Showing posts with label Quebec independence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Quebec independence. Show all posts

Sunday, October 18, 2020

50 Years Ago: When Canada Suspended Civil Liberties

Introduction

This memoir by John Riddell, at the time a leading member of the League for Socialist Action (in Quebec the Ligue socialiste ouvrière), illustrates how a small revolutionary-minded organization responded to the repression unleashed by Ottawa in October 1970. John published his account on October 16 on his web site, from which it is reproduced with thanks. It centers on the response of our Montréal members, using their candidacy of Manon Léger for mayor and their support of the labor-based Front d’action politique (FRAP) candidates for city council to maintain a public profile while defying the marshall-law restraints.

The LSA/LSO had already established itself as protagonists in the fight for Quebec language rights and as leading participants in Quebec student struggles in the late 1960s. In 1964, as a university student in Montréal, I reported in our biweekly newspaper Workers Vanguard on a lengthy interview I had with André d’Allemagne, the founder of the pro-independence RIN (Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale), a forerunner of the Parti québécois.

But while a staunch defender of Quebec’s right to self-determination, the LSA/LSO had hesitated to declare its support for independence; still unclear to us was the path the Quebec working class would take in its fight against national oppression in the Canadian state. By 1970 the demonstrated failure of the NDP to engage with Quebec liberation, coupled with the escalating mass support for the newly-founded PQ, settled the question. Barely a month before the outbreak of the October crisis our pan-Canadian congress had voted overwhelmingly to adopt a programmatic statement, For an Independent and Socialist Quebec,1 following an unprecedented public discussion by party members in our English and French language newspapers.

Critical of the PQ for its separation of Quebec sovereignty from the needed program of social emancipation, the LSO was on the contrary quick to embrace the union-endorsed FRAP as the most promising expression to date of the labour movement’s search for a political course independent of the capitalist parties, including the PQ.

In the aftermath of the October crisis, our comrades were active in defending the remaining political prisoners – chief among them Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon (the political thinkers behind the FLQ), their lawyer Robert Lemieux, trade-union leader Michel Chartrand and Radio-Canada producer Jacques Larue-Langlois. Among other actions we organized a defense committee in Toronto that brought the last three, along with singer Pauline Julien (herself arrested in October) to address large crowds at the U of Toronto’s Convocation Hall. In the end all of the defendants were acquitted by jurors of seditious conspiracy or had their charges dropped.

And we worked with other supporters of democratic rights in English Canada to organize a citizens’ commission of inquiry into the War Measures, modelled on the Russell Tribunal in England to expose imperialist war crimes in Vietnam.2

-- Richard Fidler

* * *

Recollections of Montreal Under the War Measures Act

By John Riddell

It was October 16, 1970, fifty years ago today. Turning on CBC radio over breakfast that day, I was startled to learn that the War Measures Act had been decreed across the entire country. The Canadian equivalent of martial law, War Measures were invoked on the excuse that the country faced an “apprehended insurrection.”

During that night, hundreds in Quebec had been arrested. Secretly. No charges. No phone call. No right to a lawyer or court hearing. All civil liberties were suspended. Quebec was under military occupation. A few hours later, television news started showing photos of soldiers in battledress armed with assault rifles and of tanks in the streets of downtown Montreal.

Police Abductions

I got in touch with other members of the League for Socialist Action in Toronto, where I then lived. Our first concern was to contact our group in Montreal, which had several dozen active supporters. At first, no answer. Then news: the editor of our French-language newspaper, Art Young, had disappeared, along with another leading local comrade, Penny Simpson. Hundreds in Montreal had been jailed and arrests were continuing.

The federal government’s drastic attack on civil liberties did not come as a surprise. Only three days earlier, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, when asked how far he would go to “restore order” in Quebec, had quipped, “Well, just watch me.” He claimed that a “parallel power” had emerged that was challenging elected political authorities.

Earlier in October, a British diplomat, James Cross, and Quebec’s deputy premier, Pierre Laporte, had been kidnapped by cells of the FLQ (Quebec Liberation Front). Many Quebeckers, while often critical of the kidnappings, expressed support for the liberatory goals of the FLQ manifesto.

Radical Upsurge in Quebec

The previous decade had witnessed a tumultuous rise of labour and nationalist movements in Quebec, and of support for radical social reforms and political sovereignty. Quebec had seen massive student strikes and protests, an explosive rise of labour militancy, and deep-going structural reforms such as nationalization of its electric power industry and of the previously church-run educational system.

In addition, during the decade, a succession of small groups seeking to spark a colonial freedom struggle had carried out more than a hundred guerrilla-style attacks using the FLQ label.

My organization, the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière, contended that the real responsibility for this violence lay “with the monopolists, the exploiters who are repressing the Quebec nationalist movement.” While criticizing kidnappings as a method, we called for an end to attacks on civil liberties and freedom for political prisoners.

These events unrolled long before the Internet age. As socialists, we did not have access to daily papers, television, cellphones, or radio. We communicated with each other and the broader world in person, by phone, by letter mail, and by printing and distributing literature. But the War Measures seemed at first to have outlawed all public radical activity.

Emergency Office

The day after the War Measures decree I took the first train to Montreal. I located my Montreal comrades, who had gone underground. Expecting further arrests and a raid on our headquarters, they closed down our headquarters. They removed our most valued asset – our card file of contacts and subscribers – and took it out of Montreal for safekeeping. They buried it on the farm of a member’s friend. They set up a provisional office in a couple of motel rooms, equipped with two typewriters, paper, carbons, one telephone, and a list of phone numbers.

By that evening it seemed that the wave of arrests was ending. Already, there were signs of dissent regarding Trudeau’s drastic measures. Figuring that the government had overreached, we made plans to reassert our right to speak and help build the protest movement now beginning to take shape across the country.

We set out to help break down the gag law, step by step, by reopening our office, publishing and widely distributing our views, and doing all we could to help build resistance to the War Measures.

Utilizing an Election Campaign

We had a great asset. Montreal would be voting in a few days to choose its mayor, and we had a socialist candidate in the field: a young and dynamic activist, Manon Léger. Despite the mass arrests, guns, and tanks, the election was going forward.

We were supporting a promising new left political party, “FRAP” (Front d’action politique). They had no mayoralty candidate, so Manon, challenging the notoriously right-wing mayor Jean Drapeau, complemented their slate. Under War Measures, FRAP offices had been repeatedly raided, confidential files seized, and their lawyer interned. Drapeau slanderously associated the FRAP with the FLQ. Martial-law measures had dealt FRAP a crippling blow. Manon spoke out in their defense.

Under War Measures, printshops were closed to us. But back in Toronto, our headquarters housed our own small printshop – a rarity in those days – and it was effectively underground.

We in Montreal worked together with our comrades in Toronto to prepare articles for emergency underground editions of our newspapers in English and French. Travel between the two cities was still open, so we sent a comrade to Toronto with articles and then received, again by courier, a large press run for mass distribution.

We Take to the Streets

Three days after War Measures, we organized Montreal’s first street action against the crackdown. We planned it on a very small scale, aiming to show the scope for public protest without risking too much.

We sent out two squads. One crew, including Manon, went to the main subway station, Berry-De Montigny, with signs and leaflets building her campaign.

I was part of a second crew, which went to the Canadian Forces armouries at Bleury and Ontario streets, home of the Black Watch Regiment. It was a prominent spot, just a couple of blocks from the subway station. We started picketing and leafleting, right under the noses of the armed soldiers. “Withdraw federal troops!” we shouted, in French. “Free political prisoners! For a workers’ city hall!”

It took the authorities about an hour to decide what to do with us. Eventually, we were all arrested and hauled in to the local cop shop. There was a long wait while the cops tried to decide what to charge us with. Finally, they booked us for “sporting political insignia within a week of an election” and let us go. The charges were farcical. They revealed that the authorities did not dare invoke the draconian provisions of the War Measures Act. A clear victory for freedom of speech!

Getting Out the Word

Three more days; I was back in Toronto; and 11,000 copies of our emergency French-language newspaper reached our comrades in Montreal. They were distributed widely in campuses and workers’ districts. There were no arrests. This was a test of the relationship of forces. Activists took note: conditions were good for a revival of broad protest activities.

Manon got some media breaks. She picked up on a widespread sentiment that all Quebeckers were themselves hostages, members of a nation kidnapped 200 years before.

In the October 25 mayoralty election, Drapeau and his allies were victorious; FRAP candidates were defeated. Manon picked up 7,000 votes, a quarter of those voting against Drapeau.

By then, an impressive civil liberties campaign was under way, led by a new coalition, the Front Commun pour la Liberté.

The police never raided our Montreal headquarters, but they did descend on the farm where we had buried our precious records. Fortunately, they found nothing.

The Popular Movement Recovers

Most of those interned under War Measures, including Art Young and Penny Simpson of the LSA/LSO, were soon released without charges. Opposition to the War Measures gathered momentum, finding expression in the defense effort for those few detainees who faced formal charges. Within three months, the military occupation was over. Despite continuing repression and secret police disruption, the civil liberties enjoyed before the crisis were largely restored.

The labour and peoples’ movement in Quebec, recovering from brutal repression, was on the march once more.

Related documentation
This informal account is based in part on the extensive archive of LSA/LSO articles on the War Measures Act episode, available at the Socialist History Project (posted by Ian Angus).

See also Marc Bonhomme’s article in the Socialist Project Bullet: The Events of October 1970: From Yesterday to Today.

For a comprehensive assessment of the “October Crisis” and its impact on Quebec, see Richard Fidler’s “Life on the Left.”

1 Available with other relevant documentation on the Socialist History Project web site.

2 Our comrade Ernie Tate played a key role in founding the Russell Tribunal, which he describes in the second volume of his memoir, Revolutionary Activism in the 1950s and 60s (London: Resistance Books, 2014).

Wednesday, October 14, 2020

Quebec’s October Crisis, 1970 – What today’s left learned from Ottawa’s turn to repression

See the source image

By Richard Fidler

Fifty years ago this month the federal government, invoking the War Measures Act – its first use in peacetime – occupied Quebec with 12,000 troops, arrested without a warrant almost 500 citizens, and carried out 36,000 police searches of homes, organizations and publications.

Of the 497 trade unionists, artists, lawyers and left activists jailed, 435 were subsequently freed without charges, and 44 of the 62 charged were acquitted or had their prosecutions stayed. But October 1970 marked a turning point in the federalist response to Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution” and the rapidly growing popular mobilization in favour of making Quebec an independent state.

The immediate pretext for these draconian acts was the kidnapping of a British trade commissioner and a Quebec cabinet minister by the FLQ (the Front de libération du Québec), a small band of revolutionary-minded youth – even though the police involved in the hostage search said so many arrests simply complicated their task.1 This was soon followed by Ottawa’s fraudulent claims that it was actually suppressing an “apprehended insurrection” led by Parti Québécois leaders René Lévesque and Jacques Parizeau, along with Claude Ryan, then editor of Le Devoir, the only Quebec newspaper that opposed the war measures repression. Their crime: they had called on the federal government to negotiate the release of the hostages by their kidnappers.2

An immediate victim of the repression was the FRAP, the Front d’Action Politique, a municipal party founded by trade unions and community activists that was confronting Montréal mayor Jean Drapeau’s autocratic administration around a program of radical social reform and participatory democracy.3 The FRAP was polling up to 35% support leading up to the city election in November 1970. Drapeau joined with Quebec premier Robert Bourassa in asking for federal intervention. Although federal minister Jean Marchand described the FRAP as a “front” for the FLQ, the municipal party made clear that while it was sympathetic to the demands in the FLQ’s manifesto, it did not support its methods. In the election held under military occupation, the party did not elect any of its candidates although it still managed to poll an average 18% in the districts it contested.

