Thursday, April 11, 2013

Federal NDP meets in Montréal – another missed opportunity?

The federal convention of the New Democratic Party, the Official Opposition in Canada’s parliament, opens on Friday, April 12, in Montréal.

Although a majority of the party’s MPs (now 57 out of a total of 101) represent Quebec constituencies, its leader Thomas Mulcair is from Quebec, and the convention is meeting in Quebec’s metropolis, the draft Agenda indicates that little time has been set aside for debating the party’s approach to Quebec. The 122-page book of resolutions proposed by constituency associations, affiliated trade unions and party leadership bodies contains very little addressed to the national question.

This is unfortunate, as there is much the party members need to discuss — ranging from a new look at its existing position on the Quebec national question (the “Sherbrooke Declaration”) to Mulcair’s stated support for building a Quebec “provincial” NDP that would compete electorally with the pro-independence Quebec solidaire.

The Sherbrooke Declaration is now published as an appendix to the NDP program.

The party’s small Socialist Caucus, which exists mainly in the Toronto region, has sponsored noon-hour public meetings at the convention on the Friday and Saturday. The first, on “Quebec and the NDP” and “Why Quebec Students are in the Streets Again,” features speakers André Frappier, a co-leader of Québec solidaire, and Adam Szymanski, a Quebec student active in the recent student strike. The second meeting, on Canada’s military intervention in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, features Raymond Legault, a leader of the antiwar coalition “Échec à la guerre,” and Caucus chairperson Barry Weisleder.

The Caucus has produced an issue of its occasional magazine Turn Left for distribution to the convention delegates. It is also available for download at http://www.ndpsocialists.ca/. The magazine includes two articles by yours truly, one in English, the other in French, which I wrote at the request of the Caucus. Both are addressed to the NDP’s position on the Quebec national question, and in particular the federal party’s recent bill to reform the controversial Clarity Act. I am not responsible for the content of other articles in Turn Left.

Only one draft resolution submitted to this convention addresses the NDP bill; Malpeque constituency (in Prince Edward Island) challenges the “50% plus 1” test for determining the validity and legitimacy of a Quebec referendum vote for sovereignty. Other resolutions urge greater party support for English-French bilingualism in federal institutions like the Supreme Court and the CRTC, the federal broadcast control agency, and some terminological changes to reflect binational differences, such as changing “national director” in the party statutes to “federal secretary.” One, submitted by “Young New Democrats of Quebec,” advocates replacing the party’s support for “multiculturalism” with “inter-culturalism,” but without explaining the differences between the two, which are correctly viewed as significant in Quebec.[1]

The original draft of my English article had to be shortened, with my agreement, for Turn Left, owing to space limitations. It is published in full below. The French article, also published below, is an adaptation for a Québécois audience of my blog piece “The NDP Revisits the Clarity Act,” and was translated by Pierre Beaudet.

As regular readers of this blog are aware, I am a harsh critic of the NDP’s record on Quebec, and of the Sherbrooke Declaration. The first article, below, sidesteps some of these aspects and attempts to emphasize for NDP members the overriding need for the party to hold a serious discussion at all levels, but particularly in English Canada, on how the Quebec question fits within the development of a strategy for progressive change in what is currently the Canadian state.

-- Richard Fidler

* * *

The ‘Quebec question’: Despite progress, the NDP still has far to go

The NDP’s bill C-470, which would replace the Clarity Act and acknowledge the democratic legitimacy of a simple majority vote for sovereignty in a Quebec referendum, aroused a storm of opposition. Not just from the other federalist parties (which was to be expected), but also from the major media in English Canada.

Typical was an editorial in the Toronto Star, the only daily newspaper that endorsed the NDP in the 2011 federal election, protesting that the NDP bill “lowers the bar to [Quebec] secession.” The Star editors doubted whether the NDP, as “a party that aspires to govern the federation is prepared to defend it.”

More ominous was a Harris-Decima-Canadian Press poll in early February that found majority support for the bill only in Quebec, while in English Canada close to three out of four respondents were opposed. And a CP poll of provincial NDP leaders found that only one, New Brunswick’s Dominic Cardy, was willing to express support for it. The others, including the premiers of Nova Scotia and Manitoba, refused to comment.

Yet Bill C-470 simply applies the reasoning in the NDP’s Sherbrooke Declaration, adopted overwhelmingly by the federal party in 2006 as its current position on the “Quebec question.” The Declaration recognizes “Quebec’s right to self-determination,” which, it says, “implies the right of the people of Quebec to decide freely its own political and constitutional future.” If Quebec were to hold a vote on sovereignty “the NDP would recognize a majority decision (50% + 1)….” The Declaration was widely credited as a factor in the “orange wave” that elected NDP candidates in 59 of Quebec’s 75 electoral districts in 2011, hoisting the party to Official Opposition status in the House of Commons.

