They occupied Barcelona airport, imposed road blocks on major highways, demonstrated in huge numbers outside Spanish government offices and began “Marches for Freedom” on Barcelona from five provincial cities.

Every imaginable Catalan social and sporting organisation, from Barcelona Football Club to chess associations, has issued statements condemning the sentences.

On the nights of October 15–16, police and small groups engaged in running battles in central Barcelona, as smoke rose from burning rubbish bins.

On October 16, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) acting Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez appeared on television to warn that security forces would act “firmly, serenely and proportionately” in the face of violence.

To his right, People’s Party (PP) leader Pablo Casado demanded the declaration of a state of emergency in Catalonia, while Citizens’ leader Albert Rivera called for an end to Catalan self-rule under article 155 of the Spanish constitution.

One of the main instruments coordinating these responses is the Democratic Tsunami platform, anonymously run by activists from the October 1 referendum, and coordinated via a Telegram channel that, at the time of writing, had attracted 300,000 subscribers.

Punishment without crime

The unanimous verdict of the seven Supreme Court judges that set off this still expanding wave of protest was that nine Catalan leaders — seven former ministers and social movement leaders Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart — were guilty of “sedition” in preparing the October 1 referendum.

For this 18th century crime, long deleted from the penal codes of many other European states, they were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 9 to 13 years.

The harshest sentence was handed out to former Catalan vice-president Oriol Junqueras as “leader of the sedition”. Former ministers Raül Romeva (foreign affairs), Dolors Bassa (social welfare) and Jordi Turull (minister of state) came next with 12 years: along with Junqueras they were also found guilty of “embezzlement”.

Former Catalan parliament speaker Carme Forcadell incurred 11.5 years jail for allowing the chamber to vote on the referendum’s enabling law, after being instructed by the Spanish Constitutional Court not to do so.

The “sedition” of former Catalan interior minister Joaquim Forn (11.5 years) consisted in undermining the ability of the Catalan police to deliver and enforce Spanish state court orders.

Former territory minister Josep Rull was found guilty of denying a Spanish Civil Guard ship mooring facilities and of making public buildings available as voting centres.

As for Òmnium Cultural president Cuixart and former Catalan National Assembly president Sànchez, their “sedition” was proven by the fact that they had called demonstrations against Civil Guard searches and urged people to defend voting centres against police and Civil Guard attempts to impound ballot boxes.

Along with these nine, who have already been held in preventive detention for up to two years, the court found former ministers Carles Mundó (attorney-general), Santi Vila (business) and Meritxell Borras (education) guilty of “disobedience”, fining each €60,000 and banning them from standing for public office for 18 months.

The nine jailed leaders have been banned from standing for public office for the term of their sentences.

Why this verdict?

The verdict is the predictable result of the pressures operating on the Supreme Court and its chief judge Manuel Marchena.

The chief pressure was for the trial to produce an exemplary punishment of the Catalan leaders. They had humiliated the Spanish state by successfully organising a unilateral independence referendum after 18 failed attempts to negotiate a Scottish-style referendum with successive Spanish governments.

A measure of the viciousness of the sentences is to compare them to those arising from the failed 1981 coup attempt. The average punishment for the military and Civil Guards who tried to reimpose the Francisco Franco dictatorship then was six years jail: the sentences of the Catalan leaders average 8.3 years.

The Supreme Court judges were doing the work set out for them by the previous PP government of Mariano Rajoy.

According to a leaked WhatsApp message by PP Senate spokesperson Ignacio Cosidó, its Second Chamber, which heard the case, was controlled “via the back door”.

There was no way its judges, even their “progressive” minority, were going to find the Catalan leaders innocent, or guilty only of disobedience (which carries no jail sentence).

There was no ‘rebellion’

However, the heavy sentences the court was always going to impose have to be defensible in law, not only within Spain but especially before a European Court of Human Rights — which in 2018 upheld nine out of ten appeals against Spanish court decisions.

This pressure to find a plausible legal foundation for their decision meant the judges had to discard the “rebellion” charge against the Catalan leaders.