But Ottawa and its provincial and municipal allies had bigger targets in mind. Chief of these was the PQ, which in the Quebec elections earlier that year had won 23% of the popular vote, although getting only seven seats, its leader René Lévesque being defeated. Founded in 1968, the PQ sought sovereignty for Quebec albeit in “association” with the Rest of Canada. Its strategy was in part shaped by the pattern of federal-Quebec relations throughout most of the 1960s, Ottawa responding with concessions at each stage to increasing Quebec demands for autonomy. Quebec desires for recognition going beyond its status as “a province like the others” were met with ongoing negotiations in search of constitutional adjustments (the Fulton-Favreau formula). When the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was established, Quebec was allowed to constitute its own plan, the QPP, and to use the invested pension funds to build a Francophone bourgeoisie through the Caisse de Dépôt et Placements. A federal royal commission on “Bilingualism and Biculturalism” published detailed studies on the inferior ranking of Francophone Quebeckers in Canada’s economic and social order and proposed a reworking of Confederation to recognize the “equality of the two founding peoples.” Quebec was even given some representation in international diplomacy.

The PQ leaders hoped to push this further with their quest for sovereign status within a fundamentally reorganized pan-Canadian state that would afford them space in which to build an independent Francophone bourgeoisie, “Quebec Inc.,” looking primarily to the Quebec government to defend its interests.

However, with the election in 1968 of Pierre Trudeau as federal Liberal leader and prime minister, Ottawa’s approach veered sharply toward confrontation with Quebec. The Bi-Bi commission was shut down. And Trudeau seized on the FLQ’s actions to inflict some lasting political damage on the PQ and set the scene for strengthening the federal state in the face of the “separatist” threat. Successor legislation to the War Measures Act (introduced by the recently deceased John Turner, the Justice minister) reproduced most of its features and laid the basis for establishing a new security police force as recommended by the Royal Commission on Security in 1968.4 During the 1970s the RCMP’s Security Service engaged in break-ins, thefts of PQ membership lists and the files of left-wing publications, fingered left activists to employers and landlords, and even firebombed a barn frequented by left activists.5 The scandal-ridden Security Service was later replaced by an “independent” agency, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), which has recently added surveillance of Indigenous self-determination activists to its mandate.

A major step in Ottawa’s offensive was the 1982 “patriation” of Canada’s constitution, until then an Act of the British parliament. Overriding opposition from Quebec’s National Assembly, the new constitution included an amending formula that entrenched Quebec’s “equal” status as a province, not its reality as a nation, and imposed a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that was subsequently used by the courts to overrule key provisions of Quebec’s Charter of the French Language (Law 101). And the federal Liberals later helped to sabotage the Meech Lake Accord, designed to win Quebec’s assent to the new constitution, and still later, in the late 1990s and beyond, poured millions in federal funds into illegal campaigns to subvert Quebec nationalist expression (the “sponsorship scandal”).6

These “sticks” have of course been accompanied by the “carrot” of promoting major Quebec firms, especially in the engineering sector, through generous federal subsidies and legal protection to them in their many dubious transnational activities. Quebec Inc. is today characterized above all by its close interrelationship with Canadian, U.S. and other international capital. It can be relied on to oppose Quebec independence.

In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada, responding to a request by the federal government for an opinion on Quebec’s right to “unilateral secession,” ruled (with little or no reference to previous jurisprudence) that while secession might be legal provided it was determined by a “clear majority” on a “clear question” (both terms undefined) in a referendum, this would entail an amendment to the existing Constitution the terms of which would have to be negotiated among “all parties to Confederation” – meaning Ottawa and the other provinces.7 This was followed by adoption of the Clarity Act, which established that the federal Parliament alone would determine the “clarity” of the question and a possible majority in a future Quebec referendum. Ottawa continues to hold the upper hand; when Quebec Premier Philippe Couillard, a staunch federalist, attempted to discuss current constitutional arrangements, in 2017, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was quick to dismiss any attempt “to re-open Canada’s constitution.”8

Both referendums held by PQ governments conditioned Quebec sovereignty implicitly on a negotiated agreement with the federal regime. In 1980, voters were asked to support a Quebec government “proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations.” In 1995, they were asked “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership....” Although it indicated that failure to achieve such an agreement within a year could trigger unilateral secession, the reality was that any such partnership or agreement remained purely hypothetical, and unlikely to say the least.

In effect, the Parti Québécois longstanding strategy of creating a new sovereign bourgeois state in symbiotic partnership with Canada has been decisively undermined, although the party’s discomfiture has not yet resulted in the alienation of its major institutional allies such as the Quebec union centrals. Many years have gone by since the last popular mobilizations for sovereignty provoked by the demise of both the Meech Lake Accord and its follow-up, the 1992 Charlottetown Accord. In this sense, the shift in federal strategy that began with such dramatic effect in October 1970 was successful. This blockage of the traditional sovereigntist movement has understandably chilled pro-independence sentiment among Quebec’s population.

The PQ, its membership once a quarter-million but reduced today to just over 35,000, has reverted in recent years to an identitarian ethnic nationalism that fails to recognize let alone accommodate the polyethnic reality of modern Quebec. In the party’s recent leadership contest, all four candidates supported additional limits on immigration, and the party – along with its federal counterpart the Bloc Québécois – supported the Legault government’s Bill 21, imposing dress codes on public sector employees, a measure aimed primarily at hijab-wearing Muslim women. As Québec solidaire activist Benoit Renaud says in his recent book, “This is a nationalism that is in fact content with the limited powers of a provincial state and is perfectly compatible with Quebec’s remaining in this Canadian state that consistently refuses to recognize us.”9

It is a quite different story on the left, however. As another QS leader François Saillant documents in his excellent new book, Brève Histoire de la Gauche Politique au Québec,10 since the 1960s, and particularly since the early 1980s, with the demise of the old Mao-Stalinist parties,11 the left in Quebec has tended to support Quebec independence largely because any progressive program of fundamental social change is unrealizeable within the current federal regime. This central state has exclusive jurisdiction over finance, banking, regulation of trade and commerce, issuance of currency, foreign affairs, the military, criminal law, the appointment of judges of the superior courts, etc. The provinces are generally limited to powers of a “merely local or private nature.” And Ottawa holds residual power over all matters not specifically allocated by the Constitution to the provinces, including Quebec. Thus it is a commonplace on the Quebec left to combine social emancipation with national emancipation.12

This is a lesson often lost on progressive opinion in English Canada, including by some Anglophone progressives in Quebec. Almost 20 years ago I attempted to explain this in replying to a critique of the Union des forces progressistes, a forerunner of today’s Québec solidaire. Although a bit dated on a few of its particulars, such as the level of popular support for independence, I think the substantive argument holds true today. It was first published in Canadian Dimension.13

* * *

In Defence of Quebec’s UFP

Eric Shragge and Andrea Levy (“The Union des forces progressistes in Quebec: Prospects and Pitfalls,” CD March-April 2003) cite a number of difficulties confronting the new left-wing political formation. Among these are lack of trade union support, diffidence by some activists in the “social left,” an “old-Left” style and rhetoric, etc.

But their main criticism of the UFP — that it is fundamentally wrong on the national question because it supports Quebec independence —  tells us more about the authors’ bias than it does about the UFP or the Quebec left.

Shragge and Levy argue that support for Quebec independence (1) curbs the UFP’s appeal to young activists, new immigrants and native peoples because (2) it fails to reflect the reality, that the Québécois are already “masters in their own house.” This error, they say, will be “decisive” to the UFP’s “political fate.”

Let’s begin with the second point. Yes, Quebec has made great strides in recent decades in enhancing the status and role of French and the Francophone majority within the province’s institutions and society as a whole. French is now the language of work. Income differentials between French and English have been sharply reduced. Quebec’s education and health systems now rank with the best in Canada. And all of this largely through the initiatives and efforts of Quebecers themselves, often in the face of resistance and even outright opposition by big business, the federal government and their courts.

These developments, themselves the product of a nationalist upsurge that began with the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, far from eliminating national consciousness, have redefined it and stimulated a powerful pride in the accomplishments and capacities of Quebec society. The change is reflected in the way Quebecers describe themselves: as Québécois and no longer as “French Canadians.” Although many Quebecers — a small majority — still favour being part of Canada, most Quebecers look to the government in Quebec City as their first line of defence of their language and culture, the key defining features of this distinct society, and most want to enhance its role along these lines.

Quebec, while only a province under Canada’s constitution, is sociologically a nation and is seen as such by the vast majority of its residents. This nation is more than its language and culture, its “ethnicity”; it is the product of a long historical evolution of the peoples who inhabit the territory of Quebec. This new nation is not narrowly ethnic. As the UFP platform says, it is “the human community residing in Quebec province, having French as its official language of institutional and working communication, sharing a single set of laws and social conventions, and rich in its cultural diversity.”

Shragge and Levy seem to have a reductionist view of Quebec nationalism that conflates nation with language and ethnicity alone. There is no longer a national question in Quebec, they argue: “French is the official language, the economic elite bears names like Desjardins, Tellier and Martin, as do the members of the bureaucracy that runs Quebec’s state institutions. These issues are settled....” It is simply the “memory of English domination that fuels the longing for independence.”

I think this is a fundamental misreading of the reality. What fuels Quebec independence sentiment today in Quebec is not some distant “memory” of English domination but a deeply felt awareness that Canada’s current constitution and political system do not recognize Quebec for what it is —  a modern, vibrant, progressive nation that is open to the world, and not just a “province like the others” — and a determination to put an end to the constant, politically debilitating conflicts with Ottawa that this entails in terms of jurisdictional bickering, duplication and overlapping of social programs, fiscal deficit offloading, etc. Far from being settled, these issues continue to nag. In the last two decades alone, Quebec has seen the addition to the Canadian constitution of an amending formula that virtually rules out any change in its status through the normal negotiating process; a Charter of Rights that directly targets Quebec’s popular language legislation; and [Parliament’s adoption of] a federal “Clarity Bill” that would effectively dictate the terms of any future Quebec referendum on sovereignty, to name only the most egregious assaults on Quebec’s right to self-determination.

The Shragge-Levy trivialization of these issues is of absolutely no use in helping us understand the challenges facing the UFP as it seeks to broaden its support. For example, the UFP’s support for Quebec independence does not isolate it from Quebec’s trade unions, most of which are on record in support of sovereignty. That is why the unions support the Parti québécois! The PQ’s independentism is what primarily distinguishes it from the other capitalist parties, the Liberals and the ADQ.14

Most activists in the social movements are likewise sympathetic to sovereignty. Support for Quebec sovereignty in recent years has remained over 40% in poll after poll, and is strongest among the working people and youth to whom the UFP addresses its message. As for recent immigrants and minorities, the UFP’s star candidates in the recent election included such people as Amir Khadir, Omar Aktouf, Jill Hanley and David Fennario. They have no problem with the UFP’s pro-sovereignty position. In the left milieu, in fact, support for sovereignty is simply taken for granted; for most activists, that “issue is settled.”