What does the reaction to Bill C-470 tell us about the challenge facing the NDP and its attempts to reconcile Quebec’s desire for change in its status as a nation with the party’s longstanding support of Canada’s federal system?

A tortured history

The Sherbrooke Declaration’s principled recognition of Quebec’s right to national self-determination — notwithstanding some ambiguities and contradictions, discussed below — represented an important step forward for the NDP, which since its founding in 1961 has struggled to understand Québécois dissatisfaction with Canada’s federal regime. The party’s firm commitment to working within the existing constitutional framework of the Canadian state has often collided with the pro-sovereignty views held by the trade unions and most progressives in Quebec.

In the early 1960s, the majority of NDP supporters in Quebec split to form an independent party, the Parti socialiste du Québec (PSQ), which called for adoption of a sovereign Quebec constitution and the negotiation of a new “confederal” accord with English Canada. The PSQ was soon eclipsed, however, by the formation of the Parti québécois, which expressed a similar objective of sovereignty followed by some form of constitutional association with English Canada.

Caught short by the rise of the independence movement, the federal NDP tended to tail the approach to constitutional reform taken by Pierre Trudeau and the federal Liberals as well as the Conservatives. It was an active participant in the unilateral 1982 patriation of the Constitution, which now included a Charter of Rights that would be used by the Supreme Court of Canada to void major provisions of Quebec legislation protecting French-language rights. Successive Quebec governments — sovereigntist and federalist alike — have never accepted the legitimacy of that Constitution. The federal NDP campaigned for the No side in both of Quebec’s referendums on sovereignty, in 1980 and 1995. And in 2000 the party’s parliamentary caucus — defying opposition by the NDP Federal Council and the Canadian Labour Congress — voted for the governing Liberals’ Clarity Bill, which makes Quebec sovereignty following a successful “yes” vote contingent on acceptance by the federal Parliament of both the question asked and the response given by the voters.

These actions effectively foreclosed any possibility of building significant support for the party in Quebec. Unable to build an enduring base of support in the province, the NDP for decades lacked credibility in both Quebec and the Rest of Canada as a potential federal government.

By the turn of the century, it was evident that no one on the federalist side could credibly promise renewed federalism. However, a Social Democratic Forum on Canada’s Future, sponsored by the party in the late 1990s, came up with a host of proposals for a change in the relationship between English Canada and Quebec, many of them later incorporated in the Sherbrooke Declaration. The adoption of the Declaration signalled a new readiness to rethink the party’s relationship to Quebec. And in 2011, this openness was sufficient to convince many Quebec voters, now looking for potential allies in English Canada in resisting a Harper majority government, to turn to the NDP.

The Sherbrooke Declaration

Despite its new recognition of Quebec’s right to national self-determination, the Sherbrooke Declaration does not reject a federal role in determining the legitimacy of a Quebec vote for sovereignty, nor does Bill C-470. The bill simply attempts to structure that role, in effect fettering the power of the federal Parliament to reject the popular verdict. It would accept a narrow Yes victory — and suggests some acceptable wording of the question — while proposing a similar procedure for a possible Quebec referendum question on reforming the Constitution short of secession.

The virulent opposition to Bill C-470 by the Harper government and the Liberals, however, demonstrates the complete unwillingness of Canada’s traditional governing parties and their corporate backers to contemplate any fundamental change in Quebec’s constitutional status. Typical was the reaction of Liberal leadership aspirant Justin Trudeau. “To bring forward that motion is the height of both hypocrisy and political gamesmanship of the worst kind. If I needed another reason to cross out the idea of co-operation with the NDP, that’s an obvious one.”

Both Tories and Liberals had hoped that the amending formula in Trudeau Senior’s 1982 Constitution — which makes any major constitutional change contingent on adoption by Parliament and seven of the ten provinces with at least 50% of Canada’s population — would rule out any possibility for Quebec’s legal secession from the federation. They are outraged that the NDP, with its modest proposal to accept a democratic majority vote, has now challenged this federalist consensus. We can be sure that they will hound the party on this issue in the months and years to come.

The Sherbrooke Declaration indirectly acknowledges the impossibility of constitutional reform to accommodate Quebec concerns. Instead, it recommends a limited practice of “asymmetrical federalism” that would “consolidate [conjuguer] the Canadian federal state with the reality of Quebec’s national character” by allowing Quebec to opt out with compensation from federal programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. And its over-arching concept of “cooperative federalism,” an old NDP standby, involves not a reallocation of powers but a never-ending process of policy and program negotiation between Quebec and Ottawa and (in most cases) the other provinces and territories, negotiations in which Quebec may and often does find itself alone arrayed against the other ten or more governments. It is cast as a strategy for winning Quebec acceptance of a federal union even before any constitutional guarantees of its national character have been achieved. Fundamentally, this comes down to little more than the status quo.