This indictment was originally brought by the investigating magistrate Pablo Llarena and was backed by the Spanish prosecutor-general’s office and the “popular prosecution”, the ultra-right party Vox.

(The “popular prosecution” is a Spanish institution originally designed to allow the representation of community or public interest.)

Dropping the charge of “rebellion”, which a majority of Spanish jurists had already declared inapplicable, was also probably the price of a unanimous verdict between judges of different political temperaments.

It was also a political imperative. It will help Pedro Sánchez maintain the myth that Spain is a “law-governed state” with an independent judiciary and it will also help the European Union and its member states, fearful of any Catalan threat to the EU status quo, sustain the same fiction.

In the days after the verdict, spokespeople for the European Commission and the British government robotically repeated the line from Madrid.

Caught in contradiction

The dropping of “rebellion” comes at a price, however, because the whole Spanish-patriotic view of the October 1 referendum, from King Philip down, is that it was a deliberate, rebellious assault on the Constitution.

Sensitive to the angst their appeal-proofed verdict would cause, the judges devoted about 200 pages of the 493-page judgement to arguments against the “rebellion”.

Yet, in adopting the “sedition theory”, the judges fall into a painful contradiction.

Their decision says, for example, that October 1 did not involve “preconceived, deliberate and functional” violence aimed at achieving Catalonia’s separation from the Spanish state, but was rather an attempt to pressure it into negotiations.

“The over-excited citizens who believed that the positive result of the so-called referendum would lead to the hoped-for horizon of a sovereign republic were unaware that the right to decide had changed into an atypical right to bring pressure.”

But if that argument is valid against “rebellion”, how is it not also valid against “sedition”? The only difference in Spanish law is that “rebellion” is a crime against the constitution and “sedition” a crime against public order.

The judges’ answer was to smother the contradiction in lurid fictional accounts of the events of 2017. These are based on the well-rehearsed evidence of Spanish National Police and Civil Guard officers, whom Marchena “spared” from defence cross-examination, backed by visual evidence, during the trial.

In their decision, it is the huge peaceful demonstrations and non-violent protests of 2017 that become “sedition”. This ruling opens the door to any protest activity, like trade union pickets or organised attempts to stop evictions, being regarded as “seditious”.

In an October 16 interview in the Catalan daily Ara, Jordi Sànchez said: “The sentence unequivocally lies. It doesn’t specify any detail of the supposed strategy of sedition. Not one confirmed meeting, not one email, only declarations in public ANC [Catalan National Assembly] events and the calling of demonstrations.

“The Supreme Court judges’ hostility towards us has betrayed them. Their animosity towards us has leaked out in the sentence in the form of false statements to justify the prison terms.”

Offensives launched

The verdict has also been the signal for new offensives from both sides of the Catalan-Spanish State struggle.

The Spanish judiciary immediately banned convicted Catalan leaders from standing in the November 10 Spanish general election and judge Llarena reissued a European arrest warrant for the extradition of former Catalan president Carles Puigdemont from Belgium.

The PSOE government went on an offensive to persuade other countries of the immaculate character of the Spanish legal system. Cabinet members with foreign languages made themselves available for interviews on whatever international channels would have them.

On the Catalan side, the enormous, growing tsunami of mass protest started to roll.

All this is taking place three weeks out from the Spanish general election, in which Catalonia will dominate as never before. In Jordi Sànchez’s words: “They believe that they will terminate people’s sentiments by beheading those they think are leaders of the process.

“They are having the opposite effect.”


A ruling against the right to decide

by Jaime Pastor (extracts)

A reading of the 23 pages of the judgment devoted to rejecting the claim to the right to decide (199-222) reveals clearly the pirouettes resorted to by the Supreme Court (SC) in order to disqualify it. Notwithstanding its statement that “it is not our job to offer — or pursue or insinuate — political solutions to a problem with deep historical roots” (referring obviously to Catalonia’s relation to Spain), it immediately goes on to reject the defence’s allegations, since accepting them “would be used to affirm, in opposition to a monistic vision of sovereignty that is typical of historical constitutionalism, a constitutional pluralism, a diffuse and shared sovereignty including a co-sovereignty transcending rancid concepts affected by the passage of time.”