There are some issues of nation and nationalism that are not settled, of course. An important one is the relationship between Quebec sovereignty and aboriginal self-government. The UFP platform, cited by Shragge and Levy, confines itself to recognizing “the right to self-determination of the First Nations up to and including their independence.” Possible approaches might entail formal recognition of full or partial sovereignty of Native peoples in those parts of the province — geographically very extensive — in which they are the majority. It is worth noting that Quebec is the only province in Canada to recognize in law the existence of a dozen aboriginal “nations,” and it is the only province to be signing modern-day treaties with its native people.

The UFP is aware that these and many other issues need further debate, both within the left and within the population as a whole. That is why its platform states that “independence is not an end in itself: rather, it is a means of making our goal for society a reality. This sovereignty of the people will find its expression in the election of a Constituent Assembly, mandated to draw up and to propose to the population, via referendum, a Constitution for a progressive, republican, secular and democratic Quebec.”

Finally, like many readers, I am sure, I am struck by the weird contrast between Canadian Dimension’s chronic campaign for “Canadian sovereignty” and its equally chronic inability to identify with the only mass democratic and progressive movement for sovereignty within the Canadian state: that of the Québécois.

The UFP is by far the most advanced expression in North America of a worldwide process now under way of “rebuilding the left.” It needs our solidarity, not our misunderstandings.

1 Jean-François Lisée, Insurrection appréhendée: le grand mensonge d’October 1970.

2 Just this month, Justin Trudeau incredibly reaffirmed this allegation. Asked by a journalist if he would apologize for the hundreds of arrests in 1970, Trudeau denounced “these revolutionaries who wanted to overthrow the government.” (Le Devoir, 8 October, 2020). Ironically, Ryan was later leader of the Quebec Liberal party and led the federalist opponents of the PQ in the 1980 referendum.

3 The FRAP program (including a proposal for free public transit) was published in a 138-page book, Les Salariés au Pouvoir (not on-line).

4 See Robert Dumont, “Entire Left is Target of Bill.”

5 See Richard Fidler, “An anniversary that Ottawa would prefer not to celebrate.”

6 Michel David, “La première guerre,” Le Devoir 26 September, 2020.

7 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, clause 88.

8Canada's Quebec wants constitutional talks despite Trudeau opposition.”

9 Benoit Renaud, Un Peuple Libre: Indépendance, laïcité et inclusion (Ecosociété 2020), p. 182.

10 Ecosociété 2020.

11 Primarily En Lutte/In Struggle and the Parti communiste ouvrier/Workers Communist Party, both of which opposed Quebec independence as a “bourgeois project.”

12 For more on this, see “Quebec independence a key to building the left in Canada.”

13 July 2003, Vol. 37 (4), at p. 7. In fairness to Andrea Levy, it should be noted that she is now an active member of Québec solidaire. When a similar criticism was levied against Québec solidaire’s independentism in the U.S. magazine Jacobin during the 2018 Quebec election, Levy joined with André Frappier in asking me to consider writing a reply to it. I regret that I did not.

14 Action démocratique du Québec, a forerunner of today’s Coalition Avenir Québec, the party that now forms the Quebec government.

Friday, September 4, 2020

History revisited: Canada’s feminists respond to Quebec’s national movement

(And a contribution to the debate rejected by Canadian Dimension)

By Richard Fidler

Thirty years ago, in June 1990, the Meech Lake Accord died, its package of constitutional reforms having been rejected by the legislatures in Manitoba and Newfoundland/Labrador. Its demise — and with it, recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society” — gave rise in the following five years to a new surge in the Quebec movement for independence that came very close to winning in the 1995 referendum, accompanied by a series of renewed attempts by the Canadian government to negotiate a constitutional deal that would defuse that movement and maintain the existing Canadian state.

The anniversary was marked this year by a number of articles in the Quebec media but went largely unnoticed in the rest of Canada (ROC). Unremarked as well, in both Quebec and the ROC, was the role the angry public debate in Canada over modest acknowledgement of Quebec as a “distinct society” (never mind, nation) drove a wedge between the feminist movements in both nations and marked a key turning point in the evolution of the Quebec women’s organizations toward increasingly nationalist orientations and, during the 1990s, open support for Quebec independence.

This story is told in a 2009 doctoral dissertation by Flavie Trudel, of the Université du Québec.[1] The rift became public in 1987 when the Meech Lake Accord was widely criticized at a general meeting of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), on the grounds, among others, that the “distinct society” clause would likely be used by the courts to undermine federal protection of women’s rights. In reaction, the Quebec Federation of Women (FFQ) left the meeting. Francophone women’s organizations had come to see Quebec, with its jurisdiction over language, culture and family law — and the progressive values upheld, for example, by Quebec juries’ multiple acquittals of abortion rights advocate Dr. Henry Morgenthaler — as a more favourable milieu for advancing women’s rights.

In a brief to the House of Commons committee studying the constitutional proposal, the FFQ stated that in its view “the progress achieved [in Quebec] in women’s status is not unrelated to its character as a distinct society.”

About a dozen Quebec women’s organizations, among them the FFQ, the CSN’s women’s committee, and a group led by Françoise David and union militant Madeleine Parent, began meeting in late 1987 to determine whether to remain in the NAC, where Francophones were a small minority.

In 1989, the FFQ decided not to renew its affiliation to the NAC, while continuing to attend its meetings as an observer. “NAC’s failure to understand or accept the position of Québec francophone women,” write NAC historians Jill Vickers et al,[2]

“marks the beginning of the end of NAC’s ability, through the affiliation of the FFQ, to provide a bridge, however fragile, between the French and English movements.… Many NAC activists would again be unable to comprehend or accept the view of the majority of francophone feminists from Québec that their liberation rested with the Québec state and with recognition of Québec as a ‘distinct society’.”

NAC was not the only women’s organization in Canada to be critical of the Meech Lake Accord. Others included the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), which argued that the Accord endangered women because it recognized aboriginal rights and Canada’s multiculturalism without mentioning women’s rights to equality. This position was typical of the many social movements in Canada that had become seduced by “Charter politics” in the wake of Parliament’s adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with its offer of recourse to the courts to override legislated obstacles to their goals — a phenomenon brilliantly analyzed by the late Michael Mandel in The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada.[3] Mandel also points to the role of the Charter as a key ingredient in Pierre Trudeau’s strategy for enhancing federal institutions and standards in opposition to Quebec’s, itself confirmed by the illusory view that Quebec’s “distinct society” constituted a threat to women’s rights.

Flavie Trudel adds, however, that judging from the exchange of correspondence between the NAC and the FFQ, “it seems clear that the FFQ’s dissatisfaction was not addressed to the feminist action of NAC…. For example, a little later NAC was quick to come out in support of Chantal Daigle in the struggle against her former partner for her right to an abortion, and the NAC reacted with outrage to the massacre at the École Polytechnique on December 6, 1989.”[4]

Moreover, the FFQ withdrawal prompted some rethinking in NAC about its approach to Quebec issues. “Judy Rebick was elected president of NAC in 1990 on a promise to work to lessen the divisions between Québécoises and women in the rest of Canada. And Rebick committed as well to stepping up NAC’s interventions on the constitutional question.”[5] NAC soon evolved toward a “Three Nations constitutional position that recognized the legitimacy of decentralized power for Quebec and the First Nations.”[6]

Meanwhile, the FFQ continued to develop its thinking on the Quebec national question, becoming clearly pro-independence in 1990. This orientation would undergo no fundamental change through the following years. And when the Parti Québécois government turned to harsh fiscal austerity after the defeat of the referendum in 1995, the FFQ, now headed by Françoise David, focused on the fight against poverty, combined with the issue of violence against women. Its discourse was transformed, writes Trudel. “It moved to the left, close to Marxism, at the same time becoming more inclusive.”[7] At the outset of the 21st century it became as well “altermondialiste,” that is, engaged in the global justice movement. Following the success of its “bread and roses” marches in the mid-1990s, the FFQ initiated the World March of Women in 2000.

After the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord

The FFQ was now the umbrella organization for 115 Quebec associations with about 100,000 members in all walks of life. In its brief to the Bélanger-Campeau commission on Quebec’s political and constitutional future, established in 1990 by the Quebec government following the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, the FFQ stated:

“We believe that the possibility of achieving significant changes in the social and political fabric of Quebec will be proportional to the degree of autonomy Quebec obtains. And we believe that greater manoeuvrability for Quebec will promote the development of a feminist model of society, provided that women are closely associated with all phases in the development of this model. To define and implement a plan for society, we need a framework that we can be part of.

“With this in mind, and although we are fully aware that political autonomy is not the only condition for such changes, we think that women as a social group have an interest in choosing the greatest possible political autonomy for Quebec.[8] […]

“We feminists understand the importance of autonomy and identity, concepts that have always been at the heart of our struggle. We have refused to dissolve our identity as women into that of our fathers and husbands; and today we refuse to dissolve our Quebec identity into the Canadian identity. We know the price of autonomy, but also its value.

“Our feminism is expressed collectively; it is part of a specific cultural reality, that of Quebec, and it is not independent of the social and political context. For example, let us recall that the birth of neo-feminism in Quebec in the early 1970s was closely related to the goal of national liberation. Feminist groups situated the struggle of women within the struggle for national liberation, as was illustrated by the slogan ‘No women’s liberation without the liberation of Quebec. No Quebec liberation without the liberation of women.’ Then, as today, it was not feminism that was exclusive to Quebec women, but the context in which it was developing. […]

“Since it is the overall future of Quebec that interests us, we think that the changes in Quebec should not be limited to a fundamental modification of the relationship between Quebec and Canada, but should be situated within an overall plan for society. What we need to collectively redefine is not only our relationships with Canada but what this new country of Quebec will be. It is social relationships as a whole that must be re-envisaged.”[9]

And the FFQ went on to develop some of the key ideas it thought should be included in the constitution of an independent Quebec. It added:

“The new constitution should be elaborated by a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage and composed equally of men and women.

“The proposed constitution should be submitted to the entire population for ratification. It will be the property of the citizens of Quebec, and should not be the subject of any negotiations with other countries, including Canada.”[10]

No surprise, then, that the FFQ opposed the Charlottetown Accord, the follow-up to Meech negotiated by the first ministers and put to a cross-Canada referendum for approval in 1992. FFQ leaders participated in a new coalition, the Regroupement des Québécoises pour le NON, and published a “pink pamphlet,” Non à l’entente de Charlottetown: Pour un avenir qui nous ressemble.

NAC, too, with the FFQ again a member, opposed the Accord. NAC leaders Judy Rebick and Shelagh Day issued a statement explaining that “The Quebec and aboriginal peoples have the right to decide democratically their own future without being crushed by a massive campaign orchestrated by the majority’s political elites.”[11] But this position was sharply attacked not only by the media but by some NAC affiliates who protested that the position taken by the organization’s leaders was not based on adequate consultation with the members.[12] In the October 1992 referendum, the Charlottetown Accord was defeated in both Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Leading up to the 1995 referendum on Quebec independence, the FFQ voted in a membership assembly to endorse the OUI following a consultation in which three different positions were advanced: for, against, and neither. But the FFQ’s efforts were not enough to tip the balance in the popular vote, in which the OUI was narrowly defeated — 50.55% against, 49.45% in favour.[13]

And where was the left in this history?