Clearly, the ball is in the court of the Québécois to initiate and lead the movement for change in Quebec’s constitutional status, whether in or out of the federation. But is the NDP prepared not only to listen to this national movement and learn from it, but to work to create understanding and solidarity with the national struggle of the Québécois among its members and supporters in English Canada? Such solidarity is an essential ingredient in building a pan-Canadian movement that can not only defeat the Harper government but reverse the neoliberal offensive. This requires a much greater effort by the party in English Canada to address Québécois concerns — a major challenge, as English Canadian hostility to even the modest democratic content of the NDP’s Bill C-470 illustrates.

The Sherbrooke Declaration was adopted at a time when the pro-sovereignty movement was at an ebb, largely as a result of popular frustration in Quebec at the lack of success in previous attempts at constitutional reform as well as disillusionment with the neoliberal “zero deficit” record of Parti québécois governments. This may have given some credibility to the Declaration’s argument that Quebec’s aspirations could be satisfied without a change in its constitutional status. However, popular disaffection with the Harper government in Quebec offers the prospect of renewed support for sovereignty. On September 4, 2012, Quebec voters elected a PQ government, 40% of them casting their ballots for the PQ and other pro-sovereignty parties.

Impact of the ‘Maple Spring’

The defeat of Québec’s Liberal government was in part the result of the “Printemps érable,” the Maple Spring of 2012, which began with a massive strike by college and university students that eventually drew tens of thousands of other citizens into the streets in solidarity with the students and opposition to government repression. The students’ call for fundamentally rethinking the role of education in Quebec society and questioning the whole logic of neoliberal commodification of social services won the sympathy of many Québécois. The scope of this mass democratic struggle, and the profound social issues it has raised, have inspired many to think about how “another Quebec,” a society of social justice and equality, can be built as an alternative to the neoliberal regression of today. Their debates can inspire equivalent thinking and responses among other victims of the capitalist offensive across Canada.

Quebec sovereigntists are now attempting to refound the movement for independence in a series of meetings throughout the province under the aegis of the Estates General, a broad coalition of parties and other organizations. A pamphlet to introduce the debates, entitled (in English translation) “What Future: A Province, or a Country?,” lists no fewer than 92 “obstacles” to Quebec’s development under the federal regime, as perceived by its authors. Many point to what are undeniably fundamental problems with the Canadian federation.

The Sherbrooke Declaration noted that Québécois efforts to “build a social and political project based on solidarity” have been increasingly “centered around the Quebec state.” The Estates General pamphlet explains why. Not only has Canada’s constitution never recognized Quebec’s national character, it was historically founded on denial of that nationality in the wake of the British Conquest, the suppression of the 1837 Patriotes’ revolt, and the later denial of French-language rights in the other provinces. Most recently, constitutional changes and court judgments have imposed further obstacles to achieving national recognition under Canada’s federal regime. However, there is new hope for change in Quebec. As the Estates General document puts it:

“Today, in all parts of Quebec a movement is rising that resists cynicism and disenchantment, rejects the dictates of neoliberalism in the name of democracy, and seeks to reappropriate citizens’ action and implement collective solutions. In this forward march toward the common good, these forces are rediscovering the importance of the state in realizing this objective. However, the state to which the hopes and aspirations of a large majority of Québécois turn, the State of Quebec, is a truncated, padlocked and cordoned off state because it is confined to mere “regional” and “provincial” actions within the Canadian regime….

“Close to half of our budget is outside our control, and the Canadian government habitually invests it in areas that differ in priority from ours, contrary to our needs and our values. At a time when the future of the planet increasingly hangs in the balance internationally, we cannot collectively have a say, as our national state is constitutionally subordinate to the Canadian straitjacket.”

Québec solidaire: A new, progressive vision for Quebec

An important progressive component of this Quebec national movement is Québec solidaire, a left-wing party founded in 2006 following a decade-long process of coalescing left-wing organizations, including the remnants of the old Quebec NDP, with activists from Quebec’s social movements, including the women’s movement and many trade unions. Québec solidaire presents its program for fundamental social change in the conceptual framework of an independent Quebec that would act in solidarity with progressive movements in Canada and around the world. QS has about 14,000 members, slightly more than the federal NDP’s membership in Quebec.

NDP members and supporters outside Quebec can sympathize with the democratic and progressive thrust of this movement, even if many find it difficult to accept its sovereigntist conclusions. They have every reason to see themselves as partners in this process, and not its opponents. In fact, a powerful movement for social and political change in Quebec can only bolster all progressive forces in Canada.