Well yes, ladies and gentlemen, if we analyze the present and global political reality, it does not support a monistic or unilateral vision of sovereignty, since what we are witnessing is a now irreversible crisis of the sovereign national-state paradigm. In the framework of neoliberal globalization what has occurred is an intertwining of sovereignties and jurisdictions within an hierarchical inter-state system that in turn is increasingly fusing with the major economic powers around a lex mercatoria común under which most states are reluctant to recognize internal national and cultural diversity, and above all are draining it of democracy and popular sovereignty. Is not the reality of the European Union a confirmation of that “diffuse and shared” sovereignty, which has led even the states of the Eurozone to renounce one of their most symbolic powers, that is monetary sovereignty? […]

It is in this reality of an institutional architecture that a multilevel governance is developing and expanding on a global scale, especially around the hard core of politics — economics and finance, civil and military security, etc. — shared by the IMF, the World Bank, the central banks, NATO, the G8 and the United States. So it is truly sarcastic to speak of the exclusive sovereignty of states and, in our case, of the preservation of the sovereignty of the Spanish people when the latter have been excluded, for example, from deciding on constitutional reforms of such huge scope as the reform of the much-criticized article 135 of the Constitution — which annulled the social character of the “social and democratic rule of law” established by that same fundamental law. In reality, unfortunately, there is one area in which that exclusive state sovereignty is exercised, and in an increasingly more repressive form, as we see in the Mediterranean: the border controls imposed on the free movement of persons even while barriers to the entry and flight of capital continue to be eliminated.

In this regard, and to be brief, I take the liberty of quoting what I wrote recently in Le Monde Diplomatique:[1]

“In today's world, moreover, although the sovereign state paradigm continues to exist, we know that we are actually in an increasingly interdependent world on all levels, as well as a hierarchical system of states, in turn merged with major economic powers that seek to impose their interests and decisions over and above the peoples and even their representative institutions. We should not be surprised, therefore, at the rise of popular-based sovereignty movements in very different places on the planet and with quite distinct ideological orientations.

“In what concerns us here, it should be recalled that we have arrived at this point after a long process in which most states, especially since the end of the 18th century, have tended to develop a model of nationalization of their respective populations based on the promotion of a single national identity, a single language and a single culture. This paradigm, according to which access to citizenship rights is linked to belonging — voluntarily or by force — to the official national identity, has generated many relationships of inequality and injustice, due to the lack of recognition of the different ethnic and national identities within the same State.”

That is the crux of the matter and that is why the claim to the right of self-determination within demo-liberal states of the North has resurfaced. The old salt-water theory, which was intended to limit that right to colonies and occupied countries, has long since lost its applicability. That is why the internal and external dimensions of the right to self-determination are seen in cases such as that of Canada and Quebec, challenging the taboo of the “territorial integrity of states.”

Yet notwithstanding this persistent and ever-increasing reality in different places, the Supreme Court clings to the thesis of “the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the already constituted states as the natural limit to what has been called the external dimension of the right to self-determination.” Aware, however, that this “territorial integrity” has been questioned in the aforementioned cases, it excuses itself by saying that “we cannot go beyond our functional space” only to do so later by rejecting any similarity between the case of Quebec and that of Canada, since “no similarity can be proclaimed between the historical origin of Quebec’s claim and the unilateral act of secession attributed to the defendants.”

Why not? Hasn’t there been a problem of accommodation, both in Quebec and in Catalonia, of their national realities within the respective states? Yes, there is a difference, of course, but it is that while in Canada that conflict was addressed after two referendums, and a political and democratic solution has been sought despite the fact that its Constitution does not recognize the right of secession, in the Spanish state there has been no willingness to find that democratic solution. On the contrary, from the first moment a fundamentalist reading of the 1978 Constitution has been imposed making it a true straitjacket — which is what the Canadian Supreme Court judgment [on Quebec secession] rejected.