The feminists were not alone in their divisions over Meech and the Quebec national question. The Quebec NDP, which was experiencing a brief surge in support following the PQ’s endorsement of Mulroney’s Conservatives in the mid-1980s, opposed the Accord. But the federal NDP supported Meech, as it had the unilateral patriation of the Constitution in 1992 without Quebec consent. Quebec’s tiny Communist party, which had opted for Yes to sovereignty-association in the 1980 referendum, urged a No vote in 1995; the party has never supported Quebec independence, and in the early 21st century most of its Quebec members split, first to adhere to the pro-sovereignty Québec solidaire, later to support the PQ.

Other Marxists? In a recent article on the demise of the Trotskyist tendency to which both he and I had adhered, John Riddell noted that our Quebec forces, which had historically favoured Quebec independence, split in 1980 and formed Gauche socialiste in 1983: “Gauche Socialiste went on to play a significant and constructive role in the creation of a new left party, Québec Solidaire.” During the 1980s and 1990s, John notes, “the broader socialist movement was in decline.” Yet, he says, “these were the very years in which the International Socialists (IS) emerged in Canada as a dynamic and influential far-left organization.” On this, I think he exaggerates. In any case, the IS record on the constitutional debates speaks otherwise.

In 2012, IS leader Abbie Bakan criticized the NAC for opposing the Charlottetown Accord: “The National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) … tragically sided with the ‘no’ side. But this position encountered considerable challenge, most importantly from Quebec feminist allies, including the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ).” Bakan misstates the FFQ position, as we have seen. She goes on: “At the time, the International Socialists, a member organization of NAC, wrote an Open Letter calling for a reversal of the ‘no’ position.”

In a 40-page pamphlet published in 1991-92, which is still the most complete statement of IS thinking on Canada’s national questions,[14] Bakan argues that “genuine self-determination for all the oppressed can only be won by smashing the Canadian state…,”[15] but apparently she and the IS are unable to see how Quebec independence might be strategically related to that goal.

For my part, in 1987 I drafted an article for the widely-read left magazine Canadian Dimension aimed at rebutting the very myths being propagated in Canada by some feminists and leftists concerning the Meech Lake Accord. It was rejected by the CD editorial collective, citing (in a letter by managing editor Jim Silver to Donald Swartz)[16] “our disagreement with the interpretation offered by the article.” CD’s refusal was protested at the time by a number of socialists in Canada and Quebec whose support I had solicited (although they did not necessarily agree with the article’s content) — among them Gil Levine, Lukin Robinson and Swartz.

In Quebec, Roch Denis translated the article and published it in the June-July 1988 issue of Tribune Ouvrière, the newspaper of the Groupe socialiste des travailleurs, with an introduction that stated, in part: “…while the author’s position is widely held within the left and among worker militants in Quebec, it is much more seldom heard in English Canada… where the dominant circles of the ‘left’ yield to no one in their defence of the Canadian state.”

Ironically, in a book published to mark the 50th year of publication of Canadian Dimension,[17] a chapter by Peter Graefe on its coverage of Quebec states:

“In retrospect, the lack of Quebec voices on Meech Lake was unfortunate. A key claim of CD’s rejection of Meech Lake involved the spending power provisions, which were seen as preventing future universal social programs. Ultimately, the Quebec left rejected these same provisions on the opposite grounds: namely that they recognized and legitimized the use of the spending power and thus made it easier to use. In some ways, this debate was never joined in the pages of the journal….”

Here, then, for the first time in English, is my article as it was submitted to Canadian Dimension, with a few outdated references removed. My approach to the “distinct society” issue is somewhat different from the FFQ’s, although not inconsistent with it.

Meech Lake: Myth and Reality

By Richard Fidler

Almost no one on the left likes the Meech Lake accord. But the critics differ on what is wrong with it, and what it means for the political future of this country. There is parti­cular confusion over Quebec’s status, federal-provincial rela­tions, and the role of judicial review. Clarity on these matters will strengthen the opposition and reinforce the unity of the left in Quebec and English Canada.

Myth No. 1. Quebec has gained new powers.

The accord inserts a clause in the Constitution recognizing that Quebec is “a distinct society” within Canada. This was instrumental in getting [Quebec Premier] Bourassa’s signature on the accord, which is said to “bring Quebec into the Constitution.” And this in turn has helped many who are critical of other provisions in the accord, such as Ed Broadbent and the NDP federal caucus, to swallow their misgivings and endorse the accord.

But recognition of Quebec’s uniqueness is largely symbolic, as critics in Quebec have pointed out. The meaning of “distinct society” is unclear: its content will be defined by the unelected judiciary — ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada, in which Quebec judges are a minority. The judges will interpret it in light of the accord and the Constitution as a whole. What do these indicate?

The accord does not give Quebec protection in the crucial area of language rights, so essential to the definition of its distinct character. Provisions in the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter of Rights that were used to invalidate large parts of Law 101 remain in place. One might think that “distinct society” refers at minimum to Quebec’s French language and culture. But the clause is subject to a “duality principle” which, among other things, requires the Quebec legislature to “preserve” the English-speaking population in Quebec, whose presence is stated to be a “fundamental characteristic of Canada.” This is a clear invitation to the courts to cut down Quebec language laws that are deemed to interfere with Anglophone “rights.”

In addition, the accord for the first time gives constitutional authorization to the federal government to initiate spending programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction — a power Quebec long resisted.

Quebec still lacks a comprehensive veto on constitu­tional change. In 1981 the Supreme Court said Quebec’s veto was only a “convention,” not law, and that the Constitution could be patriated without Quebec consent. Under Meech Lake, the require­ment of provincial unanimity in amendments concerning federal institutions is extended, but the general amending formula (seven provinces with 50% of the population) remains.

Most important, the “principle of equality of all the provinces,” specifically mentioned in the resolution for adop­tion by the legislatures, decisively undermines any real recog­nition of Quebec as a “distinct society.” This is why Quebec has no unique veto power; as Senator Lowell Murray, Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations, explains, “Once the principle of provincial equality was enshrined in the Constitu­tion on Nov. 5, 1981, the only way to give Quebec a veto was to also give a veto to all the provinces.” Thus, from now on, all provinces must consent to any constitutional amendment affecting the powers, number and method of appointment of Senators. (This effectively precludes any possibility of abolishing the Senate.) Quebec gets a voice in appointments to the Supreme Court and the Senate — but so do all the other provinces.

In addition, all provinces are allowed to “opt out” of federal shared cost programs and constitutional amendments that transfer provincial powers to the federal government. A province opting out will qualify for federal compensation if it “carries on a program or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives” established by the federal government (not Parlia­ment).

Opting out with financial compensation was originally devised in the 1960s to enable Quebec to establish its own social programs — medicare, university funding, pensions, etc. — without conceding any special constitutional status to the province. In theory the procedure was available to any province, but only Quebec used it. Now it will be entrenched in the constitution for all provinces.

Under Meech Lake, “special status” is given to all provinces, and therefore to none. The rationale: to avoid at all costs conceding any meaningful national character to Quebec. In legal and constitutional terms, Quebec remains very much a “province like the others” — but subject to continuing constitu­tional restrictions on its power to legislate to protect its distinctive language and culture. This is the primary injustice in the accord.

Myth No. 2. Meech Lake weakens the central state.

Many English-Canadian critics of the accord complain that it weakens the federal jurisdiction, which they see as the primary source of progressive legislation. They worry that the first ministers, in signing the accord, have surrendered some portion of Canadian sovereignty.

Thus, Larry Brown of the National Union of Provincial Government Employees says (in a brief presented to the parliamentary committee studying the accord) that it “means a substan­tial transfer of power from the federal to the provincial governments.” The United Electrical Workers (UEW) speaks of the “balkanization” of Canada and warns about “a continuous dynamic of decentralization” under the accord. The Canadian Labor Congress echoes these views while conceding it does not speak for its Quebec affiliate, the Quebec Federation of Labor (QFL).

The unions worry about the enhanced provincial role under the accord. And they argue that the vague spending powers formula opens the way to gutting existing federal-provincial shared-cost social programs, and may foreclose meaningful stan­dards in future ones such as the proposed childcare program.

Conversely, however, the requirement that provincial programs be compatible with “the national objectives” could pressure provinces to participate in programs determined by Ottawa. This may be objectionable to Québécois who wish to establish their own priorities in terms of national (Quebec) needs. As the QFL put it, in a brief to the National Assembly, Quebec has established some relatively advanced social programs in recent years: “Why should we recognize the federal govern­ment’s power to dictate our next public spending priorities?” An opting out formula that recognized Quebec’s unique needs would obviate this problem.

Making compatibility with national objectives a condition for federal funding of social programs does not necessarily bar pioneering reforms by some provinces; in fact, many social reforms in Canada have been initiated by provinces, such as medicare in Saskatchewan under the CCF-NDP. Much will depend on how restrictively those “national objectives” are defined.

Other arguments marshalled in support of the “balkani­zation” thesis are similarly unconvincing. The provinces may submit lists of nominees for the Senate and Supreme Court, but the federal government makes the ultimate determination. A province may negotiate an immigration agreement with the federal government that is “appropriate to the needs and circumstances of that province,” but any such agreement must conform to national standards and objectives set by the federal Parliament.

Nor should the ideological consequences of the accord be ignored. The Globe and Mail editors argue that Quebec’s formal acceptance of patriation and the Charter of Rights, and the enhanced provincial role in determining the composition of federal institutions, will tend to “increase the legitimacy” of those institutions “in Quebec and in the regions.”

Ed Broadbent was probably right when he told Parlia­ment: “The powers of the national Government of Canada have not been reduced one iota by this accord.” That is why the Quebec NDP opposes the accord — and why Broadbent supports it.

Myth No. 3. Increased judicial review will promote democracy and equality.

The underlying problem with Meech Lake is not the increased provincial input in federal institutions and policies, but the enhanced role of the executive, bureaucratic and judi­cial powers under the accord.

The role of the elected House of Commons and provin­cial legislatures is diminished through such means as annual First Ministers’ conferences on the economy and the constitu­tion. Mulroney and other first ministers are even claiming that none of the 11 legislatures “debating” the accord may amend it in any way. Intergovernmental agreements contemplated in the accord can bind successor legislatures, and leave no role for native people, Northerners or Francophone minorities outside Quebec who do not have governmental status. The Senate is here to stay. The amending formula becomes increasingly complex.

Above all, the accord effects a further huge transfer of power to the judiciary. Judges will have to determine the meaning of terms like “distinct society,” “national objectives,” and “reasonable compensation.”

Ironically, some critics of Meech Lake would rely on the courts to remedy perceived injustices in the accord, by extending the scope of judicial review under the Charter of Rights. Some unions and women’s groups are calling for an amendment that would make the “distinct society” clause subject to Charter protection of women’s equality rights. They point out that the accord specifies that the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society is not to affect federal jurisdiction over Indians or the multicultural character of Canada under the Charter. The failure to provide a similar exemption for women, they say, permits Quebec, in the name of promoting its distinc­tiveness, to override women’s rights.

In legal terms, the pro-Charter argument is less than overwhelming. It can also be argued, as does the Quebec women’s federation (FFQ), that in terms of the constitutional division of powers native people and cultural minorities are analogous with Québécois, in that they all have national or ethnic charac­teristics. Women, however, are not a nationality and there is therefore no need to mention them in the accord.