But it will be a struggle. Many anti-Quebec misconceptions and prejudices have to be confronted and overcome. The NDP will face unrelenting opposition in its efforts by a hostile media, especially in English Canada.

However, there really is no alternative if the party is to build on its May 2011 breakthrough. And there is ample evidence that the needed reorientation of NDP thinking on Quebec, initiated by the Sherbrooke Declaration, can in coming years help to cement strong ties of solidarity between progressives in both nations — a precondition to turning politics in Canada toward the left.

Richard Fidler

* * *

Le dilemme du NPD

En 2006, le NPD avait surpris l’opinion en adoptant la « déclaration de Sherbrooke ». Cette déclaration, bien qu’elle dépasse le discours habituel du NPD, contient d’importantes ambiguïtés et contradictions qui en fin de compte nient l’engagement formel du parti à défendre le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple québécois.

Pas de réforme constitutionnelle

À un premier niveau, la déclaration n’aborde pas la question du statut constitutionnel, ni du point de vue d’une réforme, ni du point de vue de l’indépendance. Cette question pourtant centrale est évitée par le NPD qui préfère une approche bureaucratique et administrative. Le fédéralisme préconisé par le NPD n’implique aucune redistribution des pouvoirs et débouche sur un processus sans fin de négociation entre le Québec et Ottawa, et même avec les autres provinces et territoires. On demande au Québec d’accepter le cadre fédéral, avant même des négociations constitutionnelles qui pourraient éventuellement redéfinir la confédération et offrir au Québec des garanties sur son statut de nation. Cette approche, c’est ce que le NPD qualifie de fédéralisme « coopératif ».

La loi de la « clarté »

Il est encore plus remarquable que la Déclaration de Sherbrooke ne mentionne pas la loi dite de la « clarté », votée au Parlement en 2000 à l’initiative du gouvernement Chrétien. Il faut se souvenir que les députés du NPD (il y avait deux exceptions) ont voté en faveur de cette loi qui brime le droit du Québec à l’autodétermination. La direction parlementaire du NPD est allée dans ce sens en dépit de l’opposition au projet de loi exprimée par le Conseil fédéral du NPD ainsi que le Congrès du travail du Canada et plusieurs militants ordinaires du parti. En vertu de cette loi, un vote pour un « oui » serait soumis au bon vouloir du parlement fédéral et des autres provinces.

En janvier dernier néanmoins le NPD a proposé une nouvelle loi (C-470), qui obligerait le gouvernement fédéral à négocier avec le Québec dans l’éventualité où la majorité des Québécoises et Québécois votait pour la souveraineté dans le cadre d’un référendum. En faisant cela, le NPD a voulu évité d’être coincé par un projet de loi du Bloc Québécois (C-457), qui voulait tout simplement demander l’abolition de la Loi sur la « clarté ». Le projet de loi C-470 représente un certain progrès pour le NPD puisqu’il prend, au moins partiellement, ses distances par rapport à la Loi sur la « clarté ». Ceci dit, le projet de loi C-470 ne déborde pas le cadre conceptuel de cette loi.

Les « conditions » du NPD

Pour justifier son projet de loi, le NPD s’identifie aux principes énoncés par la Cour Suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec. Selon le NPD, la loi sur la « clarté » ne respecte pas ces principes de ce jugement selon lequel, dans l’éventualité d’un vote majoritaire pour la souveraineté, « toutes les parties » seraient dans l’obligation de « venir à la table des négociations ». Cette négociation, toujours selon le NPD), serait soumise au respect de certaines conditions :

  • Le gouvernement fédéral doit déterminer si, à son avis, la question référendaire « énonce clairement la modification constitutionnelle envisagée ». Le libellé de cette question pourrait être par exemple : « Le Québec devrait-il devenir un pays souverain ? ». Ou encore : « Le Québec devrait-il se séparer du Canada et devenir un pays souverain » ? Si le gouvernement fédéral juge que la question n’est pas claire, il en saisit la Cour d’appel du Québec qui doit alors se prononcer sur la clarté de la question dans un délai de 60 jours. Si cette Cour déclare la question inadéquate, le référendum québécois serait illégitime. En d’autres mots, le NPD propose que le gouvernement fédéral (ou la Cour d’appel du Québec dont les juges sont nommés par Ottawa) ait le pouvoir de décider si l’éventuel référendum sur le statut constitutionnel du Québec sera légitime ou non.
  • Dans la même optique, Ottawa aurait le droit de déterminer cette légitimité, non seulement en fonction d’une question qu’il jugerait « claire », mais aussi en évaluant l’ensemble du processus et de la procédure du référendum (l’exercice du vote, le dépouillement du scrutin, la transmission des résultats et les limites des dépenses, etc.)
  • Une fois que ces conditions seraient respectées et qu’une « majorité des votes validement exprimées est en faveur de la modification proposée », le NPD voudrait que « toutes les parties formant la Confédération » (c’est-à-dire non seulement le gouvernement fédéral et le gouvernement québécois mais aussi les gouvernements de toutes les provinces et territoires) s’assoient et négocient la sécession ou le changement constitutionnel demandé par le Québec.