Then the SC makes a quick and superficial tour of other cases: Montenegro (“a previously constitutionalized process”), Scotland (“result of a negotiation process” and with the particular feature that the UK constitution is unwritten), or Kosovo (for the unique nature of the conflict and the EU tutelage). Interestingly, with respect to the latter, the Court passes very quickly over the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), forgetting that while it recognizes the specificity of the case, that does not stop it from extracting some general conclusions, among them that while international law does not recognize the right to secession within existing states, it does not prohibit it either. In order to recognize it, the ICJ limits itself to demanding some procedural requirements of the collective subject that is prepared to exercise it: the non-use of force, proof that the process seeking a negotiated settlement must be exhausted, and, finally, that a clear majority of the population concerned has declared itself in favour of secession by peaceful means.[2]

Starting, therefore, from the conclusions of the ICJ, the debate should revolve around the question of whether the negotiated settlement process has been exhausted within the framework of the Spanish State. It seems clear that since the de facto annulment of the substance of the Nou Estatut de Autonomía by the Constitutional Court,[3] there has been a widespread feeling in a large sector of Catalan society (of which about 48% vote for independentist parties, but whose real percentage could only be verified in a referendum that turns on this issue), of non-recognition as a people by the Spanish state. That 2010 ruling was understood as a breach of the territorial constitutional agreement of 1978. It is this that helps to explain the rapid rise of independentism over the almost 10 years since then, which is not to deny that other factors of a secondary order may have been an influence. All the more so when there has not been a single alternative proposal since then for a new type of consensual relationship among the parties of the regime other than the application of article 155[4] and/or the National Security Law.

In these circumstances, and returning to the case of Kosovo, the conclusions of the ICJ should be taken into consideration and the possibility of recognizing the right to secession be accepted […] that is, to recognize that in the last resort, the negotiation routes have been exhausted and to avoid a stagnation of the conflict, it would be legitimate to respect the right to secession of the population of the affected territorial area (in this case an Autonomous Community) provided that it complies with the democratic procedural requirements. It is precisely around this hypothesis that there is a total absence of references in the Supreme Court ruling.

The final answer of the SC is, therefore, that “there is no such right” and, what is worse, that “there is no democracy outside the rule of law,” thus opposing one principle to another and refusing to recognize, as did the Constitutional Court itself, that there is at least a “political aspiration” to which a political solution should be sought. The logical thing, then, would be to adopt an evolutionary interpretation of rights, as was done, by the way, with the recognition of gay marriage, and to consider, as the ICJ did, that there are extreme situations in which the legitimate exercise of the right to decide prevails over the “safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the already constituted states” and, in our case, of the sacred unity of Spain. […]


[1] Jaime Pastor, “La cuestión catalana y la disputa por la soberanía,” Le Monde Dipomatique (Spanish edition), No. 271, p. 3. Available in Viento Sur: https://vientosur.info/spip.php?article13844.

[2] Iñigo Urrutia, “Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination: The Approach of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo,” REAF-Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals Vol. 16 (2012). Available at https://works.bepress.com/inigo_urrutia/5/.

[3] The 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia was a law passed by the Catalan legislature, then approved by Spain’s parliament and later ratified in a referendum by Catalan voters. Almost immediately, the opposition center-right Popular Party challenged the statute before the Constitutional Court. The court deliberated for the next four years until June 28, 2010 when it struck down 14 of the statute’s 223 articles and curtailed another 27. Among other things, the ruling struck down attempts to place the distinctive Catalan language above Spanish in the region; ruled as unconstitutional regional powers over courts and judges; and said: “The interpretation of the references to ‘Catalonia as a nation’ and to ‘the national reality of Catalonia’ in the preamble of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia have no legal effect.” (“The Spanish Court Decision That Sparked the Modern Catalan Independence Movement,” https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/.) – Tr.

[4] Article 155 is only two short paragraphs of the 1978 Constitution of Spain. It says that if a regional government “does not comply with the obligations of the Constitution or other laws it imposes, or acts in a way that seriously undermines the interests of Spain,” the national government can ask the Senate to vote on the use of the measure. (“What is Article 155 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution?,” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/article-155-spanish-constitution-171019100117592.html.) – Tr.