Politically, the pro-Charter argument is disastrous. It is offensive to Québécois, both male and female. It suggests that unless the Quebec government is subject to external consti­tutional constraints, it will continue to oppress women; that is, that the Québécois themselves are unable to eliminate sexual oppression. This position has divided Quebec and English-Cana­dian feminists and has been effectively exploited by Mulroney, Bourassa and other supporters of the accord to demoralize those in Quebec who criticize the “distinct society” clause as providing insufficient protection of Quebec’s vulnerable language and culture. (“You see, even this is too much for English Canada; it’s the best you can hope for.”)

The National Association of Women and the Law, tes­tifying before the parliamentary committee on the accord, cited the “potential” for “misuse of population control in the name of preserving or promoting distinct populations.” But the old stereotype of a priest-ridden Quebec engaged in a “revenge of the cradles” hardly squares with contemporary Quebec’s compara­tively progressive approach to women’s rights, reflected, for example, in the greater access to abortions. As the FFQ noted, “in Quebec, respect for women’s rights is increasingly a part of our political culture. The progress we have made in terms of women’s status is not unrelated to this characteristic as a distinct society.”

The federal government-sponsored Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women has even called for making the entire Constitution subject to the Charter — and for a judicial opinion on the accord before it is adopted by Parliament.

This resort to the Charter and the courts is misguided. As many in the left are coming to understand, the Charter of Rights is at best a dubious instrument for advancing the struggles of the oppressed and exploited.

Charter rights are abstract. Their content is defined by the judiciary, with its traditional conservative bias. Legal reasoning tends to discount arguments founded on history and class — essential considerations when assessing laws that engender inequality or that are designed to overcome it. Is it mere coincidence that the overwhelming majority of cases so far under the sexual equality provision of the Charter have been initiated by men seeking “equal” benefits for men?

The courts tend to favor the individual over the collective, and private enterprise over government. Thus the Supreme Court had no difficulty finding that the “fundamental” freedom of association in the Charter did not protect union members’ right to engage in collective bargaining or to strike, while the right of protection against arbitrary search and seizure protected the Southam newspaper chain from a federal law designed to curb monopoly concentration.

In fact, the general thrust of Charter litigation, as of all judicial review, is to restrain government action or legislation. This can be useful in some circumstances — for example in defending individual rights against arbitrary police action, or women’s right to choose against the criminalization of abortion. But what women, Québécois, and all working people need above all is positive government action that protects them against unfettered corporate power and the inequalities of the “free market”.

Charter litigation has definite limits as part of an offensive political strategy. It tends to divert attention away from the need for collective action to obtain specific reforms and governmental change, in favor of the courts and abstract judicial arguments of principle.

For example, opponents of cruise missile testing launched a court challenge under the Charter that received massive media attention. The courts in the end ratified the tests. Meanwhile, Operation Dismantle’s alternative strategy of promoting binding municipal referenda across Canada on cruise tests as well as NATO membership got lost in the Charter mania. Similarly, unions confronting wage-control legislation in several provinces chose to fight it with a Charter challenge in the courts instead of organizing on-the-job protests and strike action as they had in 1976 in response to Trudeau’s wage controls. Again, the courts upheld the legislation and the unions were back to square one.

An alternative approach would focus on rallying support for specific actions and laws rather than leaving the solution to the discretion of judges. For example, feminists say their desire to amend the Meech Lake accord is prompted by a recent ruling that the rest of the Constitution is not subject to the Charter. In that case, teachers and school boards in Ontario went to court to challenge the provincial government’s decision to extend Catholic school funding to senior grades. They argued that the protection of denominational schools in Ontario and Quebec in section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 was contrary to the Charter. They lost. The Supreme Court said that it would not interfere with the “fundamental compromises” negotiated between the provinces and the federal government. In effect the judges threw the decision back into the political sphere, where it should have been all along. What should the Ontario teachers do now? Certainly not fight to make the Charter override the rest of the Constitution. Instead, they could join forces with the Quebec unions and community groups that have been fighting to secularize the schools by ending the religion-based distinctions in section 93.

The Charter directs us to rely less on legislatures and governmental power and more on the courts for solutions to our problems. It is no accident that its adoption coincided with the unilateral patriation of the Constitution following defeat of the Quebec referendum on sovereignty. The Charter is a cen­tralizing instrument: it subjects Quebec’s laws and government action to judicial scrutiny for compliance with a pan-Canadian jurisprudence. In doing so, it restricts Quebec’s capacity to develop its own institutions and laws adapted to its national character or distinctiveness.

Until now Québécois have been somewhat diffident toward the Canadian Charter. The Parti Québécois government was applauded when it invoked a Charter provision to exempt Quebec legislation from some key provisions of the Charter.

But in mid-April 1987, a few days before signing the Meech Lake accord,  Bourassa quietly let the provision lapse. With the accord, Charter politics now acquire greater force in Quebec — even though Quebec’s own Charter, an act of its National Assembly and therefore subordinate to the Canadian Charter, is in some respects more advanced. (For example, it prohibits dis­crimination on grounds of political views or sexual orientation, and it is directed against arbitrary discriminatory action by private agencies, not just governments.)

The proposal to extend the jurisdiction of the Charter, and therefore the courts, simply reinforces these trends. And it stands reality on its head. Quebec’s struggle for its rights as a nation, however imperfectly reflected in the Meech Lake accord, does not threaten the struggle by women against their oppression as a sex. The interests of Québécois and women lie in a common struggle against a central state that maintains the oppression of both.


[1] Flavie Trudel, “L’Engagement des femmes en politique au Québec: Histoire de la Fédération des femmes du Québec de 1966 à nos jours.” I am indebted to Raghu Krishnan for drawing this work to my attention.

[2] Jill Vickers, Pauline Rankin, Christine Appelle, Politics as if women mattered: A political analysis of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 119.

[3] Toronto, Thompson Educational Publishing, 2nd ed. 1994.

[4] Trudel, op. cit., p. 253.

[5] Ibid., p. 254.

[6] Vickers et al., op. cit., p. 9. See also “NAC Response to Federal Constitution Proposals,” October 25, 1991. Copy in my possession.

[7] Trudel, op. cit., p. 285.

[8] Richard Fidler, Canada, Adieu? Quebec Debates its Future (Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991), pp. 159-60.

[9] Ibid., p. 163.

[10] Ibid., p. 164.

[11] Trudel, op. cit., p. 292. My re-translation from the French.

[12] Ibid., p. 292.

[13] Ibid., p. 316.

[14] Abbie Bakan, Quebec: From Conquest to Constitution, A Socialist Analysis (Toronto: An International Socialists Pamphlet). A pdf copy is in my possession.

[15] Ibid., p. 3.

[16] Dated February 17, 1988. Copy in my possession.

[17] Cy Gonick (ed.), Canada Since 1960: A People’s History (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2016).

Sunday, August 16, 2020

More on that failed fusion experience: a report from the past

Introduction

John Riddell, in his “Inquest into a failed socialist fusion” published last November, cited a number of reasons behind the ultimate failure of the RWL/LOR[1] to live up to the ambitions of its founding components.[2]

One was the false rationale behind the fused organization’s “turn to industry,” initially a campaign to persuade a large number of comrades to take jobs in Canada’s major industrial unions. The “industrial turn,” says John, “was based not on existing reality but on a prediction regarding future conditions. Such a future-based orientation is impervious to the test of experience.” John’s analysis largely focuses on the period after 1980, the year in which the RWL and I parted company.

In a parallel critique of the fusion experience cited by John, Bernard Rioux points to a related factor, in my opinion of more importance in the first years following the 1977 fusion: political differences within the new organization over the course of the class struggle in the Canadian state.

“The first year of the LOR/RWL (1977-78) was marked by some definite successes in the building of a Trotskyist organization in the Canadian state.

“But significant political differences soon reappeared: in our activities, in writing articles, and in the educational content of the members. Was it necessary to call ‘For an NDP government,’ the traditional slogan of the LSA/LSO, or should we have been advocating abstention in the elections, the traditional position of the GMR? Would we call for an NDP vote in English Canada while rejecting it in Quebec? How were we to explain our support for independence? Responses differed as the issues arose in quick succession.

“The differences were expressed around three sets of problems: what was the weight of the Quebec national question in the Canadian revolution; what form and rhythm was our involvement in the unions to take; and what weight should be given to the new radicalizing layers among women and gays and lesbians?”

A significant minority within the RWL/LOR leadership began to dispute the answers the majority leadership was posing to these questions. The following report, which I gave to our united leadership on behalf of the Political Committee minority in May 1979, explains our view of the issues at that time.

The political context was the preparation of the RWL/LOR’s approach to the May 22 federal election. Our debate occurred in the wake of the organization’s April 1979 convention, where these differences were first clearly expressed. My report reflected the valuable input of such comrades as Riddell, Ernie Tate and the late Colleen Levis. I think it stands up well, even now. Apologies for its length; I have never been a “man of few words”!

Worth noting are a few pseudonyms. Tyson is Steve Penner. Samuels is Judy Rebick. My byline replaces the pseudonym used in the report as published in the RWL/LOR, from which I have scanned the text.

Incidentally, here are the results registered in the May 22 federal election, when the Conservatives under Joe Clark were elected to office with less than a parliamentary majority.

Richard Fidler

* * *

Report to Political Committee on federal election campaign, May 6, 1979

By Richard Fidler

The following report reflects the line of the PC minority. It was rejected by a vote of 5 for, 8 against.

(The information on the CLC campaign in this report was compiled with the assistance of Comrade Dennis Marlon of the Toronto branch.)

I want to deal with four things in this report: 1. the Canadian Labor Congress campaign in support of the NDP; 2. the question of the NDP in Quebec; 3. the election statement and draft platform of the majority leadership; and 4. what we should be doing with the RWL campaign.

Political Context

Any bourgeois election campaign presents an important opening for a small propaganda group like the RWL to fight for our ideas and our program. This is all the more true in the current context—one of rising class struggle, both internationally and in Canada.

We are now in the fifth straight year of capitalist “austerity.” Workers’ real wages continue to decline; unemployment remains at post-Depression records and threatens to rise still further. Slashing cutbacks in social services continue apace; democratic rights are under attack on all fronts.

Lacking a class-struggle leadership, workers have taken some harsh blows from the capitalist offensive. Yet they have suffered no decisive defeats. Their combativity remains intact, and is rising. Strikes are increasing in number; they are harder fought (Inco, CUPW). Nationalist sentiment continues to deepen in Quebec. This pattern in Canada reflects a similar pattern internationally—from the revolutionary up­surge in Iran to the rising workers’ struggles in Western Europe and the United States.

Among working people there is less and less confidence in the ability of the capitalist system to “deliver the goods”—to maintain, let alone improve, the standard of living and rights of the masses. Everywhere we find growing receptivity to socialist ideas.

These developments must shape our approach to the election campaign. Above all, we must be concrete: the basic themes of our class-struggle program must be directly linked to the experiences of the mass of working people.

Our central axis must be class political independence from the bourgeoisie. On all the major questions facing the workers and their allies, we outline a class-against-class response. This includes the fight against the imperialist war drive; against capitalist austerity and the anti-working class offensive, for the shorter workweek and the sliding scale of wages; for the rights of the oppressed, above all active defense of Quebec’s right to self-determination in English Canada and the fight for independence and national liberation in Quebec.

At the apex of our program is the concept of the workers and farmers government, a government of the workers and their strategic allies that governs in their interests.

This program must be linked to the actual struggles of working people as they are unfolding today—from solidarity with the struggles of the Iranian workers and peasants, to the fight against nuclear power.