Où est le droit à l’autodétermination ?

Comme on le sait, la loi sur la « clarté » ne spécifie pas le pourcentage du vote qui constituerait une « majorité claire ». En réalité, les partis fédéralistes comme le PLC et le PC ont déjà dit qu’il faudrait plus de 50 % des voix pour que la sécession soit légitime. Pour le NPD, la position est plus nuancée. Dans la déclaration de Sherbrooke, le NPD affirme qu’il « reconnaîtrait une décision majoritaire (50% + 1) des Québécoises et Québécois » tout en ajoutant qu’« il appartiendrait au gouvernement fédéral de déterminer son propre processus ». L’objectif du projet de loi C-470 est de forcer le gouvernement fédéral à engager des négociations impliquant « toutes les parties formant la Confédération ». On évite ainsi la discussion sur le partage des pouvoirs et sur le fait que dans la constitution actuelle, c’est Ottawa qui dispose des pouvoirs réellement importants, tels le système financier et bancaire, le commerce, les affaires extérieures, les tribunaux et instances judiciaires supérieures, les forces armées et la police fédérale.

Une certaine ouverture

On doit cependant admettre que le projet de loi du NDP manifeste une certaine ouverture. Dans la clause 9 de C-470 par exemple, Ottawa et les provinces seraient obligées de négocier toute proposition constitutionnelle ratifiée par les électeurs québécois concernant l’intégration du Québec dans l’ordre constitutionnel canadien (soit la constitution de 1982 (qui n’a jamais été endossé par les gouvernements québécois), la délimitation du pouvoir fédéral de dépenser au Québec, les transferts fiscaux permanent et les normes y afférents, ainsi que le retrait du gouvernement du Québec, avec pleine compensation, de tout programme en cas d’intervention du gouvernement fédéral dans un domaine de compétence législative provinciale exclusive. Ces clauses pourraient renforcer la position du Québec face aux gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux. En substance, cette approche pourrait rejoindre la « gouvernance souverainiste » préconisée par le leadership du PQ en substitution au projet original.[2] Par rapport à un éventuel référendum, le NPD suggère qu’Ottawa et Québec négocient préalablement la question, un peu comme l’ont fait récemment les gouvernements anglais et écossais.

Entre l’arbre et l’écorce

Entre les lignes, il appert que le NPD cherche à dialoguer avec les éléments plus conservateurs du PQ et de la mouvance nationaliste québécoise. Il voudrait également se mettre de l’avant comme force politique capable de réconcilier le Canada et le Québec. Ce faisant, le NPD pourrait également apaiser les tensions qui subsistent au sein de sa députation québécoise (58 députés du NPD), qui semble-t-il ne partagent pas la même idée sur la question nationale québécoise.

Cependant, l’approche du NPD a été la cible d’une montagne de critiques au Canada anglais. Non seulement de la part des autres partis fédéralistes (ce qui était prévisible), mais également de la part des médias qui en général ont été très violents dans leur dénonciation de C-470. Le Globe & Mail, le Ottawa Citizen, et même le Toronto Star (le seul quotidien qui avait appuyé le NPD lors de l’élection de 2011) ont tous dénoncé un projet qui pourrait « faciliter la sécession du Québec ». Un parti qui aspire à gouverner la fédération, ont-ils dit, doit être prêt à « défendre le Canada ». Ces réactions n’augurent rien de bon pour Thomas Mulcair qui espérait attirer les appuis tant des nationalistes québécois que des anglophones fédéralistes modérés.

Au Québec, la réaction à C-470 a été plutôt tranquille. Les médias québécois ont surtout mentionné le fait qu’au Canada, il semble avoir un refus unanime des aspirations québécoises dans leur ensemble. Une exception cependant a été l’analyse de la correspondante du Devoir à Ottawa, Manon Cornellier. Selon Mme Cornellier, le projet du NPD pourrait réconcilier le caucus québécois avec le reste du pays où une majorité substantielle d’électeurs continue d’appuyer l’idée d’une loi qui pourrait contrôler une tentative de sécession. En substance selon elle, C-470 limite la marge de manœuvre et l’arbitraire d’Ottawa. Indirectement, il confirme l’appui du NDD au droit à l’autodétermination, à la reconnaissance d’une victoire possible du oui au référendum et au fédéralisme asymétrique.

Avenir incertain

Avec une telle manœuvre, le NPD espère satisfaire ses électeurs québécois. Le Bloc Québécois serait ainsi privé de plusieurs de ses appuis (les « nationalistes mous ») et ainsi, le NPD pourrait protéger ses 58 sièges. En tout cas cela reste à voir.

Car en réalité, aucun des deux projets, tant celui du NPD que celui du Bloc, ne seront adoptés ni même présentés au vote de la Chambre. De manière plus importante, le débat autour de C-470 a démontré l’ampleur du « non-débat » sur cette question au Canada anglais. Un jour ou l’autre, le NPD sera confronté à ce dilemme. Ou bien il est apte à proposer une nouvelle vision du Canada qui impliquerait sans ambages ni ambiguïté le respect des droits du peuple québécois à l’autodétermination. Ou bien il s’engage à défendre le statu quo quoi qu’il advienne. Seuls de grands bouleversements politiques et sociaux pourraient modifier la donne.[3]

Or justement, le mouvement Idle No More représente potentiellement une ouverture. Ce mouvement militant reflète l’opinion d’une partie croissante des Premières Nations qui estiment que l’architecture légale et constitutionnelle que lui a imposée l’État colonial canadien n’est plus tolérable. Il reste à voir si cette évolution pourrait forcer un réel débat au sein de la gauche au Canada anglais, qui était et reste ambiguë par rapport aux enjeux fondamentaux soulevés par les peuples qui réclament leurs droits.

-- Richard Fidler


[1] “Multiculturalism,” in federal legislation and the Constitution, places all ethnic cultures in Canada’s population, including French and English as well as those of other immigrant and settler populations, on an equal footing, ignoring the distinct national cultures of the First Nations, the Québécois and the Acadians. “Inter-culturalism,” a Quebec concept, emphasizes integration, not separation. It was defined by the Bouchard-Taylor commission on reasonable accommodation as “a policy or model that advocates harmonious relations between cultures based on intensive exchanges centred on an integration process that does not seek to eliminate differences.”

[2] Le nouveau ministre des relations internationales du Québec, Jean-François Lisée, a déjà proposé un « plan B » étapiste dans son livre Sortie de Secours: Comment échapper au déclin du Québec (Boréal, 2000). L’idée est d’organiser plusieurs référendums sur des besoins essentiels qui, s’ils étaient acceptés, imposerait un renouvellement du fédéralisme.

[3] Le NPD peut-il se rapprocher de l’aile progressiste du mouvement souverainiste, notamment de Québec Solidaire ? Pour cela, il faudrait rejeter la proposition de Mulcair de bâtir une aile provinciale du NPD au Québec (remise à plus tard lors du dernier congrès du NPD pour des raisons principalement pragmatiques). Le membership officiellement réclamé du NPD au Québec est de 13 000 membres, un peu moins que le membership de QS et de loin inférieur à l’objectif recherché par M. Mulcair (20 000) lors de sa campagne pour le leadership du NPD.

Sunday, March 24, 2013

Solidarity, Quebec politics and Québec solidaire – a presentation by Amir Khadir

Amir Khadir, one of Québec solidaire’s two deputies in Quebec’s National Assembly, was guest speaker at this year’s Phyllis Clarke Memorial Lecture in Toronto. It was a rare opportunity for an Anglophone audience to hear a presentation by a leader of Quebec’s pro-independence party of the left.

Amir’s lecture was addressed primarily to outlining QS’s approach to international solidarity in the face of neoliberalism and capitalist globalization. In the wide-ranging discussion period that followed, he spoke about the Quebec student movement, the relation between class and national questions, the aboriginal movement, the environment, how Québec solidaire sees the relation between electoral and mass action, and other topics, including some final remarks about Paul Rose’s contribution to building the left in Quebec.

Thanks to Pance Stojkovski and Left Streamed for this video presentation. Click on the link below.

http://www.socialistproject.ca/leftstreamed/ls168.php

Friday, March 22, 2013

Paul Rose and the formation of Québec solidaire

In my recent post “Paul Rose’s tortuous path in search of Quebec liberation,” I passed rather lightly over an important period in Rose’s life, when he played a leading role in the process of left regroupment that led most recently to the formation of Québec solidaire. That process, and Paul Rose’s key role in it, is recounted at length in a March 21 email article by Marc Bonhomme, then an activist in Hull, in the Outaouais region, who worked closely with him during that period.

Marc’s account adds some important details to the story, and Paul Rose’s contribution, that have not been related elsewhere. I take the liberty here of translating extensive excerpts from it, as well as summarizing some parts in my own words, as they help shed light on the recent history of the Quebec left. Marc’s original text will soon be posted on his web site. My own account of the formation of Québec solidaire is here.