In the election campaign, as in all our activities, we advance a program to unite the working class and the oppressed in struggle independently of the bourgeoisie.

1. The CLC campaign in support of the NDP

The Canadian Labor Congress’s campaign to mobilize union support behind the NDP is the most
favorable opening for us in this election—both for what it means in the class struggle, and as an opportunity to turn the RWL outward and get a feel for the situation in the unions.

Some of the main aspects of this campaign were described in the article in the April 9 issue of Socialist Voice (“Unions mobilize behind NDP election effort”). The campaign is without precedent; it is probably the CLC’s most important involvement with the NDP since the founding of the labor party in the early 1960s. The campaign is “separate but parallel” to the NDP’s. Seminars have been held at various points across the country, involving up to 500 or more union stewards, local presidents and executives, committee people, business agents, and in some cases rank-and-file militants. Local unions are distributing leaflets,
stickers, and buttons at plant-gates, on the shop floor, and door to door; the theme is “The perfect union—me and the NDP” (in French, “L’union fait la force”).

Union newspapers carry extensive coverage on the NDP; examples are the four-page inserts in the CBRT&GW’s Canadian Transport and the CUPE newspaper, The Public Employee. Most of this material appears also in the French-language editions of the union newspapers. In addition, the Quebec Federation of Labor has put out a special eight-page election edition of its monthly Le Monde Ouvrier; besides listing all the NDP candidates in Quebec, and calling on workers to support them, it contains numerous articles on the struggle against wage controls, the fight of the postal workers, unemployment, inflation, women’s rights, health and safety in the workplace, the situation of working farmers, and the RCMP and repression.

Phone banks have been established in many areas; the goal is to contact union members individually to talk about the NDP with them. Immigrant workers are reached in their own language.

Many union officials and newspapers compare the election effort to labor’s mobilization in the cross-country strike against wage controls on October 14, 1976. It is certainly labor’s biggest mobilization since then.

The model frequently cited is a federal by-election in Newfoundland last fall, when unions—in particular, the Canadian Paperworkers Union and the Newfoundland Fishermen’s Union—mobilized in support of the NDP, increasing its vote from 4 percent in the previous election to 44 percent and electing an MP.

The basic theme of the union campaign is that it is not enough to “defeat Trudeau.” Workers must vote for a party that is based on the unions, and that can defend the interests of working people. Union literature emphasizes the need to defeat both Trudeau and Clark, and with them the parties of big business. The pro-NDP campaign is explained as a continuation of labor’s campaign against the wage controls.

The context of the campaign, as I have mentioned, is the increasing politicization of workers and their unions in response to the capitalist crisis. It corresponds to and is an extension of similar developments we have noted outside the federal election arena—for example, the growing involvement of the Metropolitan Toronto labor council with the NDP at the municipal level, as in the recent campaign in the city’s Ward 4 aldermanic by-election, and the slate of NDP-Labor Council candidates in last November’s civic elections.

The campaign is centered in key industrial unions that we have targeted for colonization—Steel, Auto, the IWA, as well as the CPU and other unions like CUPE. It involves many unions not affiliated to the NDP, or not previously identified with the party. An example is the Public Service Alliance of Canada, one of the country’s largest unions; the pro-NDP campaign is the concrete form taken by PSAC’s earlier proposal to form “Political Action Committees” during the election to fight Bill C-22. At a CLC election strategy meeting in Toronto March 1, unions representing about 90 percent of the CLC’s 2.3 million members were present. Only 10 percent of CLC members are actually affiliated members of the NDP.

Response to the campaign

The campaign is strongest in the industrial union centers—union bastions like Sudbury, Brantford, and Windsor in Southern Ontario. At a union election seminar in Windsor, the 600 militants present adopted a proposal to publish a leaflet on women’s issues in the campaign.

In Winnipeg, unions have focused their activity in Bird’s Hill riding, where the NDP has strong chances of election. The unions’ May Day rally was to feature NDP candidates as speakers. In Vancouver, the Steelworkers and IWA are in the forefront of the campaign.

It was reported in the Toronto branch that in Hamilton, the new leadership in the 10,000-member Steel local 1005 at Stelco, led by the ex-”Waffle” militant Cec Taylor, campaigned to “put 1005 behind the NDP.” This is particularly significant because the Liberal party has traditionally played an influential role in that union.

In Toronto, the UAW held a “cadre school” on the elections attended by some 300 local union officers and militants. Comrade Joe Flexer attended; he reports he received a good response when he criticized the NDP program in the framework of supporting the CLC’s initiative. The CLC campaign is relatively weak in Toronto; one factor is the slow pick-up by Steel locals, most of which have been immersed in local elections until last week.

I’ll deal with Quebec at greater length later in this report. It’s worth noting, however, that at Sept-Îles on the Côte Nord, one of the centers of the May 1972 upsurge, a leader of the Steelworkers union, the main union in the area, is running as an NDP candidate. At Ste-Thérèse the president of the UAW local at General Motors is the NDP candidate. Comrade Joe Young went up there and found that the local was discussing support for the NDP campaign at its membership meeting.

At the Ontario Federation of Labor women’s conference, as Linda Blackwood reports in the April 30 Socialist Voice, the question of the NDP was a dominant theme.

Perhaps most interesting is the shop-floor response to this campaign. Everywhere, comrades report, the distribution of pro-NDP literature in their factories sparks political discussions. As Comrade Art Young says, it “changes the atmosphere in the plant,” politicizing it.

The bourgeoisie is paying close attention to the CLC campaign. The Financial Post and Globe and Mail, two leading big-business mouthpieces, have in particular described its impact in the unions, and speculated publicly on the longer-term implications for the labor movement. The New York Times has also discussed its importance.

Some weaknesses

It’s easy to spot the weaknesses in the CLC campaign. In the Voice article we listed four main ones.

  1. The “critical support to a (capitalist) minority government” line of the CLC and NDP leadership. The union brass are focusing their efforts on only 60 ridings, where they estimate the NDP has the best chances of victory. The aim is to elect enough NDP MPs to hold the “balance of power” in the next Parliament, should neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives get a majority. We have explained what is wrong with this approach. However, we should note that the logic of the campaign is to center less and less on that narrow electoralist goal, and increasingly on the general theme: “more New Democrats.” The “balance” of parliamentary power is not a perspective with much appeal to rank-and-file unionists!
  2. The campaign is not conceived as a break from tripartism and class collaborationism. For the union brass, it is their complement; by increasing NDP strength it is designed to increase the CLC’s ability to press for tripartite deals with the employers and government. In this, of course, the CLC’s approach does not differ at all with the NDP’s program, which is class-collaborationist to the core. As we have always pointed out, the fact that the unions are campaigning in support of the NDP’s program, a program that doesn’t differ substantially from the program of the capitalist parties, seriously undercuts the potential political impact of the campaign.
  3. The CLC campaign is organized strictly from the top down. It is not designed to encourage rank and file members to mobilize on their own behind the NDP. Few mass meetings are being organized during the campaign; instead, the union brass have focused their efforts on individual contact with workers, as through the “phone banks.”

We countered this in the Voice article by citing the experience in the Newfoundland by-election, when the Corner Brook paperworkers twice shut down the mill in strike action and canvassed support for the NDP. We have also pointed to the need to take the defense of workers struggles into the campaign—for example, by challenging the NDP and CLC to take up the defense of the postal workers union and the Inco strikers, and to speak out in defense of Quebec’s national rights.

  1. A glaring weakness, of course, is the campaign’s relatively limited character in Quebec. I’ll deal with that later.

A big step forward for labor movement

These are all important weaknesses of the CLC campaign, and we shouldn’t hesitate to explain them. But they should not blind us to the overriding positive nature of the campaign.

The analogy with the October 14, 1976 mobilization is an appropriate one. We see the same kind of contradictions: a mass mobilization of the union ranks for a class-collaborationist project. In the case of October 14, the general strike action was designed simply to build pressure for the CLC bureaucracy’s proposed “tripartite” labor-management-government collaboration in administering the capitalist economy. That didn’t stop us from seeing the immensely progressive nature of the proposed action; we jumped right in, and together with union militants everywhere helped to build it. We should recall that it was the rank-and-file activists, not the CLC brass, who ensured the success of October 14—making it a powerful demonstration of labor’s rejection of the capitalist austerity program. Likewise, it would be a big error to turn our backs on the current CLC campaign with ultimatist rhetoric and abstract denunciations, because of the reformist political content the union brass give it.

The campaign by the unions to build support for the NDP—even conducted as it is around programmatic support for the NDP, and with strictly electoralist methods—is highly progressive. The vast majority of workers in this country do not yet understand even the necessity to stop supporting the parties of the capitalists; according to one study, only 20 percent of trade unionists’ votes went to the NDP in the 1974 federal election, while the Liberals’ share was 51 percent.

We should get into this campaign and build it, as an important step in the direction of independent labor political action. The CLC-NDP campaign should be the central focus of our press, our candidates, and our forums during the election campaign.

Unfortunately, the approach of the majority leadership of the RWL has been exactly the opposite, up to now. The election statement published in our press takes a sectarian stance. In the English version, it mentions the CLC campaign only in negative terms. In the French version, there is no mention of the CLC campaign. In the draft platform the majority comrades have submitted to this PC meeting, they seem to have modified this position. The draft states: “The CLC campaign is an important step forward for Canadian labor and should be supported by all socialists.” (I presume that also means we think workers should support it, too.) But that is still the only positive thing we say about it. The rest is all badmouthing of the campaign, counterposing it to mass action by the union ranks for their demands. In other words, the R WL majority leadership accepts the framework imposed on the campaign by the CLC bureaucracy.

Our approach should be just the opposite. We should get into this campaign, and take our program into all the debates around it. We should link it with our proposed solutions to the capitalist crisis, including our program of mass-action struggle for transitional, democratic, and immediate demands.

There are some other things we should note about this development. We’ve debated whether we should favor affiliation by unions to the NDP. (The convention voted to favor affiliation when the Tendency 3 reporter on the national question incorporated the Tendency 4 amendments into the majority resolution.) Essentially what we were debating was whether it is progressive for unions to strengthen their ties with the NDP. That is the meaning of the CLC campaign: it is the concrete form today of the unions’ efforts to increase labor’s weight in the labor party. To the degree that the ranks become involved, this will increase the weight of workers in the party against the petty-bourgeois elements that predominate in the party’s leadership.

It is unclear at this point what the electoral impact of the CLC campaign will be, whether it will result in a qualitative increase in the NDP’s popular vote. But what is clear already is that it will have an impact on the unions going far beyond May 22, election day. It will shake up the whole CLC—not only in the narrow sense that the McDermott leadership has staked its reputation on the success of this maneuver, but more significantly in its implications for the unions and the union ranks. It puts the question of labor political action on a new footing. The NDP becomes more of a factor in labor’s struggles. Linked with the perspective of electing the NDP, labor’s struggles take on a greater political dimension.

This increased identification between the unions and the NDP will tend to raise the question of affiliation to the NDP in a number of local unions. We have already encountered that in CUPE’s Ontario Division.

Above all, it tends to raise political questions in the unions that we are in—unions that are central to the class struggle in this country. We have to be part of that process.

It is in the CLC campaign that we see motion in the working class in this election. Workers are mobilizing around this campaign in much greater numbers in this election that they are on the Quebec national question—important as the latter is in our program. The CLC-NDP campaign is the concrete form today of labor’s struggle for governmental power.

2. Quebec and the struggle for the labor party

In Quebec, we are fighting for a labor party that can lead the struggle for independence and socialism, the fight for a workers government. We advocate that the unions present workers candidates in elections—that they take the initiative in establishing a mass workers party.

In this framework, it was correct to support the initiative by the Rassemblement des Militants Syndicaux (RMS) and the GSTQ for 75 workers candidates” in the federal election. But our support should have been critical support—which it wasn’t. There were major errors in the RMS campaign.

  1. It was presented solely in a national framework. The workers’ candidates were to fight for Quebec’s national rights, and virtually nothing else. The campaign failed to address the question of government.
  2. It was sectarian with respect to the NDP in English Canada. The RMS petition denounced the NDP’s position on Quebec while failing to give the party critical support against the capitalist parties. In fact, it failed to make any distinction between the NDP and the capitalist parties. Moreover, while advocating a full slate of “workers’ candidates” in Quebec, the RMS failed to speak to the logic of this position—the need for a labor party in Quebec.
  3. The most important error, however, was that supporters of the RMS campaign did not take it into the unions as such. The entire axis of the campaign was to get individual signatures on a petition, instead of trying to get local unions to take the initiative in nominating candidates, and talking up the need for the unions to run candidates with the union membership, on the job. For the GSTQ and the RMS, the goal of the campaign was simply to mount pressure on the union bureaucracy, not to encourage action from below.

The draft election platform drawn up by the RWL majority leadership falls into the same trap, when it says that “the union federations rejected an appeal... for labor candidates.” The task was not to pressure the federations to field candidates, but to take the proposal for workers candidates to the ranks. For example, the Montreal transit workers union, with a relatively strong base of GSTQ and RMS supporters, might have been won to running a candidate.

The RMS campaign won significant support; the petition was signed by about 2,500 union members, including some secondary leadership elements. That is a significant demonstration of support for moves toward independent labor political action. Nevertheless, the campaign was, as Lutte Ouvriêre now says in its current issue, “a failure.” No workers candidates resulted from the campaign.

So what is the situation today in the Quebec labor movement, with respect to the federal election? In no other part of the country is the union bureaucracy so completely immersed in overt class-collaborationist politics. The leadership of the teachers union (CEQ) has issued a scarcely veiled call to vote for the Créditistes, an especially reactionary bourgeois party. In this it echoes the Parti Québécois leadership. The Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) leadership says defeat Trudeau at all costs, and condemns all the parties, including the NDP, equally. The leaders of the CLC’s Quebec affiliate, the Quebec Federation of Labor (FTQ), say defeat Trudeau ... by voting for NDP candidates.

As for the majority leadership of the RWL, it says (in this draft election platform) that “The FTQ support to the NDP is a bad joke.” (There is no criticism of the voting formulas of the other union federations.) The election platform counterposes the FTQ’s support of the NDP to the struggle for a labor party, just as Comrade Tyson did in his document on the NDP, when he said the FTQ stance was a “block” to the creation of a labor party (in Thesis 38). And Comrade Samuels echoes this position today in her report for the majority.

This approach is fundamentally wrong.

How is the FTQ’s endorsement of NDP candidates an obstacle to the fight for a labor party—the struggle for the unions to fight politically in opposition to the bourgeois parties? The FTQ at least draws a class line in the electoral arena. Are the CSN or CEQ positions any better? Aren’t they worse? The CSN and CEQ are on the wrong side of the class line. (And so are the FTQ leaders in cases where they support, covertly or overtly, candidates of the bourgeois parties.)

It is the labor bureaucracy’s support of bourgeois parties that constitutes the main obstacle to independent labor political action in Quebec, not the Quebec NDP.

True, the NDP in Quebec is not the form that an indigenous Quebec labor party will likely take. But it is a workers party. It is a current in the workers movement, as are the Maoists, the CP, the RWL, the GSTQ, etc. Unlike those other organizations, the Quebec NDP is linked to the mass party of the English-Canadian labor movement. And it has much greater electoral support than they do. Its vote has ranged in recent years between 5 and 10 percent of the total popular vote. That’s not much in comparison with what it gets in most areas west of Quebec. But it is more, by the way, than the NDP gets anywhere else east of the Ottawa River with the exception of parts of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. (In the New Brunswick provincial election last fall the NDP got 4 percent of the total vote; the Parti Acadien, with a nationalist program oriented to the one third of New Brunswick that is Acadien, got 2 percent. In Prince Edward Island the NDP was able to nominate only five candidates in the recent provincial election.)

If we had forces in the FTQ unions, which are among the major industrial unions in Quebec, how could we have responded to the Canadian Labor Congress campaign in support of the NDP? Instead of opposing it, we could have grasped it and sought to turn it into a weapon to advance the struggle for a Quebec labor party. We could have pointed to how the unions in English Canada were mobilizing behind the NDP, explained the need for a labor party in Quebec that could fight for power, and urged that the FTQ unions present their own candidates in the election on a program of class-struggle demands. They could invite non-FTQ, non-CLC unions to join with them in this effort, perhaps through holding an inter-union conference, just as the unions in the Montreal area did in 1970 in launching the Front d’Action Politique to contest the municipal elections.

We would call on the NDP and the CLC to support these workers candidates. The CLC should give them the same money and resources it would contribute to NDP candidates in English Canada. And we would encourage these union-nominated candidates to tour in English Canada, to argue the case for Quebec’s right to self-determination (and other class-struggle demands) to trade unionists and NDP supporters in the other nation.

Independent workers candidates nominated by the unions could fight for independence and socialism; and they could explain the need to fight for government in alliance with their class brothers and sisters in English Canada, around a perspective of a government of the Quebec labor movement and the NDP.

Comrade Samuels, in her report today, complained that the FTQ leaders used their support of the NDP to avoid taking a stand on the RMS campaign for workers candidates. But if the RMS had taken its campaign for workers candidates into the union ranks in the way I’ve outlined above, I think it is safe to say that the FTQ brass would have had much more difficulty in getting away with this excuse. It is true that the FTQ is not waging a campaign for the NDP of a scope comparable to the CLC unions’ campaign in English Canada. But it is equally true that they are under very little pressure to take any other course, such as sponsoring independent workers candidates and fighting for an autonomous Quebec labor party. And with the RWL’s current blind eye toward the reality of the FTQ’s support to the Quebec NDP, we contribute to that problem.

‘Spoil your ballot’—or vote NDP?

Whatever we might have done, whatever might have happened, the fact is that nominations are now closed. Who are the “workers candidates” in Quebec—the candidates we should urge workers to support? (Let’s not forget that most Quebec workers intend to vote in this election.) One of those candidates, obviously, is Michel Dugré, the RWL candidate in Hochelaga-Maisonneuve.

Another is René Denis, a GSTQ leader running in Montréal-Rosemont. It is not yet clear on what basis Denis is running; he says he hopes to become the candidate of those who signed the RMS petition. Samuels suggests we can support him because he is for Quebec’s independence. That is insufficient
programmatic grounds; would we support the Parti Québécois? I think we can support René Denis for one reason alone, which we should explain clearly in motivating our position: his campaign is independent of the capitalist parties and, as a member of the GSTQ, he is identified with the program of revolutionary Marxism.

The other candidates we should support in the remaining 73 Quebec ridings are the NDP candidates. The Quebec NDP has presented a full slate of candidates; 22 are members of FTQ unions; seven are members of the CEQ; five are members of the CSN; and one is a member of the union of small farmers, the Union des Producteurs Agricoles. (In fact, union members are probably a higher proportion of the NDP candidates in Quebec than they are in English Canada. Where the party’s electoral prospects are more favorable, it tends to run more lawyers, clergy, and professors—those the leadership sees as potential parliamentarians.) In a few cases, as we noted earlier, local unions have become involved in the NDP candidates’ campaigns.. The NDP candidates are the “workers’ candidates” in this election.

All the arguments that I have heard for withholding support to the NDP candidates in Quebec in this election come down to one programmatic criterion: the federal NDP’s opposition to Quebec’s national rights. That is not sufficient reason to reject a vote for the Quebec NDP candidates, as I have explained elsewhere (see “For a Government of the NDP and the Quebec Unions,” Preconvention Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 12, March 1979). Quebec is not on the verge of insurrection, and the NDP is not spearheading federalist opposition to Quebec’s rights.

Moreover, opposition to an NDP vote misses the potential to exploit contradictions in the NDP’s situation. Most NDP supporters in Quebec don’t agree with the federal party’s stand on Quebec. At its March convention, the Quebec NDP voted against Broadbent’s “national unity” line, and in support of Quebec’s right to self-determination. The convention also voted to withdraw from the federalist Pro-Canada committee and denounced Trudeau’s federal referendum bill, which has been supported by the Broadbent leadership.

Quebec is the only place in the Canadian state, to the best of my knowledge, where the trade union leaders who support the NDP—and the NDP candidates themselves—are openly critical of the NDP’s program on an important subject, in this case the Quebec national question. FTQ president Louis Laberge has sharply attacked the federal NDP’s position on Quebec, on several occasions.

In the May 4 issue of La Presse we read that the Quebec NDP leaders have attacked Laberge because he came out in support of Conservative Roch Lassalle and Créditiste Fabien Roy. Laberge says the NDP shouldn’t have run a full slate, and charges that not enough of its candidates are trade unionists; the NDP replies that it wants to offer an electoral alternative in all the ridings, and boasts of how many trade unionists it is running. The same issue of La Presse reports that the Quebec convention of CUPE debated whether to support the NDP candidates; one workshop called for supporting the NDP, while three others voted against, and one workshop said “no party seems to represent the interests of the Quebec workers.”

The point is that there is motion on this question. Class-conscious Quebec workers sense they are in a real dilemma. In the major political event now taking place, how are they to register an independent class position? Their leaders for the most part tell them to put their confidence in candidates of the bourgeois parties. Many workers are rightly skeptical of this line. They are debating and thinking about alternatives.

For the comrades of the RWL majority leadership, all of this seems to be a closed book. Comrade Bob Mills, in his report on the RWL convention in Socialist Voice, speaks of the “pure trade unionism” of Quebec unions. The English version of the majority’s election statement says that “In Quebec the labor leadership has been silent during the elections....” The draft election platform of the majority says “In Quebec the labor movement has been totally inactive in the campaign.” All these statements are false. The union leadership is not “silent”—most of them are calling for support of bourgeois candidates and parties. On the other hand, there is some motion in the direction of independent labor political action, even though feeble—and it’s expressed primarily around the NDP campaign, with at least the verbal support of the Quebec Federation of Labor.

And the RWL’s answer to this? “Spoil your ballot.” This slogan on the election poster in Quebec (“annulation”) does not appear in the collection of slogans on the English version of the poster. Were the comrades afraid to let English-Canadian workers know the poverty of their political intellects in Quebec?

How does this “spoil your ballot” position demark us from the rest of the confused “left” in Quebec? We’re the “sick joke,” not the FTQ leaders. We allow Laberge of the FTQ, with his “critical support of the NDP” line, to appear to have more of a class line than we do in these elections! It shows how completely out of touch we really are.

3. Critique of the RWL election program

I don’t have time to make a detailed criticism of the majority leadership’s election statement, published in two somewhat different versions in our English and French language press. A few comments are in order, however.

The worst feature is its abstract and sectarian character. It is completely removed from the real clash of class forces in the election—and from developments in the overall class struggle. An example is the treatment of the CLC’s pro-NDP campaign, which is the concrete form today in both nations of labor’s struggle for power. There is not a word on this campaign in the Lutte Ouvriêre version of the statement; in the Socialist Voice version, it receives only passing condemnation.