Richard Fidler

* * *

Marc Bonhomme begins:

“As one who worked with Paul in the days of the Parti de la démocratie socialiste (PDS), from 1994-95 to 2002-03, I wanted to pay tribute to him and also to emphasize his contribution to the building of the Quebec political left. We should not overlook that moment in the career of this historic figure who was — as much before as after the 1970 October crisis — a man of the people, for all seasons. As the editor of L’Aut’journal notes:

“‘Paul Rose, an outstanding figure in the history of contemporary Quebec… was involved in all the important struggles in Quebec. During the 1960s, he was one of the originators of the Maison du pêcheur in Percé, the ancestor of Quebec’s youth hostels…. In 1968 he was one of the organizers of the McGill Français demonstration and participated in the notorious St-Jean-Baptiste demonstration…. During his thirteen years of imprisonment, Paul Rose fought for inmates’ rights and organized ‘labour strikes,’ a precedent in penitentiary history, demanding the right to education for the prisoners, from literacy classes to university…. After his release in 1982, Paul Rose continued his activism at L’Aut’journal, in the CSN as a union advisor and, in politics, in the Parti de la Démocratie socialiste, the Union des forces progressistes and Québec solidaire.’ (Pierre Dubuc, Paul Rose n’est plus, L’Aut-journal, 14 March 2013)”

[…]

When he emerged from prison, says Bonhomme,

“Paul returned to the political struggle with the same goal of liberation but correcting his methods, because in his view the times had changed. He eventually joined the NPD-Québec in 1992, a party that had been pro-independence since 1989 and thus repudiated by its federal big brother. Why the NPD-Québec? Because it was at the time the only credible party with a social agenda that was both independentist and left-wing. In doing so, he affirmed his clear rejection of the ‘stageist’ strategy of the multi-class Parti québécois, ‘sovereignty first and God knows what later.’…”

In a July 2001 article in L’Aut’journal, Paul Rose explained:

“As to my position on the national question when I joined the NPD-Québec (now the Parti de la démocratie socialiste), it is still the same: there can be no true independence of Quebec without a liberatory social agenda, just as, conversely, there can be no real attempts at social emancipation and struggles against poverty that totally ignore the fight against national oppression. These aspects, social and national, of the Quebec reality are, from our standpoint, intimately linked and the exact opposite of the narrowly nationalist positions of the neoliberal parties [Bloc québécois and PQ], whether in Ottawa or Québec. A reality that is just as valid in Palestine as in Northern Ireland, and for our sisters in the first nations of America.”

Bonhomme continues:

“Realizing that the party’s program was too moderate and its practice too electoralist to claim to be working for the national and social liberation of Quebec, Paul invited the anticapitalist and independentist groups and individuals, including Gauche socialiste, the Fourth International section, to join the NPD-Québec. The result was a de facto strategic alliance between the left nationalists, led by him, and the pro-independence anticapitalists.

“The first test of this alliance was the 1995 referendum, when the renovated party put into practice the principle of the united front, […] campaigning separately for the Yes with few resources, since the PQ had refused it the funding that the umbrella coalition for the Yes should have granted. The financial deprivation of this party of a few hundred members did not prevent Paul and [his brother] Jacques from setting up a makeshift caravan for the Yes that toured Quebec.

“In the Outaouais region, for example, Paul spoke to a full hall on both campuses of the Cégep de l’Outaouais, as well as making the front page of the newspaper Le Droit….”

Marc Bonhomme is critical of what he calls the tactical error of campaigning as the “Réseau populaire pour le oui, the people’s network for the yes,” instead of under the name of the PDS, which would have clarified its break from the federal NDP and reflected the new radicalism of the party. Paul Rose, he says, “was reticent about this name PDS, which ignored the pro-independence dimension; however, it had been favoured by the anticapitalists, overly concerned with demarking themselves from the ‘actually existing socialism’ of the 20th century.”

The new PDS adopted a program to replace the previous one, deemed too social-democratic although it was not social-liberal; for example, it rejected the NAFTA.

“It will be recalled,” says Bonhomme,

“that in the late 1990s Canada and Quebec were going through a big debate over the public debt, a forerunner of the current debate in the European Union, with both the federal Liberal government and the provincial PQ government cutting deeply into social spending. Paul was determined to include in the program the demand for a freeze on the payment of the public debt, as suggested by the anticapitalists….”

Bonhomme cites the program of the PDS, with its call for “a freeze on repayment of the public debt except that portion held by small savers, at least until the achievement of full employment.” See the full program of PDS, 1997.

“If one takes the trouble to glance through this program, it will be found that this freeze is far from being the only antiliberal or even anticapitalist element. So it was with this program that the PDS confronted the 1998 [general] election. Thanks to the marvels of the first-past-the-post electoral system, the PQ was re-elected as a majority government although it won fewer votes than the opposition Liberals. The PDS fielded candidates in 97 of the 125 ridings; their average age was less than 30. It was an impressive effort, due in large part to the work Paul did, especially outside the metropolitan regions, but the party’s vote, less than 1% of the total, was disappointing. …”

Meanwhile, a new formation, the Rassemblement pour une alternative politique (RAP), initiated by L’Aut’journal, with which Paul was still closely associated, sought to bring together nationalists disappointed with the rightward direction of the PQ. It ran a few candidates in the 1998 election, including Michel Chartrand (who got close to 20% of the vote running against the PQ premier Lucien Bouchard). The campaigns of the RAP and the PDS were not well coordinated, but the RAP was not seen so much as a rival of the PDS as an intermediary site for clarifying political positions between those who sought only a vehicle to pressure the PQ and those who wanted a new party, possibly one less radical than the PDS.

Other clarifying experiences were the feminist mobilizations like the World March of Women, the demonstration against the FTAA in Québec in 2000, the antiwar mobilizations in 2003, and the Mercier by-election in 2000. In the latter, the PDS strongly supported the candidate of the independent left, Paul Cliche, who ran on a platform of support for independence and rejection of NAFTA and the FTAA — and “Paul Rose was possibly the most enthusiastic, for he was aware of the need for a qualitative leap.” Many PDS members participated in the campaign, as did the RAP, the Communist party (PCQ) and many who were not in any party. When Cliche got 24% of the popular vote, the left went wild. This “spirit of Mercier” was so infectious that for a brief time even the Greens and the remaining “Marxist-Leninists” of the CPC(M-L) participated in the moves to begin building a united part of the left.

The UFP was founded in June 2002. But not before its founding was almost aborted because of differences over the proposed structure and orientation of the new party, says Bonhomme. The RAP leadership, together with the PCQ and the support of representatives of the Montreal Central Council of the CSN, wanted a coordinating superstructure that would have given them control of the party, which they proposed be a coalition of the PDS, RAP and PCQ as well as a “fourth party” of the unorganized left. This coordinating body, a sort of general staff, would then present the membership with a pre-determined program and statutes.

It was largely thanks to resistance from the PDS, under Paul Rose’s leadership, that a bottom-up process was instead adopted involving the five or six local and regional associations of rank-and-file non-party members as well as the leaderships of the PDS, RAP and PCQ. On this basis, everyone was able to participate in the development of the program (and, to a lesser degree, the statutes) of the new party, membership being open to all who signed a statement declaring that “I do not support the neoliberal parties (ADQ, PLQ, PQ)….”

According to Bonhomme, Rose’s PDS was instrumental in forestalling certain positions favoured by the leaders of the RAP and the PCQ, such as their conditional acceptance of the NAFTA (copied from the union centrals).

Paul Rose chose not to become an active member of Québec solidaire, Bonhomme says, as he did not support the procedure adopted in negotiating the fusion of the UFP and Option citoyenne in 2006. In this latter case, the UFP and OC leaderships negotiated an agreement at the top on statutes and a vague declaration of principles which were then ratified as a bloc at the party’s founding convention, without debate or amendment by the membership. Rose felt the QS leaders were insufficiently committed to Quebec independence. And he deplored their expressed disagreement with the demand for a reinvestment of $10 billion in public services and social programs. However, he did support the formation of QS, as he made clear in a big public meeting in Hull where he spoke two months before the party was founded, at the invitation of the UFP-Outaouais and a student association.

Bonhomme also attributes Rose’s gradual withdrawal from active involvement in the left regroupment process to his personal isolation — first, from his nationalist allies, when the editors of L’Aut’journal, fearful of losing the financial support of their funding sources in the union bureaucracies, abandoned the process over their opposition to a clear break from the PQ (they went on to found SPQ Libre as the PQ’s left conscience); and second, by the reluctance of his anticapitalist allies, such as Gauche socialiste, to press for programmatic clarity in the UFP, and later QS, where they were content to participate in the party leadership bodies and avoid confrontation with its ambiguities.

Says Bonhomme:

“Paul’s great merit, and I am referring here to the building of the political left, was to be the linchpin of the first clarifying process that initiated an end to the scattering and marginalization of the Quebec left. The strategic orientation uniting national liberation with social emancipation — no doubt we should now speak of ecosocial emancipation — that Paul advanced was the right one, and he was the keystone in the alliance between the left nationalists and the pro-independence anticapitalists….”