The supplementary “platform” the comrades have now drafted is no improvement. There are lots of “themes” ‘—sometimes good themes—but no attempt to link them to the real action of the class. None of this material has any educational value.

For example, on Quebec. What about the union resolutions on self-determination? What about the fight by militants in the NDP in support of Quebec’s rights? What about the evidence that the bourgeoisie’s “national unity” drive—its attempt to make the Québécois the scapegoats for the economic crisis, among other things—is failing among workers in English Canada? This is a fact of immense importance for us, which we have yet to discuss, let alone explain adequately. Trudeau’s Pepin-Robarts Task Force on National Unity noted this; it’s one of the main themes of the report. But in analyzing the report in Lutte Ouvrière, the comrades simply repeated the old clichés about the danger of the “sword” being used, ignoring the real class dynamics of the national question revealed by the Task Force.

On the shorter workweek. What about the CLC’s formal commitment to the 32-hour workweek, or the postal workers’ heroic strike for the 30-hour week? Don’t these deserve a mention?

On nationalization. Why not explain it by reference to the Inco strike; the workers of Steel Local 6500 have raised the demand for nationalization in the course of their struggle. Shouldn’t we pick up on that, and link it to the need for socialized planning under workers control?

On women’s rights. What about the struggles for abortion rights—a major issue across the country, and especially in Quebec? What about the strike struggles for equal pay, and the need for affirmative action programs and job quotas for women and oppressed minorities? The NDP program talks about those things. Why not the RWL’s?

On international questions. These were totally missing in the English version of the statement, and got only a short paragraph in the French version. A strange performance for internationalists! The platform at least talks of “solidarity” with international workers’ struggles. It even mentions Iran. Fine. Why not bring that up front a bit, and say something about the lessons of the tremendous upsurge in Iran? And why don’t we clarify our position on defense of the workers states in face of the imperialist war drive?

On unity of the working class. Why not explain how it takes shape concretely in defense of the demands and needs of all the exploited and oppressed, using some examples: the struggle against wage controls, the need to defend CUPW, women’s struggle against the federal abortion law—as well as defense of Quebec’s rights.

Why the high degree of abstraction in these leadership pronunciamentos? In large part, it reflects our isolation from the class struggle, particularly from the industrial unions that are now at the heart of labor’s response to the capitalist offensive. But that observation in turn begs an explanation. A major reason is suggested by the framework of the election statement, in which the entire social and political context of the election—and the class struggle—is presented as the national question. This method reaches the point of absurdity when the statement, in its French version, argues that all the ills of capitalism are the result of the “national unity” drive of the ruling class.

It’s a schema, based on the false concept that the Quebec national struggle is the key to unlocking all the contradictions of the class struggle in the Canadian state. The schema blinds us to a lot of other things that are happening—things that are often only distantly related to the national struggle, if they are related to it at all. And in Quebec it has led us into a blind alley of sectarianism with respect to the most important feature of this election campaign: the very limited but nevertheless real motion that is taking place around the NDP.

A small revolutionary propaganda group like the RWL can make mistakes—even grave mistakes—and survive. But the mistakes we are making today are unnecessary mistakes. We are miseducating our cadres. We are dropping class criteria in our approach to key political questions. The error on the Quebec NDP vote may not loom large in the overall picture of the class struggle in Canada. But it is symptomatic of an underlying problem in the RWL—the increasing divorce of a majority of our membership and a major part of our leadership from the workers movement. We have already paid a heavy price for this course, in the loss of valuable cadres and disorientation of our program. We cannot afford to continue it any longer.

4. The R WL at this stage in the campaign

How can we use our participation in the election campaign to win support for our class-struggle program? It is not enough to present RWL candidates running on the full program of revolutionary Marxism. The five candidates we are running ensure that the RWL has a public presence in its own name. That is good. But the program they put forward, and that the whole organization defends in these elections must be related to the real struggles of the masses of working people.

We must take our program and our campaign into the unions above all, and use this election to help turn the RWL outward into active involvement in the class struggle.

The key here is to get into the CLC campaign. Branch executives—not just NDP or trade union fractions—must take responsibility for directing our participation in this campaign We should mobilize the branch memberships behind it. In Winnipeg, for example, I understand that the comrades have decided to make the unions’ campaign in Bird’s Hill their primary emphasis; only a few comrades are assigned to Larry Johnston’s campaign as their main assignment. We will try to take the Johnston campaign into the unions, especially to those union members involved in the Bird’s Hill CLC-NDP campaign. It is in the framework of overall support for the unions’ fight to elect the NDP that we will gain the widest hearing for our programmatic proposals and our criticism of the union-NDP program, as indicated by Comrade Flexer’s experience cited earlier.

Above all, we should put the CLC campaign at the center of our campaign. We should talk it up everywhere, identify with it, and seek to build it in our union locals. We should use the opportunity provided by this election campaign to conduct a real probe of what is happening in the labor movement right across the country. That means our press should carry lots of information on what’s happening in the union campaign, and the NDP campaign as a whole. Press sales should center on unions and plants where the campaign is getting particular attention. We should write educational polemics in our press on various aspects of the union-NDP program; an example is Comrade John Riddell’s critique of the NDP’s “industrial strategy” in the April 30 Socialist Voice, the first in a series he will write. The more we get into the unions and this kind of campaign, the more we will be confronted with the need to arm our comrades to answer the reformists’ program, not just denounce it. That means we must follow closely what the NDP and union leaders say in this campaign, and pay particular attention to the response the campaign gets among rank and file workers with whom we are in contact.

In short, we should consciously seek to use our participation in the CLC-NDP campaign to deepen our as-yet fragile roots in .the unions, as part of our central task of moving the RWL into the strategic centers of the proletariat in this country.

From the Summary

Comrade Foco spoke of the “indifference of workers in English Canada” to the national rights of Quebec. I don’t think that is quite accurate. Generally, workers in English Canada are not indifferent to the rights of the oppressed. If they are conscious of a real threat to those rights, they are prepared to mobilize in support of them. Recall the NDP’s opposition to Trudeau’s War Measures in October 1970. I think that position - a very unpopular one with the ruling class - reflected something more profound in the base of the NDP and the unions.

The real question is how to harness workers’ underlying sympathy for the Québécois and other oppressed. We have to be concrete. The CLC campaign behind the NDP is an important opening. We should take into it the resolutions a number of unions — inclu­ding for the most part CLC affiliates — have passed in sympathy with Quebec’s rights. That’s what Dennis Lomas did at the Ontario NDP convention. He took the adopted position of his union, CUPE, in defense of Quebec’s right to self-determination and challenged the CUPE secretary-treasurer Kealey Cummings to defend it before the NDP delegates. We could cite many other examples, of course.

There was an interesting discussion here about the relative importance of the national question in the election. The polls are unanimous in saying that for workers everywhere, including in Quebec, “national unity” ranks way down the list of their concerns behind such items as inflation and unemployment. Comrade Connolly pointed out that it was only in the wealthy Anglophone bastion of Westmount in Montreal that “national unity” ranked as the top concern. That doesn’t mean that the national question, or binational unity, are not key issues that we want to raise. But we should think about how to raise them.

I think many comrades have at best an abstract understanding of how the unity of the workers in both nations will be built. It will be built not just on explicit references to the national question and national demands, but around concrete struggles on issues of central concern to the workers in both nations. The struggle against wage controls, conducted jointly in both nations, did much more to cement binational unity of the working class against the federal state than all the trade union convention resolutions on Quebec self-determination. That’s a fact.

Our program for binational unity of the working class is our entire program of class-struggle demands, directed against the employers and their government and central state. You can’t reduce it to simply the defense of Quebec’s national rights, important as that is.

And it should be added that the defense of Quebec’s rights can’t be reduced to relatively abstract concepts like self-determination and independence. It involves defending the language rights of Québécois, fighting against wage discrimination, etc. Worker comrades in Quebec all say that it is the question of language discrimination that bears heaviest in workers’ minds when they think of the national question. That’s where it hits them in the guts.

Comrade Rivière told us the national question was the key issue in this election because it has to be resolved if workers’ struggles are to have an “outlet” (débouché) — that is, a perspective of victory. It’s true that without a real perspective of binational unity the struggle for governmental power cannot succeed — in either nation, in my opinion. But Rivière’s formulation suggests that united binational struggles of the workers are virtually ruled out unless and until workers in English Canada have been won to explicit support of Quebec’s right of self-determination. Here again, this stands the dialectic of binational workers’ unity on its head. The workers of English Canada will come to an understanding of the importance of Quebec’s rights in the course of common struggles with their Québécois comrades — that understanding cannot be a prior condition of those struggles.

On the Quebec side of the equation, I think we have to be much more conscious of how nationalist parochialism has poisoned the left and the labor movement. Rivière cited the new book by Roch Denis, a leader of the GSTQ: Luttes de classes et question nationale au Québec. There’s a very interesting section in that book in which Comrade Denis describes the split in the labor party forces in Quebec in the early 1960s. The “gauche nationale” (national left) that broke from the NDP to establish a party independent of both the NDP and (as it happened) the trade unions was largely motivated by nationalist as opposed to class considerations. Denis quotes extensively from the documents of this current, which argued explicitly against a party based “on the interests of the working class” in favor of a party based “on the interests of patriotism.” This current also argued that because of the unique national character of the Québécois, it was impossible to envisage a common binational struggle for governmental power.

Whatever the wisdom of the move at that time to establish a distinct Parti Socialiste du Québec independent of the NDP (and I think we were correct to participate in this movement) there can be no doubt that much of the argumentation behind it was false, as the material in Denis’ book indicates.

We should also be clear on why the union bureaucrats in, Quebec — including the FTQ bureaucrats — don’t really want to build support for the NDP. They say it’s because of the NDP’s position on the national question. But of course if they wanted they could change that position; all they have to do is mobilize a little union muscle within the NDP. No, they fear any mobilization behind the NDP for the same reason they fear any moves in the direction of a labor party, including the running of independent workers’ candidates. They are dead opposed to taking any serious steps toward a break with the bourgeois parties — in particular, with the Parti Québécois. If they mobilize the unions against the bourgeois parties on the federal level, the question will inevitably arise — why not on the Quebec level? Why not build a union-based alternative to the PQ? That’s just what they want to avoid.

Comrade Dubois asked if I was advocating that we join in the campaign for the NDP now, in Quebec. Sure, why not? Now that it’s clear that the NDP candidates are the only “workers candidates” in most of Quebec, we should get into that campaign with our own program, and see what’s happening. Efforts to elect NDP candidates in Quebec in this election can only help build support for the labor party; NDP supporters necessarily include union militants who are trying to grapple with the real problem posed by their lack of a viable working-class political alternative. We want to meet those militants, talk to them, struggle with them.

Yes, Comrade Klément, I propose that the axis of our election intervention in Quebec, as elsewhere, be the CLC’s campaign. In the conditions that exist today, it is a step forward to support NDP candidates in Quebec, and to the degree that it helps, even minimally, to pose the need for independent labor political action, it will assist the process of forging binational workers’ unity.

May 6, 1979


[1] John’s title on both parts of his article misstates the fused organization’s name: Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue ouvrière révolutionnaire (RWL/LOR).

[2] See Statement of Principles of the Revolutionary Workers League.